From Self-Preservation to Cosmopolitan Friendship: Kant and the Ascent of Love

“Kant-Lectures” of the Academia Kantiana Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University

20 February 2018

Pärttyli Rinne

I. Introduction

I am very grateful to the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, to Akademia Kantiana, and in particular to Professor Nina Dmitrieva for the opportunity to present this lecture today. I would also like to thank Dr. Valentin Balanovskiy and Dr. Leonid Kornilaev for their hospitality. Given that I have devoted a significant part of my life to the systematic study of the philosophy of Kant, I feel especially privileged to be giving this lecture here in Kant’s old home town. The location adds to my excitement.

My presentation today will concern the concept of love in Kant’s philosophy. The lecture is based on my book Kant on Love, which has just been published (De Gruyter 2018). Now why would one want to combine these two topics in the first place, the philosophy of Kant and the concept of love? Love is certainly not the first thing that comes to mind when we think about Kant or his philosophy. Kant never married, and saw human sexuality as deeply problematic from a moral perspective. There was something degrading about sex. It was objectifying, vitiating to human dignity, and he even compared it to cannibalism. Kant also loathed homosexuality and masturbation. More generally, Kantian ethics is often viewed as cold and excessively formal. According to this picture, Kant emphasises ‘duty’ and ‘pure reason’ over everything else, and he expresses dislike toward emotions and inclinations, as they appear to be hindrances or obstacles for living a moral life. However, in the last decades scholars working on Kant’s philosophy and his ethics in particular, have started to acknowledge that this picture of an austere, ascetic, or indeed ‘cold’ Kant is not entirely accurate. Especially Kant’s mature moral philosophy, as it is presented in The Metaphysics of Morals, takes emotions and emotive dispositions seriously into account as part of the moral life. Kant is aware that feelings and emotions are constitutive for human existence, and cannot be neglected. The striving for a moral character will include the cultivation of certain positive emotions. That is to say, Kant’s mature position is, that for us to improve morally, we must become aware of, and strengthen those other-regarding emotions, such as love, that facilitate moral action. It is also quite simply the case that Kant has a lot more to say about love than previous research has acknowledged. In Kant’s philosophy, love operates in various contexts and has several different meanings. However, it must still be emphasized that for Kant, the feeling of love can never be the objective foundation of morality. It remains true, that for Kant, the ground of morality lies in pure practical reason and respect for the moral law.

The motivation behind my chosen topic is hence two-fold. Firstly, I believe that it is important for Kantian scholarship, for historians of philosophy, and for the community of academic philosophers for more generally, to appreciate the comprehensive concept of love as it appears in the philosophy of Kant. In a sense, acknowledging the role of love in Kant’s philosophy is about doing justice to Kant. Secondly, I believe that by investigating the concept of love in the texts of a great historical philosopher, we can learn about love in our own lives: what love is, what it feels like, and what kind of rational requirements and even duties it imposes on us? I think it would be beneficial for humanity if we had a better understanding of love. At the very least, I am personally motivated by a desire to understand love better.

The main claim I wish to defend in this talk today is that love is much more important to Kant than previously realized, and that understanding love is actually essential for Kantian ethical life. As we all know, love is a complicated concept, and this holds also for Kant’s views on love. Based on different contexts where Kant discusses love, we can identify various aspect of love, such as self-love, sexual love (and love of beauty), love of God, love of neighbor, and love in friendship. The list is not exhaustive, but these, I believe, are the paradigmatic or the most prominent aspects of love in Kant’s philosophy. If we analyse what Kant says about love within these different contexts, we see also that there is a general conceptual division related to love, which underlies much of Kant’s thought on love. I call this division the ‘general division of love’. According to the general division, love is generally divided into two types or kinds of love: love of benevolence [Liebe des Wohlwollens] and love of delight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. Basically, love of benevolence means willing what is good for the object, it is a desire to somehow benefit the object of love, even if it would be difficult to know in specific cases how exactly to do this. Love of delight, on the other hand, means taking pleasure or joy in the attributes or the sheer existence of the object. It is a pleasure accompanied by the representation of the object of love. In one way or another, all the different aspects I mentioned (self-love, sexual love, love of beauty, love of God, love of neighbor and love in friendship) have some kind of relation to the general division of love. All in all, the general division of love brings a relative unity to Kant’s conception of love.

