




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ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАНТА И АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ НАУКИ И ПОЛИТИКИ



ПРОГРАММА
международного научного семинара

Калининград, 4-5 мая 2018 г.



Балтийский федеральный университет имени И. Канта
Институт гуманитарных наук
Академия Кантиана

Международный научный семинар

**ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАНТА
И АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ
СОВРЕМЕННОЙ НАУКИ И ПОЛИТИКИ**

4 – 5 мая 2018 г., Калининград

*Программа конференции
Тезисы докладов*

Калининград
2018

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ПРОГРАММА СЕМИНАРА

ПЯТНИЦА, 4 МАЯ

9:00–9:30 Регистрация участников

9:30–9:45 *Открытие семинара:*

Андрей Клемешев, ректор БФУ имени И. Канта

Эльмира Зильбер, проректор по научной работе и международным связям БФУ имени И. Канта

Татьяна Цвигун, директор Института гуманитарных наук БФУ имени И. Канта

Нина Дмитриева, научный директор Академии Кантиана

Секция 1: Кантианские перспективы в современных прикладных исследованиях

Модератор: В.А. Чалый

9:45–10:25 *Леонард Александрович Капинников.* Этика Канта в современном мире

10:25–11:05 *Валентин Александрович Бажанов.* Культурная революция в современной нейронауке как реализация кантианской исследовательской программы

11:05–11:20 **Кофе-брейк**

11:20–12:00 *Кристоф Реманн-Зуттер.* Как Парижское соглашение по климату может реализовать условия глобального общественного договора? Кантианские подходы к этике климата

12:00–12:40 *Валентин Валентинович Балановский.* Экологическое сознание и этика И. Канта: О недопустимости клонирования вымершей флоры и фауны

12:40–14:30 **Обед**

Секция 2: Кантианская антропология в контексте современного гуманизма

Модератор: Дэвид Бэкхёрст

14:30–15:10 *Янина Ло (урожд. Зомбецки).* Sapere aude... К вопросу о трансформации человека. Кантовские стандарты в контексте транс- и постгуманизма

15:10–15:50 *Мартин Штикер.* Нормативность обязательной цели. Кантианец задается вопросом: Сколько мы должны помогать нуждающемуся?

15:50–16:30 *Сергей Валентинович Луговой.* Кант и проблема межрелигиозных конфликтов в современном обществе

16:30–16:50 **Кофе-брейк**

16:50–17:30 *Фредерик Тремблэй.* Неокантианская концепция первой философии как этики, «одолжествление» культуры и научная объективность

17:30–18:10 *Пярттули Ринне.* Любовь в глобальной политике: кантианская разработка идей Ролза и Нуссбаум

СУББОТА, 5 МАЯ

Секция 3: Кантианские подходы к современным политическим и правовым проблемам

Модератор: Нина Дмитриева

- 9:30–10:10** *Вадим Александрович Чалый.* К кантианским понятиям политической рациональности и политического разума
- 10:10–10:50** *Алексей Николаевич Круглов.* Философия Канта и конституционное право Российской Федерации
- 10:50–11:10** **Кофе-брейк**
- 11:10–11:50** *Андрей Сергеевич Зильбер.* Право всемирного гражданства и его блуждающие границы
- 11:50–12:30** *Дэвид Бэкхёрст.* Кант, проблема образования и формирование разума
- 12:30–14:30** **Обед**

Секция 4: Кант и просвещение разума в XXI веке

Модератор: Юрген Штольценберг

- 14:30–15:10** *Томас Штурм.* Кантовское понятие разума, современные теории рациональности и их влияние на политику
- 15:10–15:50** *Ирина Николаевна Грифцова, Галина Вениаминовна Сорина.* Идеи философии образования Канта и современная аналитика текста
- 15:50–16:10** **Кофе-брейк**
- 16:10–16:50** *Анатолий Геннадьевич Пушкарский.* Значение философии математики Канта в основаниях математики
- 16:50–17:30** *Леонид Юрьевич Корнилаев.* Просвещение и научный метод
- 17:30–17:40** **Заккрытие семинара**

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

FRIDAY, MAY 4

9:00–9:30 *Registration*

9:30–9:45 *Opening ceremony:*

Andrey Klemeshev, Rector, IKBFU

*Elmira Zilber, Vice-Rector for Research and International Cooperation,
IKBFU*

Tatyana Tsvigun, Director of the Institute for Humanities

Nina Dmitrieva, Scientific Director of the Academia Kantiana

Section 1: Kantian Perspectives in the Contemporary Applied Researches

Moderator: Vadim Chaly

9:45–10:25 *Leonard Kalinnikov. Kant's Ethics in the Modern World*

10:25–11:05 *Valentin Bazhanov. Cultural Revolution in Contemporary Neuroscience
as The Implementation of Kantian Research Program*

11:05–11:20 ***Coffee break***

11:20–12:00 *Christoph Rehmann-Sutter. How Can the Paris Climate Agreement Fulfil
the Conditions of a Global Social Contract? Kantian Perspectives on
Climate Ethics*

