Русская версия

“As in the case of the understanding, there is in the case of reason a merely formal, i.e., logical use, where reason abstracts from all content of cognition, but there is also a real use, since reason itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles, which it derives neither from the senses nor from the understanding.
— Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), A299/B355.

 

 

KANTIAN RATIONALITY LAB LECTURES

Organized by Prof. Dr. Thomas Sturm & Dr. Martin Sticker

The Kantian Rationality Lab Lectures are delivered by internationally leading scholars. They cover all areas of the Megagrant on Kant’s theory of reason, its principles, its manifold uses and functions, and its application to contemporary challenges in science, ethics, and the project of the Enlightenment. The lectures provide a regular forum for exchange between KRL members and the international community of Kant scholars and other philosophers. Everyone is welcome to attend the lectures.

The Kantian Rationality Lab Lectures currently take place online (on Zoom). If you wish to take part, please write to martinjsticker AT gmail DOT com.

 

PAST KRL LECTURES

 

UPCOMING KRL LECTURES

November 18, 2021: Andrew Chignell (Princeton): Kant’s Epistemic Fallibilism: Four Models (6.00-8.00pm CET/7:00-9:00 Kaliningrad Time)

Kant follows Locke and others in the tradition in associating knowledge (Wissen) with certainty (Gewissheit). This has led numerous commentators to assume that he is an infallibilist about epistemic justification – i.e. that a belief that is justified must also be true. In places, however, Kant goes much further than Locke and suggests that many “merely empirical truths” are also capable of being known with certainty. This is harder to square with infallibilism. Here I sketch four different models of what “certainty” (Gewissheit) might be, for Kant, and argue that each is compatible with a fallibilist account of his epistemology.

January 27, 2022: Arthur Ripstein (Toronto): A Public World of Enduring Objects: Kant’s Deductions of Property And Substance (6.00-8.00pm CET/7:00-9:00 Kaliningrad Time)

February 24, 2022: Camilla Serck-Hanssen (Oslo): Kant’s “Metaphysical Deduction” of Ideas of Reason (6.00-8.00pm CET/7:00-9:00 Kaliningrad Time)

March 10, 2022: Lucas Thorpe (Istanbul): tbd (6.00-8.00pm CET/7:00-9:00 Kaliningrad Time)

March 24, 2022: Irina Schumski (Tübingen): tbd (6.00-8.00pm CET/7:00-9:00 Kaliningrad Time)

May 5, 2022: Michela Massimi (Edinburgh): Tbd (6.00-8.00pm CET/Kaliningrad Time)

May 19, 2022: Paul Guyer (Providence, RI): tbd (6.00-8.00pm CET/Kaliningrad Time)

June 2, 2022: Yoon Choi (Marquette, MW): The Activity of Thinking and the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason (6.00-8.00pm CET/Kaliningrad Time)

June 23, 2022: Oliver Sensen (New Orleans, LA): The Autonomy of Pure Reason (6.00-8.00pm CET/7:00-9:00 Kaliningrad Time)

Kant says: “Pure reason … gives (to the human being) a universal law which we call the moral law.” There is a renewed controversy in the Kant literature what that means. In particular, it is debated who gives a law to whom, and what ‘giving’ could mean in this context. In my talk, I follow Kant’s clues in the text that link the source of the moral law to the categories of understanding, and the claim that they are not innate, but “initially acquired.”