I argue further, that if we investigate Kant’s discussions of the various aspects of love, using the general division of love as a guiding tool, we arrive at an overall picture of love in Kant, which can be called an ‘ascent of love’. Taking a comprehensive view of the evidence we have of love’s concept in Kant’s philosophy, we can say that for Kant, love permeates human existence from the strongest impulses of nature to the highest ideals of morally deserved happiness. What exactly the ascent view or the ascent model of love in Kant is, and how it is warranted by Kant’s texts, it is now my task to explain. I will begin by articulating the general division of love, after which I will focus on clarifying the ascent model. The sketch I offer is bound to be rather brief, a ‘skeleton’ of Kant’s concept of love, if you will, and I will not be able to address interpretative difficulties in great detail. My aim is to provide a concise overview of the topic.

II. On The General Division of Love

 There is only one direct passage in Kant’s published works, where he speaks about a ‘general division of love’. The direct published evidence is contained in the first part of the Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason, where Kant discusses the origin of evil, and particularly its relation to self-love. Even though this is the only published passage, and the specific context here is that of self-love, we nevertheless see the elements of the general division, and the division itself in operation all over Kant’s discussions of love. Kant refers to the general division of love in a lengthy footnote: “Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into love of benevolence and love of delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.” (R, 6:45.22-5) What does Kant mean with the phrase that both love of benevolence and love of delight ‘must be rational’ – is the claim descriptive or normative? In other words, does Kant think that in general, love is by definition rational, or does he mean that love must somehow be made rational? The right answer is the latter: Kant thinks that love must be conditioned by reason, and this will become clearer as we proceed. Another passage, from the so called Collins-lecture notes on ethics, corroborates the existence of the general division of love in Kant: “All love is either love of benevolence or love of delight. Love of benevolence consists in the wish and inclination to promote the happiness of others. Love of delight is the pleasure we take in showing approval of another’s perfections. This delight may be either sensuous or intellectual.” (Collins, 27:417.19-26) My argument is, that if we follow the operation of this basic division of love in different contexts of Kant’s texts, we arrive at the ascent model of love.

III. The Ascent of Love

 What is the ascent of love in the first place? The concept of love has its roots deep in the history of Western philosophy, and this history is subsequently shaped by the Christian religion. One of the earliest texts of the Western culture, Hesiod’s cosmogony, describes love (Eros) as an “immortal god” who sprang out of the original Chasm right after Earth. Eros melts the limbs of mortals and overpowers their mind. The pre-Socratic Empedocles views the whole cosmos as an eternal sphere, where two basic powers, love (Philotes) and strife alternate in a never-ending circle, so that love brings all things together, and strife tears them apart again. The first ‘ascent model of love’ is formulated by Plato in his Symposium. On Plato’s account, the lover begins by erotically loving the physical beauty of an individual young man, and then gradually ascends to loving the beauty of souls, activities, laws, customs and knowledge, so as to finally grasp the pure idea of eternal beauty. For Aristotle, benevolent love for one’s friends belongs to the good life, to such an extent that he calls friends ‘greatest of the external goods’. For Christian thinkers, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, love of one’s neighbour is the path to loving God as the supreme good.  In the Western tradition up to Kant, love has traditionally been conceived as somehow a vehicle between mere nature and the highest good. Even though the Kantian conception of love has unique features, Kant’s conception of love must be understood as rooted in this Western tradition.

 Figure 1.