12:00–12:40 *Valentin Balanovskiy. Ecological Consciousness and Kant's Ethics: On
the Impermissibility of Cloning Extinct Flora and Fauna*

12:40–14:30 ***Lunch***

Section 2: Kantian Anthropology in the Context of Contemporary Humanism

Moderator: David Bakhurst

14:30–15:10 *Janina Loh (n. Sombetzki). Sapere Aude... Regarding a Transformation
of Man. Kant's Marks on Trans- and Posthumanism*

15:10–15:50 *Martin Sticker. The Normativity of Obligatory Ends. A Kantian Take on the
Question: How Much Must we do to Help the Needy?*

15:50–16:30 *Sergey Lugovoy. Kant and the Problem of Interreligious Conflicts in
Modern Society*

16:30–16:50 ***Coffee break***

16:50–17:30 *Frédéric Tremblay. The Neo-Kantian Conception of First Philosophy as
Ethics, The 'Oughtization' of Culture, and Scientific Objectivity*

17:30–18:10 *Pärttyli Rinne. Love in Global Politics: A Kantian Reworking of Rawls and
Nussbaum*

SATURDAY, MAY 5

Section 3: *Kantian Approaches to the Contemporary Problems in Politics and Right*

Moderator: Nina Dmitrieva

- 9:30–10:10** *Vadim Chaly.* Towards the Kantian Notions of Political Rationality and Political Reason
- 10:10–10:50** *Alexey Krouglov.* Kant's Philosophy and the Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation
- 10:50–11:10** **Coffee break**
- 11:10–11:50** *Andrey Zilber.* Kant's Cosmopolitan Right and its Wandering Borders
- 11:50–12:30** *David Bakhurst.* Kant, Education, and the Formation of Reason
- 12:30–14:30** **Lunch**

Section 4: *Kant and Enlightenment of Reason in the 21st Century*

Moderator: Jürgen Stolzenberg

- 14:30–15:10** *Thomas Sturm.* Kant's Concept of Reason, Current Theories of Rationality, and Their Impact on Politics
- 15:10–15:50** *Irina Griftsova, Galina Sorina.* Kant's Philosophy of Education and Modern Text Analytics
- 15:50–16:10** **Coffee break**
- 16:10–16:50** *Anatoly Pushcarskiy.* The significance of Kant's philosophy of mathematics for foundations of mathematics
- 16:50–17:30** *Leonid Kornilaev.* The Enlightenment and the scientific method
- 17:30–17:40** **Closing ceremony**

ABSTRACTS

Leonard Kalinnikov

(Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University)

Kant's Ethics in the Modern World

1. The problem of moral grounds is the original problem of moral philosophy, where normativism and ethical relativism has been encountered since the 17th century. Modern moral philosophy has a clear tendency of decomposing normativity in ethics in all its forms: whether in the form of theological theories of the basis of morality, which modern ethics seeks to secularize, or in the form of Kantianism. As a result, Kant's normative ethics appears on the one hand to be in the form of ordinary religious morality, and on the other hand, appears to be a subjective arbitrary doctrine based on good wishes only which have no relation to reality.

2. The positivist destruction of metaphysics in general has led to particularly disastrous results in the metaphysics of morals. The most important result is the division of morality and law, the lack of understanding regarding the integrity of morals. Criticism by G. E. Moore concerning the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics contributed to the spread of ideas of ethical relativism, arbitrariness in ethics, and the spread of emotivism and ethical intuitionism, the main form of which was ethical axiology (especially in the form of *material value ethics* of M. Scheler and N. Hartmann).

3. Kant's solution to the problem of moral grounds has a number of important aspects. First, it directly connects morality with the theory of freedom as a measure of the relatively unhindered achievement of the goals of the subject. Second, the idea of morality appears as *causa sui* and as the ideal absolute limit of freedom. Third, there is the connection of morality and the social (transcendental) nature of the human being, morality appears as the essence of humanity, the practical reason acts as the source and basis of consciousness. Fourth, there are the ideas of the antinomic nature of the world, its openness, which is the basis of the teleological processes, and teleology as a system of relations that constitute morality. The fifth aspect is the *factual basis* of Kant's normativism in ethics, *the norm as a fact* of the essence of humanity. Finally, sixth, the moral norm appears as the *supreme value*, i.e. the categorical imperative and its absolute character as the law of good.

4. Kantianism in ethics acts as the basis of criticism of any form of ethical relativism.

Cultural Revolution in Contemporary Neuroscience as the Implementation of Kantian Research Program

The XX-th century is notable for its fantastic discoveries in science and technology. That why it often called the “atomic”, “nuclear” and / or “space travels” age. The XXI century pretend to claim as the century of “information technologies”. However, some discoveries that are likely to determine the shape of the 21st century as well. They not so visible and well known outside the professional community of researchers.

In 2014, the Nobel Prize in Physiology for Medicine awarded for the discovery of the cells of the navigation system of the brain. In my opinion, it can be compare with the first swallow announcing the summer or in some sense the tip of the iceberg -- if we mean scientific revolution in neuroscience, which in terms of its key features usually characterized as *socio-cultural*.