This is what the ascent of love in Kant’s philosophy looks like in the form of a diagram. There are many things in the model above, and not all of them can be discussed today. I am not asking you to comprehend the model with one glance. What I wish to point your attention to is the complexity of the basic outline of the concept of love in Kant. Kant’s concept of love traverses different domains fundamental to human existence, and in these different domains (excluding the merely animal self-love), the general division of love appears. For a scholar devoted to understanding the structure of love, the conceptual framework of love sometimes appears as a puzzle. In his writings, Kant laid out the pieces to this puzzle, but he never put the puzzle together. The ascent model is an interpretative reconstruction and systematization based on what Kant said about love in his writings. So what is the ascent model of love in Kant? Firstly, it is a conceptual classification or a hierarchy of different aspects of love with respect to creation in general, ‘crude nature’, and the ‘highest good’ (the morally deserved happiness of all rational creatures). Secondly, from a practical perspective, the ascent model involves a subjective journey of moral progress. The Kantian agent has a subjective relation to all these loves, but she should especially strive for the higher ones. The ascent model is somewhat reminiscent of Plato’s ‘ladder of love’ in the Symposium, but for Plato the ‘peak’ of the ascent (or the highest good) is a quasi-mystical vision of the oneness of beauty, whereas for Kant the comprehensive highest good is a communal notion of perfect happiness proportionate to the perfect virtue of all agents. For Kant, this kind of highest good is an ideal exemplified by an ethical community where friendly relations of love and respect are prevalent.

So we can think of the ascent model in terms of three partially overlapping contexts: religious, natural, and moral. In all these contexts we can show the general division of love as operative in various ways and in various functions. My basic point is this: love in Kant is a highly complex, dynamic network of closely intertwined concepts. I will now briefly flesh out the ascent model by saying something about the operation of love with respect to the three contexts of religion, nature, and morality.

III.1. Religious Love

In Kant’s philosophy of religion, love of God is actually of foundational significance, both as God’s love for human beings, and as the human being’s love for God. As the students of Kant’s philosophy will know, we can have no theoretical knowledge of God, but we should still postulate God practically in order to hope for the highest good. In his famous phrasing, morality leads inevitably to religion (R, 6:6). In this framework of philosophy of religion, Kant gives two accounts of God’s love in terms of the general division. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes: “The divine end with regard to the human race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought only as proceeding from love, that is, as the happiness of human beings.” (MM, 6.488.26-35) And a little further in the same work, he asserts that the intention of the world’s author “can have only love for its basis.” (MM, 6.490.21-491.4) What this means is clarified in the Vigilantius lecture notes on ethics: “God’s love for us (also expressed by the words: God is love) is thus the divine benevolence and kindness toward us, which constitutes the foundation of the divine legislative power [potestas legislatoria divina]. Now to return that love is the corresponding duty of all His subjects, (…)” (LE, 27:721.1-6). In the Religion within the bounds of mere Reason we find a distinctly different account of the same idea that ‘God is love’: “’God is Love’; in him one can venerate the loving one (with his love of moral delight for human beings insofar as they are adequate to his holy law),” (R, 6:145.20-146.1). In The Metaphysics of Morals and the Vigilantius lectures on ethics, God’s love of benevolence is the ground of creation and the moral duties of humans, where as in the Religion, God’s love is moral delight in human moral striving. From the human side, Kant tells us: “Love towards God is the foundation of all inner religion” (LE, 27:720.1-7). The idea is that human beings should return God’s love by gladly practicing their moral duties, especially towards their neighbours. We can never achieve moral perfection, but if we could, our perfect love for God could also be called ‘love for the moral law’. This would mean that we would no longer have any inclinations that go against morality, but we would always do the right thing gladly, with a corresponding inclination. But this kind of disposition is impossible for imperfect creatures like us. In the end, we can merely hope that if we sincerely try to love God by striving to become more moral, God will eventually love us with the love of moral delight.

III.2. Natural Love

 With respect to mere nature, love constitutes the strongest impulses of the human being. When we are discussing human agency in terms of nature, we are dealing with self-love. Kant has a dualistic conception of the motivational grounds of agency. There are only two basic kinds of motivation: respect for the moral law and self-love. Either the agent is motivated by morality or by natural causes – and all non-moral motivation implies love for oneself. Hence, all inclination-based activity of the agent falls under the rubric of self-love. As Kant writes in the Critique of Practical Reason: “All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.” (C2, 5:22.6-8) Basically, self-love is self-benevolence or delight in oneself: we want things to go well for ourselves, and when this happens, we are pleased. To desire one’s own happiness is the most natural thing for a human being. But to make things more difficult, as often happens with Kant, there is also a moral self-love: “Only the maxim of self-love, of unconditional delight in oneself (independent of gain or loss resulting from action), is however the inner principle of contentment only possible for us on condition that our maxims are subordinated to the moral law.” (R, 6:45.40-46.18) The moral self-love is a contentment, where we are conscious of our ability to override selfish maxims through respect for the moral law. But this is a special case, and the take home message should be that there is nothing moral about self-love as such. In any case, the concept of self-love is foundational for the Kantian conception of agency.

Concerning the crudest, animal level of human nature we find statements like this one from the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: “The strongest impulses of nature are love of life and sexual love, (…). Love of life is to maintain the individual, sexual love, the species.” (AP, 7:276.28-33) In this context, love denotes fundamental animal impulses of desire. Kant calls the animal impulse of self-preservation ‘love of life’. The animal within us desires to stay alive, and will struggle for its continued survival. Similarly, in the Religion where Kant writes about an ‘original predisposition to good in human nature’, he divides the cognitive structure of the human being into animality, humanity, and personality, and discusses animality and humanity in terms of self-love. About animality he states: “The predisposition to ANIMALITY in the human being may be brought under the general title of physical and merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not required. It is three-fold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive.” (R, 6:26.12-18) My main point here is, that Kant thinks of the strongest impulses of nature in terms of love. As such, these impulses are not grasped by the general division of love: they are non-rational, but still Kant holds that they are somehow predisposed to the (moral) good. How to understand animal self-love as predisposed to the good? In other words, how can it be that a mere animal impulse somehow facilitates or enables moral progress, or moves us in the direction of morality? Firstly, we may think that animal self-love is a necessary enabling condition for any kind of human progress. If we did not care about our own existence or the life of our children, and if we were not at all interested in sex, our species would soon perish. But secondly, there may be a stronger connection between animal self-love and morality, which connection we can illuminate with a brief glance at Kant’s conception of sexual love. As I already mentioned, Kant thinks that as such, the basic impulse of sex is morally degrading, because it involves making oneself and the other a mere means for physical pleasure. However, Kant holds that in marriage sexuality can be practiced, because in the marital relationship both parties possess each other reciprocally, and through the marital bond regain their personhood, which is otherwise threatened by sexual encounters. In the context of marriage, sexual impulse or inclination can unite with moral love. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes:“[sexual inclination] cannot be classed with either the love that is delight or the love of benevolence (…) this ardor has nothing in common with moral love properly speaking, though it can enter into close union with it under the limiting conditions of practical reason.” (MM, 6:426.26-32) And in the lectures on anthropology: “as long as it [sexual inclination] is brutal and aims merely at enjoyment, it is only animal instinct. – But as soon as it is connected to benevolence and aims at the happiness of the other, it becomes genuine love. It must not be like love of roast beef, which one devours.”(LA, 25:1361.4-8) Apparently, sexuality, and particularly marriage, is a powerful context of intimacy, which occasions the connection of crude natural impulses with morality, and love of benevolence and love of delight. I have therefore proposed a distinction between two variants of sexual love in Kant: a ‘narrow sexual love’ and a ‘broad sexual love’. Narrow sexual love denotes merely the animal impulse to sex, or the natural sexual inclination, whereas broad sexual love means the sexual impulse as connected with love of benevolence, especially in the context of marriage.

Before moving to discuss the morality of love, I will merely note that Kant also discusses aesthetic pleasure in terms of love. Love of beauty is a non-instrumental pleasure or delight taken in the form of a natural object, such as a landscape. According to Kant, when we contemplate, for instance the shape of a wild flower, insect or crystal, and we feel love for the object, we are not thinking of any kind of purpose for the object, nor would we want to use the object for our own purposes (C3, 5:299-300). According to Kant, beauty is a symbol of morality, and love of beauty mediates between nature and the moral outlook. When we love something without an intention to use it, we are paving the way for morality.