This revolution in neuroscience is unfolding in the context of the “hard core” of the Kantian research program of studying the forms of activity of consciousness and their expression in the language that are conditioned by neurobiological structures and features of the human brain. At same time, the leading modern neuroscience scholars just in this way -- as a continuation of the implementation of the Kantian program -- describe their research (Gallistel, Gelman, 1992; Dehaene, Brannon, 2010). It is clear that here we mean the spirit, and not the letter of this program.

The leitmotif of the Kantian research program, which implemented in modern neuroscience, is to search for the bases and forms of categorization of human experience that are predetermined at the neural network level. Some researchers explicitly claim: “culture in general, is shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse” (Chater, Christiansen, 2010, p. 1150).

These and other similar results in the latest history of neuroscience give grounds for rethinking the concept of a priori forms of sensuality and reason. Questions to be cleared up: what are the interrelation and interdependence of consciousness, language, culture, transcendental and situational, biological (ontogenetic) and socio-cultural, analytic and holistic in terms of philosophical and methodological comprehension of the contemporary neuropsychological picture of brain's functions? What new facets highlighted in the cognitive dimensions of consciousness activity, conditioned by the specific structure and work of the brain, which mostly determined by socio-cultural factors? What traditional philosophical ideas can be refined and / or even revised in the light of the latest discoveries?

In my presentation belonging to an area that can be called neuroepistemology, I will try to focus only on the problem of understanding the nature of the subject of cognition in terms of its transcendental interpretation, the relationship between the transcendental and the situational -- as this

problem looks in the light of the latest achievements of social and cultural neuroscience.

References

Chater N., Christiansen M. Language acquisition meets language evolution // Cognitive science. 2010. Vol. 34. Pp. 1131 – 1157.

Dehaene S., Brannon E. Space, time, and number: a Kantian research program // Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2010. Vol. 14. N 2. Pp. 517 – 519.

Gallistel C.R., Gelman R. Preverbal and verbal counting and computation // Cognition. 1992. Vol. 44. Pp. 43 – 74.

The work supported by RBRF grant №16-03-00117a.

Christoph Rehmann-Sutter
(Lübeck University)

How can the Paris Climate Agreement fulfil the conditions of a global social contract? Kantian perspectives on climate ethics

In his political philosophy, Kant has prominently used the model of a natural state (*Naturzustand*), in order to clarify questions of legitimacy of law and government. He also applied his model to the difficult relationships between the nations on earth (e.g. in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, § 61). He was concerned with the establishment of a permanent peace between the nations and the ending of wars. Based on this account of international politics, and also on the basis of Kant's practical philosophy more general, perspectives on current challenges of both global and national politics of mitigation of dangerous anthropogenic climate change shall be elaborated. Moral questions which are connected with it shall be identified.

The covenant, which nearly all countries agreed upon on 12 December 2015 at the 21. *Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC* in Paris, contains legally binding mechanisms to keep further warming of the earth climate "well below + 2 degrees Celsius". For the first time in history, the nations have hence adopted a *state of contract* in terms of climate politics, and have left – to speak with Kant – a natural state of climate politics. With this move, the preconditions have been created that allow to ground global climate politics in international law and also to enforce it. This state of contract shall be analysed from a perspective of justice, which will be inspired by Kant.

The talk will first describe the key mechanisms of the "Paris Agreement". Controversial points will be identified, which are grouped around the questions of „equity“ and injustice in the international distribution of CO₂ emission quota and the allocation of responsibilities for societal change among the countries. I will particularly discuss the controversy between Roubiou du Pont et al. (2017) and Kartha et al. (2018). In a third step I will outline Kant's version of the idea of a social contract and his model of a natural state. Which are their guiding intuitions? How could they be interpreted in regard to global climate change? I

will argue for a series of claims about how the implementation of the Paris Agreement should be structured, if, in the present situation of global societies, climate governance should fulfil the conditions of a “just” social contract. Kant’s model shall be applied to the necessary socio-political coping practices within that climate regime.

References

Robiou du Pont, Y. et al. Equitable mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. *Nat. Clim. Change* 7 (2017): 38-43.

Kartha, S. et al. Cascading biases against poorer countries. *Nat. Clim. Change*, 8 (2018): 348-349.

Valentin Balanovskiy

(Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University)

Ecological Consciousness and Kant’s Ethics: On the Impermissibility of Cloning Extinct Flora and Fauna

The idea that humankind is responsible for the destruction of natural balance may lead to the idea that we must fix the damage e.g. through the revival of extinct fauna. Such an idea in isolation from reality and in its extreme form leads to a thought that the cloning of animals, whose extinction is not a human fault, is a good idea too (a model of something like this was shown in the film *Jurassic Park*). Such an approach may have bad unexpected consequences, because as a rule we have no exhaustive and precise data on all properties of a given ecosystem before the human impact. For this reason it is not possible for us to make an absolutely right decision on what we should do to fix the damage precisely and, what is more important, we cannot rightly define the limits of our possible and proper impact. So, what about mammoths?