III.3. Moral Love

I now continue to the moral topics of neighbourly love and love in friendship. As you see in the ascent model diagram above, the general division appears in various places, both on the side of morality and on the side of nature. The reason for this is, that if all the textual evidence is taken into account, there are actually four variants in the general division of love for others, instead of just two. In other words, there is a natural love of benevolence, and a natural love of delight, which are based on natural inclination. There is also a moral love of benevolence, which is based on reason, and an intellectual love of delight, which is based at least partially on the moral attributes or the rational nature of the other human being. Let me reiterate the passage from the Collins notes on ethics:

All love is either love of benevolence or love of delight. Love of benevolence consists in the wish and inclination to promote the happiness of others. Love of delight is the pleasure we take in showing approval of another’s perfections. This delight may be either sensuous or intellectual. All such delight, if it is love, must first of all be inclination. The love that is sensuous delight is a delight in the sensuous intuition, due to sensuous inclination; (…). The love based on intellectual delight is already harder to conceive. (LE, 27:417.19-30)

Love of others is either benevolence towards others or delight in others. In these early lecture notes, love of others is discussed mainly in terms of inclination, but very importantly, the conceptual framework of love of neighbour involves such a thing as the duty of love. This duty of love of others or neighbourly love is mentioned already in the early lectures, and discussed in Kant’s mature moral philosophical works, the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Finally, its framework is developed in the “Doctrine of Virtue” of The Metaphysics of Morals. In the Groundwork Kant makes a well-known distinction between duty and inclinations, such that inclinations cannot be rationally commanded, and are therefore not moral, whereas actions from duty can be commanded. In this context he also presents a reading of Jesus’ second commandment to love one’s neighbour as oneself. The Groundwork distinction between inclination and duty informs the division of love of others:

It is in this way, no doubt, that we are to understand the passages from Scripture that contain the command to love one’s neighbor, even our enemy. For love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty itself – even if no inclination whatsoever impels us to it, indeed if natural and unconquerable aversion resists – is practical and not pathological love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of sensation, in principles of action and not in melting compassion; and only the former can be commanded. (GW, 4:399.27-34; see also C2, 5:83)

I should perhaps note that for Kant, ‘pathological’ does not mean ‘sick’ or ‘perverted’, but merely anything pertaining to sensory experience. Even though, as we have seen, the conceptual framework permits intellectual and sensuous delight in others, as well as benevolence or beneficence from feeling, the most important concept here is practical love. A similar distinction between pathological and practical love can be found in the Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant again discusses the Christian commandment:

But love for God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for he is not an object of the senses. The same thing toward human beings is indeed possible but cannot be commanded, for it is not within the power of any human being to love someone merely on command. It is, therefore, only practical love that is understood in that kernel of all laws. (C2, 5:83)

Practical love is a secularised, post-Christian active neighbourly love. In the “Doctrine of Virtue” of The Metaphysics of Morals love of other human beings is discussed in two different places with two different meanings. In the Introduction, Kant presents neighbourly love as a natural predisposition of the mind to be subjectively receptive to duty. Scholars disagree on the details of what this love is actually like, or how it should be classified. Even though this scholarly debate is not directly relevant for the purposes of today’s talk, I wish to say that I believe (in harmony with the results of Dieter Schönecker, 2010), that this love is love of delight. More importantly, later in the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant hands out a rich, 10 page discussion of the duty of love, where he clearly identifies the duty of love as practical love of benevolence:

In this context, however, LOVE is not to be understood as feeling (aesthetic), that is, as pleasure in the perfection of others; love is not to be understood as delight in them (since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in beneficence. (MM, 6:449.17-22)

Systematically, Kant further divides the duty of love to three distinct duties: beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy, but I will not discuss these details here. His basic argument for the duty of love can be expressed in simple terms. Kant thinks that because I want others to be benevolent towards me, I therefore ought to be benevolent to others. This is the way that the maxim of benevolence can become universal: it includes both myself and others. As Ryan Hanley (2017) has noted, Kant’s argument is historically novel, as it detaches the justification of the duty of neighborly love from theistic commitments, and instead appeals to secular reason. Practical love is about doing good to others, making their happiness one’s aim. The disposition to practical love is something we ought to cultivate, it is an imperfect duty in the Kantian framework, and we should strive to become better at it.

 Figure 2.