Mammoths became extinct a few thousand years before the first writing systems were invented. Up to now we still don’t know exactly what happened. Maybe this happened because of human impact, but maybe because of some evolutionary or catastrophic process. If so, would it be reasonable to revive mammoths by cloning if we have no exhaustive data on their extinction?

The first that comes to mind when we turn to Kant to answer this question is his constant talk of some mysterious ‘plan’ of nature, which spreads its influence not only over human beings (because we belong both to the world nature and to the world of freedom), but also over natural creatures. Here a casuistic question arises: if the society, animate and inanimate nature are ruled by some quasi-intelligent ‘plan’, maybe the extinction of some animals, even because of human activities, is a natural process that doesn’t require any artificial regulation? Common sense dictates that such an idea borders on

sacrilege, because if we accept this statement as normal, the result will be a total irresponsibility of corporations and individuals for any environmental problems. But an estimation of such judgments ceases to be a simple matter in the light of modern discussions on the true reasons of the global warming (alternatives are: human activities and the natural order of things). But if we apply the same casuistic question to an issue of creatures, which have become extinct because of absolutely or predominantly natural reasons, then common sense dictates that in this case too, close to sacrilege is the idea to take responsibility for the extinction of mammoths or dinosaurs (whose disappearing wasn't our fault).

The next thing that should be mentioned is Kant's explicit instructions on how we should behave towards animate and inanimate nature. The most fruitful in this respect is an Episodic Section of *The Metaphysics of Morals* titled *On an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts of Reflection*. Particularly we can find here that an attitude of care towards plants and inanimate nature and the humane treatment of animals are related to our duty to ourselves. If somebody fails to comply with this duty, then he harms his moral sense, and this in its turn creates premises of immoral behavior towards reasonable beings. Unfortunately in this section Kant wrote nothing about a necessity to fix damage to mineral, plant or animal realms, which was caused by humans in the past. In other words, the possible maxim should be formulated not in the following way: 'Sow the same number of the trees you cut for your profit or without any need, and never cut them again!', or 'Clean up all the areas you littered and never litter again, because otherwise you will destroy the beauty of nature and through this your sense of beauty!', or 'Cure animals, harmed by you, and never harm them again, because otherwise you will destroy your moral sense', but only in the following way: 'Never cut down trees! Never litter territory! Never cripple animals!' Thus in Kant's explicit instructions we can find neither possibility nor necessity for extinct flora and fauna to be resurrected by cloning or any other way to fix a damage.

There is another argument, hidden in Kant's works, against the idea of cloning extinct animals, which hide. For example from the essay *On an Alleged Right to Lie out of Philanthropy* we may conclude that to make a right decision we must be absolutely sure that we possess exhaustive knowledge on the conditions, under which we have to act. Here a possible maxim may be formulated in the following way: 'Do less, but only what is absolutely sure would lead to a good outcome, or do nothing, and don't disturb the natural order of things!'. I think that today we cannot be absolutely sure that the cloning of mammoths would have a good or at least a neutral outcome.

***Sapere Aude...* Regarding A Transformation Of Man. Kant's Marks On
Trans- And Posthumanism**

Trans- and posthumanism are two heterogeneous movements of the late twentieth century found in philosophical anthropology and philosophy of technology. They combine several disciplines, such as philosophy, social and cultural studies, AI and computer sciences. Their proponents understand themselves on the one hand as technologically advancing Renaissance-humanism, on the other hand in critically distancing themselves from thinking and philosophy of the Enlightenment. Both, trans- as well as posthumanism regard the humanistic human being as a starting point for their analyses. Immanuel Kant plays different roles within the trans- and posthumanist paradigm as this talk intends to show.

The transhumanist project is one of developing, enhancing and perfecting man by transforming him. The transhumanist goal is the technological transformation of man into a posthuman being, which in the case of transhumanism means a 'new human being', a human being 2.0, or to be more precise, a human being x.0, since from a transhumanist point of view the potential evolution of man is necessarily unfinished. The 'trans' in 'transhumanism' refers to the attempt to create a new and better mode of human existence, in working one's way 'through' the current human, so to speak. Technics (i.e. technologies and techniques) within the transhumanist paradigm is medium and means for this purpose of optimizing man to a human being x.0. Standard transhumanist subjects include, for instance, immortality and radical life extension, as well as methods of human enhancement.

Posthumanism, on the other hand, is no longer primarily interested in man. Critical posthumanism questions the traditional and mostly humanistic dichotomies such as woman–man, nature–culture, and subject–object, that are fundamentally constitutive of our current understanding of the human and the cosmos in general. The critical-posthumanist attempts to go beyond man by breaking with conventional categories, as well as with their associated vocabulary and thinking. In so doing, critical posthumanism reaches an understanding of man that is to be located 'post' today's essential concept of man. This, rather than the enhanced human being x.0 of transhumanism, is critical posthumanism's vision of the posthuman.