Lastly, I will discuss Kant’s notion of friendship in terms of love. This will bring me to the closure of my talk, completing the ascent model of love in Kant that I have wished to outline. Basically, loving dispositions towards others enable friendship. Friends are other human beings, so the general division of love should apply to this context (Kant uses the general division of love in the context of friendship particularly prominently in the Vigilantius lectures on ethics). At bottom, friendship is an intimate union of love and respect in an equal, reciprocal relationship between two persons. For Kant, it is essentially an exclusive relationship, as we cannot share with everyone the kind of intellectual intimacy required by friendship. Kantian friendship is very much about morally meaningful communication. Like Moran (2012) has pointed out, it is about communicating thoughts and feelings on a shared journey of moral progress. The friends are benevolent towards each other, and take delight in each other’s company, but they are also able to cautiously note the moral imperfections of each other, and this way they help each other to become more moral. I will not go into the taxonomical details of different kinds of friendships in Kant’s works, but there is one distinction that is especially important for my argument. This distinction has been noted by (among others) Marcia Baron (2013). The first major kind of friendship is that between two people. But there is also a more general disposition of friendship that concerns one’s outlook towards the whole human species. The second form of friendship is about being generally a friend of human beings [Menschenfreund]:  “A friend of human beings as such (i.e. of the whole race) is one who takes an affective interest in the well-being of all human beings” (MM, 6:472). This kind of person basically wishes well for everyone, and takes delight in the well-being of others. In the Vigilantius lectures Kant states: “being everyone’s friend; it does no more than formulate the duty to harbour love of benevolence for the happiness of others, and is quite different from the term: to make friends with everyone.”(LE, 27:676) Kant acknowledges, that the universal disposition of friendship brings with it a danger of losing sight of specific, individual relationships, but he still maintains that “the great value of human love rests in the general love of humanity as such.” (LE, 27:673.25-31) In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant makes a subtle distinction between a Menschenfreund and a Freund der Menschen, which distinction qualifies the notion of a friend of human beings [Freund der Menschen] with a demand, that the friend of human beings must acknowledge the fundamental equality of everyone. What separates a Freund der Menschen from a Menschenfreund, is that the Menschenfreund merely possesses benevolence, whereas being a Freund der Menschen involves “thought and consideration for the equality among them [human beings]” (MM, 6:473.1-2). To describe the people with a universally friendly disposition, Kant also uses the term citizen of the world [Weltbürger]. This disposition of universal friendship is requisite for approaching the communal highest good.

Apparently, for Kant, cultivating benevolence in reciprocal relationships moves us towards the ideal ethical community, or towards a more loving world in general:

It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself (…) but to use one’s moral perfections in social intercourse (…). While making oneself a fixed center of one’s principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world – not exactly to promote as the end what is best for the world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity – agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect (…) (MM, 6:473.16-24)

Obviously, what is ‘best for the world’ in the above quotation has to be the highest good, or the morally deserved happiness of rational creatures, as referring to human beings. It seems that by cultivating love and respect in friendships, and by gradually opening our ‘narrower circles’ to people who are not yet our friends, we are moving towards the ideal ethical community. Through becoming friends of human beings, we gradually ascend towards a cosmopolitan community of love and respect.

IV. Conclusion

 The aim of my presentation today was to provide a concise general overview of the concept of love in the philosophy of Kant. I hope to have pointed out that love in Kant is a complex concept that includes many things. Love is more important to Kant than previously realised, and understanding love is actually essential for Kantian ethical life. The concept of love in Kant involves a ‘general division of love’, according to which love divides generally into love of benevolence and love of delight, and this division brings relative unity to Kant’s conception of love. I have also argued, that the ‘ascent model of love’ is a viable general model of love in Kant.


Kant, I. Gesammelte Schriften Hrsg.: Bd. 1-22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin 1900ff.

Other References:

Baron, M. 2013. “Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons, and the Virtues of Social Intercourse (TL 6:468-474)”, in Trampota, A., Sensen, O. & Timmermann, J., eds., Kant’s “Tugendlehre”, 365-382. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hanley, R. 2017. Love’s Enlightenment. Rethinking Charity in Modernity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Moran, K. 2012. Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.

Rinne, P. 2018. Kant on Love. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Schönecker, D. 2010. “Kant über Menschenliebe als moralische Gemütsanlage”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 92, 2, 133-175.

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