Between transhumanism and critical posthumanism I'd like to situate a third line of thinking: technological posthumanism. Like critical posthumanists, technological posthumanists aren't primarily interested in enhancing the human to a superior version: their vision of the posthuman isn't a radically modified human being—at least not exclusively. But unlike critical posthumanist thinkers, technological posthumanists don't question humanist categories and dichotomies. On the contrary, they intend to create an artificial alterity, an artificial superintelligence, a strong AI, or universal AI, that in the

end will surpass man by constituting a new race—this is technological posthumanism's agenda and posthuman vision. On their way to the Singularity—that is, in technological-posthumanist terms, the era that humans will eventually reach by creating an artificial superintelligence—human beings will of course profit from technological achievements, and modify and enhance themselves by means of these advances, for instance, by merging with nanobots, and eventually be immortalized through uploading the human mind onto a computer. But this vision is merely a nice side-effect and automatic step on man's way towards the posthuman era, rather than the ultimate ambition. Therefore, the role and function of technics within the technological-posthumanist spectrum is to be seen as end, aim and purpose, rather than medium and means (as within transhumanism).

In critical-posthumanist thinking, on the other hand, the technical is neither medium and means nor end, aim and purpose, but rather the principal category (besides culture and the sciences) for criticizing humanist and other traditional categories. Technics within critical-posthumanist thought serves as a substitute category, in opposition to nature, which crucially influences and shapes man's understanding of themselves and of the world, and which – at the same time – promises the progressive potential of questioning these conventional schemes.

To summarize my thoughts up to this point, in trans- and posthumanism there are three strategies to transcend man: (1) transhumanism tends to enhance man to a human being x.0; (2) technological posthumanism primarily creates an artificial alterity; and (3) critical posthumanism questions the categories that have been conventionally used to define man. Transhumanism, technological, and critical posthumanism refer to Kant's thinking and the Enlightenment philosophy in various ways: On the one hand, transhumanism understands its own project as a technological humanism and honestly follows Enlightenment authorities such as rational thinking and reason. On the other hand, a humanist could criticize transhumanists for their reduction of the human being to a pure means to the end of entering the posthuman era. Technological posthumanist thinkers – although they in principal follow their transhumanist colleagues – have a better chance of escaping the anthropocentric frame of Kant's and Renaissance-humanism's philosophy that is heavily criticized by critical posthumanists. But technological posthumanism still rests on the (at least implicit) preference of mind and cognitive capacities in general over the body within the Kantian and humanist tradition. Critical posthumanism intends to ultimately break with Kant's anthropocentrism, the essentialistic-humanistic definition of man, and unreflectingly invoking rational thinking and reason.

The Normativity of Obligatory Ends
A Kantian Take on the Question: How Much Must We Do to Help the
Needy?

I argue that we should understand the application of imperfect duties to specific cases as determined by the framework Kant sets out for the pursuit of ends (moral and non-moral ones) not by the authority duty enjoys over non-moral ends. This helps us understand how beneficence can be part of a moral life that is not devoid of what makes life worth living, such as pursuit of personal projects.

In the first part of my talk, I argue against Jens Timmermann who has advocates that on a Kantian framework latitude only pertains to the choice of means and that it can never be legitimate to pursue personal ends at the expense of ends set by duty. Against Timmermann I show that for Kant the application of obligatory ends is not a matter of the authority of duty but of instrumental rationality, judgement and of weighing occasions to promote ends against each other and of making those ends one has adopted compatible with each other. What follows from the adoption of obligatory ends for the application of those ends to concrete cases is not a question of the authority of duty anymore, since this authority is satisfied once I have adopted the requisite ends. Instead, it is a matter of what it means to have made an end one's own.

In the second part, I develop the systematic implications of this view. I discuss how conceiving of obligatory ends as ends we have adopted among our other ends can help us to determine how much we morally ought to do for the globally worst off. I argue that we should think of beneficence as an end we must adopt, but, apart from this, it should be considered like other ends we have adopted. This means that it is rational to promote beneficence effectively and when it comes with no costs to our other ends, and when the beneficent course of action would, on the whole, promote best the ends we have adopted. We do, however, not have to promote beneficence maximally, since we are not required to promote any of our ends to a maximum and to the detriment of other ends. This is not part of what it means to have an end on Kant's framework, given that Kant acknowledges that agents have a plurality of (moral and non-moral) ends. Furthermore, for the promotion of our ends immediacy and spatial and other distance is significant. This grounds a certain degree of partiality in the application of beneficence and this grounding of partiality is not simply an *ad hoc* intervention to ward off the requirement that we must do all we can to help the distant poor. It is in line with how we think of the pursuit of all ends and supported by the idea that we must adopt beneficence as an end.

My reading of the normative status of imperfect duties contrasts with both: approaches that deny that we have latitude regarding how much we do to fulfil

imperfect duties (Timmermann, Cummiskey) and overly latitudinarian approaches that maintain that we only have to do something and only sometimes (Hill). My reading affords a new way of thinking about imperfect duties modelled on our everyday understanding of promoting ends and the everyday ways in which agents weigh different personal projects against each other. Insofar as, *ceteris paribus*, less revisionary conceptions of morality are to be preferred over more revisionary ones, the idea to think about beneficence as one of our ends is attractive.

Sergey Lugovoy

(Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University)

Kant and the Problem of Interreligious Conflicts in Modern Society

One of the global challenges faced by political action in the 21st century is the aggravation of interreligious contradictions. According to the Pew Research report for 2015, about 5.5 billion people (77% of the world's population) live in conditions of actual religious enmity or restriction of religious freedom. Large-scale migration processes and reactions to them have led to the spread of fundamentalism and the emergence of national-religious social movements. The situation is aggravated by the fact that, on the one hand, most states declare that the character of power is secular and that all religions are equal, but, on the other hand, these same states provide special privileges and financial assistance to traditional religions. The politicization of religion inevitably raises questions about a possible collusion between the church and the state on the basis of common vested interests and harms the moral authority of the "official" religions. At the same time, the fundamental human right to freedom of religious choice, enshrined in the constitutions of most states, sometimes serves as a cover for terrorist organizations in recruitment. All this increases the number of interreligious conflicts and creates difficulties in trying to solve them on the political plane.

In Kant's philosophy, when thinking about the phenomenon of religious conflicts and developing methods for their resolution, it is suggested to take into account not only politics but ethics as well. Since, from Kant's point of view, any historical religion has a moral essence that is universally valid for all people (pure religious faith), then conflicts, according to the Koenigsberg philosopher, arise only because of the non-essential and random components of religion. Further, any belief for Kant has only subjective certainty, therefore, to a true religion, each person can come exclusively independently, and forcible conversion is futile and meaningless: religion is in the sphere of a person's individual private life. Finally, in matters of faith, Kant recommends that one be guided by conscience, that is, try to act in accordance with the categorical imperative of practical reason. All other models of behavior, including attempts to regulate religious relations without regard for morality, with the help of purely external legislation are unpromising and inevitably become false service to God. On the contrary, moral enlightenment reduces

the likelihood of any conflicts, promotes mutual understanding between people and allows us to hope for the attainment of eternal peace.

Frédéric Tremblay

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The Neo-Kantian Conception of First Philosophy as Ethics, the 'Oughtization' of Culture, and Scientific Objectivity

From the time of Aristotle up to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, metaphysics (ontology) was considered to be the *philosophia prima*, i.e., the first philosophy. With his *cogito ergo sum*, Descartes had sown the seed that would lead to the overthrow of metaphysics from the throne of first philosophy. But only with Kant did the reign of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) truly begin. However, Kant also belonged to a tradition that gives priority to practical reason (ethics) over both metaphysics and epistemology. This may seem paradoxical at first glance, but the so-called “Copernican revolution in philosophy” was a necessary condition for the ethical turn to occur, because the defense of the primacy of ethics first required a re-centering of philosophy around the human being. The founder of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, has also carried forward the Kantian project of promoting the conception of the primacy of ethics. For Cohen, the thing in itself becomes the ethical task, which in turn is conceived as the very essence of God. So, according to him, considerations about what “is” should always be subordinate to considerations about what “ought to be.” In fact, for him, nothing truly “is” besides God; nature and the entire region of the world studied by the natural sciences is reduced to nonbeing. On this view, “truth” no longer means “correspondence with the facts,” but something like “faithfulness to God/ethics.” This worldview — and variations of it — has continued to gain ground during the twentieth century with thinkers such as Emmanuel Lévinas, and Western culture as a whole continues to become increasingly “ought-centered” today. In this talk, I am concerned with the conception of first philosophy as ethics as defended principally by Kant and Cohen. Moreover, since this conception unconditionally prioritizes what “ought to be” over what “is,” and since science is concerned with facts, i.e., with what “is,” the question naturally arises whether the prioritization of ethics is compatible with science. Can science remain objective under the weight of a dominant culture that demands at every turn that scientific results align with what it has decided ought to be the case?

Love In Global Politics: A Kantian Reworking Of Rawls And Nussbaum

This presentation argues that love ought to play a substantial role in the shaping of global politics, and that Kant's practical philosophy offers resources for conceptualising politically effective love in a global context. The resolution of contemporary global problems, such as climate change and rising income inequality especially in developed countries, requires not only multi-national, institutional co-operation, but also individual understanding and acknowledgment of responsibility for the direct and indirect consequences of one's actions.

At least since Rawls, liberal theory has been able to conceptualise the sense of justice and love of humanity as continuous with each other, and in the recent work of Martha Nussbaum, we have witnessed an explicit revival of the emotion of love in a political context. While freedom and justice form the core value basis for public institutions in the liberal framework, love may be indispensable for enabling the adequate functionality of these institutions. In the theories of Rawls and Nussbaum, love plays a dual role. On the one hand, especially in Rawls' moral psychology, love received from others builds trust and an understanding of the value of reciprocity, which together serve as the subjective foundation of the sense of justice. On the other hand, especially for Nussbaum, love is the emotion which denotes intensive positive attachments to other persons, institutions, and ideals.

Following Rawls and Nussbaum, I argue that there is an interplay between the policies of public institutions and the emotional dispositions of citizens in a given political context, and that relatively intense emotional attachments to concrete or ideal objects facilitate action with respect to those objects. In other words, human emotions participate in the shaping of politics, and we take better care of what we love. In her plea for a more humane and just society, Nussbaum calls for 'critical patriotism' or 'love of one's country' to overcome narrow self-interest. Rawls, for his part, thinks that love of humankind is 'supererogatory' or 'saintly', and hence cannot be demanded of individuals let alone of institutions. In contrast to Rawls and Nussbaum, I contend that to effectively confront the most pressing global problems of our time, what humanity needs politically is a more direct rational and emotional engagement with representations of the planet Earth and of our species as a whole in terms of love.

Turning to Kant's moral theory, I argue that there are resources in Kantian ethics and moral psychology for conceptualising and developing this kind of love of humanity in a political context. In particular, I focus on Kant's notions of 'universal love of human beings' [*allgemeine Menschenliebe*] and 'friend of human beings' [*Freund der Menschen*], which are founded on the concept of rationally commanded benevolence towards others. I propose that by building

on these notions, it is possible to construct a global politics of love that avoids relying on the category of the 'supererogatory', that is more universalistic in scope than the politics of love proposed by Nussbaum, and that can be emotionally appealing despite being grounded in the Kantian thought of 'duty'.

Vadim Chaly

(Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University)

Towards the Kantian notions of political rationality and political reason

Explaining and justifying the separation of one's political activity from what is often called one's "worldview", constitutional in many countries, remains one of the biggest issues for political philosophy. It might seem that a person, when entering the arena of political interaction, is required to resign her most cherished values, ends, and hopes, assuming an artificial and restricted role of an instrumentally rational individualist. This requirement seems to affect not only theistic or religious worldviews, but also, and somewhat paradoxically, worldviews based upon belief in universal powers of reason. Kantian transcendentalism in many eyes falls victim of this requirement. However, present combination of the onset of worldview positions in politics and skeptical distrust of universality of reason seems to call for a reconsideration of transcendentalism.

My paper deals with the notions of rationality and reason as applied to politics in the broad sense of participation in the collision of interests, ends, and values. My task is to restate their relationship in Kant's philosophy and some recent Kantian discussions in search for a more harmonious, realistic, and universal model of *homo politicus*, suited for the project of "new Enlightenment".

After a brief restatement of politically relevant features of Kant's anthropological model, I will turn to examining some of its recent interpretations. In Kantian nomenclature, theoretical problems of politics belong to practical philosophy. However, practical reason with its ideas finds here a severely restricted use. God, immortality and freedom as potential sources for fanaticism and enthusiasm are left outside of politics, and the task of building a political community is addressed as if for a "nation of devils", i.e. beings, led exclusively by egoistic instrumental rationality. But the resultant community is insufficient to realize a human life, so to address this Kant develops in "Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason" the idea of an "ethical community", built on unity of moral principles and faith. This, together with his philosophy of history, helps ease the tension between politics and morality, rationality and reason and bring into alignment rational individualist aims and universally reasonable ends.

Kant's Philosophy and the Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation

Over the past years, a number of Russian lawyers have suggested that Kant is the 'father of Russia's constitution', meaning the constitution that became effective following the 1993 referendum. This assumption comes from the fact that Kant formulated the doctrinal principles of the legal state, which are also the tenets of today's Russia. Another argument in favour of such a position is that the term *Verfassung*, which is repeatedly used in Kant's texts, can be translated as *constitution* (Petr Barenboim). Moreover, Kantian philosophy is occasionally invoked in legal conflicts at the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. After the consideration of the legitimacy of the armed conflict between President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament in 1993, one of the judges of the Constitutional Court expressed his opinion regarding the court decision. He concluded his speech with a citation from Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*: 'But one who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him' (AA, VI 437). Similar quotations from Kant – 'the one who is tired of fighting for their rights, has no longer the right to be called human' (a paraphrase of an excerpt from Kant's lectures on ethics, AA, XXVII 435, 1554) – are often used as slogans at opposition rallies.

The thesis that Kant is the 'father of Russia's constitution' has drawn criticism from Kant scholars. They stress that the provisions of the Constitution require amendments to match the spirit of Kantian philosophy and Kant's view of the legal state. According to Kantians, not only legal reforms but also a change in the moral condition of the Russian society and reforms in education – in the spirit of humanisation rather than juridification – are due in this context (Vladimir Belov).

The current discussion on philosophical and legal problems in Russia shows both parties are not really interested in Kant's legal thought, particularly, in his views on property, contract, family relationships, etc., which are presented in the 'Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right'. One of the actual authors of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Sergey Alekseev, carried out a special study on the problems of right in Kant. He even used a quotation from Kant in the title of the study (Alekseev S. S. 1998. *Samoe svyatoe, chto est u Boga na zemle. Immanuel Kant i problemy prava v sovremennuyu epokhu* [God's most sacred institution. Immanuel Kant and the current problems of law]. Moscow). Alekseev based his study on Kant's works on the problems of morals and later socio-political writings, choosing the German philosopher's lectures on ethics over the 'Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right'. The current discussion often ignores the boundary between right and ethics and appeals to Kant as an ethicist are made to prove one's position on legal matters.

When one considers how the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation infers and justifies human rights, it becomes evident to what degree the

document embraces the ideas of Kantian philosophy, and how it describes human dignity in legal terms. A comparison of the Constitution of the Russian Federation with some European constitutions in effect, including that of Germany, and with the text of the last Soviet constitution of 1977 gives a further insight.

Andrey Zilber

(Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University)

Kant's cosmopolitan right and its wandering borders

"The right of world citizenship" is an essential component in the peace project, proposed by Kant. It does not contradict civil rights, it does not confuse the rights of citizens and foreigners. This is an innovative proposal: the right to peaceful relations not only at the state level, but also at the level of the relations of people with states and people among themselves. It includes prohibitions of piracy, imperialism, and colonialism under any pretext. And, what is especially popular in the current culture of travelling, Kant's cosmopolitan project includes the right to openness of any country to any visitor, who does not behave in a hostile way towards this country and its inhabitants. Kant has called it "universal hospitality".

We can assume that, among all the requirements of Kant's peace project, this right turned out to be the most easily realized and is exercised to the greatest extent. As for selective or individual restrictions - Kant himself allowed such measures in a situation of difficult economic and political relations. As for sanctions, Kant would likely support only those that can be undertaken by the UN Security Council under section VII of the UN Charter. The policy of isolationism that was conducted in the socialist states is also quite acceptable according to Kant's views, given his position on the question of "despotic" regimes: he preferred their slow reform to rapid destruction with loss of sovereignty and immersion in anarchy.

We can assume that the conditions of universal hospitality have already been created. Special treaties between the states establish a visa-free visit regime - this is already a friendly relationship, more than a universal peaceful relationship. The right of world citizenship strengthens especially trade relations which include short-term visits. The right to permanent settlement is outside the conditions of universal hospitality. Today, however, international law has gone even further, it is complemented by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Kant was very appreciative of the nature of people's disinterested curiosity towards the outside world and readiness for resettlement. There are accounts, according to which the refugee crisis brings about the downfall of hospitality, as if Kant had included refugees in (the concept of) hospitality. I argue that Kant did not include refugees in hospitality and did not consider such kind of problem.

There is one more problematic aspect, processes of globalization. The positive effect of globalization is obvious, but it has opponents, both in

economic and cultural dimensions. A special group of problems is borne by the scientific and technological revolution and the development of means of communication. Before the First World War, visas were a formality, they were issued at border points and served only the purpose of registering foreign citizens. The strengthening of control and restrictions on entry is a reaction to a sharp increase in migration flows. Espionage, which was criticized already by Kant, now reaches a new level of development; in addition we have international terrorism that was unknown to Kant. Increased mobility, the decrease of close local connections between people and the strengthening of long-distance electronic communication - it all causes concern in government institutions. It is not entirely clear how to assess this problem of private communication in Kant's view. It is clear that he spoke for the natural right of freedom and especially the freedom of public communication in print media. According to Jürgen Habermas, who calls himself Kantian, countering terrorism does not require the restriction of basic human rights, although this thesis requires some clarification.

David Bakhurst

(Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario)

Kant, Education, and the Formation of Reason

Kant wrote that “the greatest and most difficult” problem is the problem of education. This is because education is fundamental to the human condition. Education is the process by which each individual inherits the collective wisdom of previous generations, and is initiated into styles of thinking and reasoning, as well as norms, practice and modes of feeling, constitutive of the culture into which she is born. This process of *Bildung* is one in which the individual's very capacity to reason is nurtured and cultivated – she learns how to think – and in which her moral sensibilities are developed and refined. Education therefore makes us what we are. It not only shapes our identity, it is also the condition of our freedom, since for Kant freedom and rational responsiveness are one. What makes the problem of education difficult, of course, is that we can fail to educate well, and thereby harm and debilitate those we seek to educate.

My project seeks to defend this broadly Kantian idea of the philosophical significance of education, but to develop it philosophically, first by replacing Kant's rationalistic conception of reason with one that sees responsiveness to reasons as drawing on, rather than as suppressing, the emotional and appetitive dimensions of our lives; second, by transcending Kant's vision of reason as fundamentally rule-bound; and third, by overcoming the narrow progressivism that accompanies Kant's conception of Enlightenment and the essentially civilizing development of culture. This will enable a satisfying account of the role of education in the cultivation of powers of reason and moral judgement, which will in turn facilitate our ability to address those burning questions, political and environmental, that confront humanity today,

and equip us better to understand the potential and the limits of technology, not only to enhance human life, but to enable the very process of education itself.

Thomas Sturm

(ICREA / Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Kant's Concept of Reason, Current Theories of Rationality, and Their Impact on Politics

'Reason' (*Vernunft*) is the overarching, integrative concept of Kant's philosophy. It forms and frames all parts of his thinking about metaphysics, morality and science, his philosophy of history and anthropology, with far-reaching consequences for his Enlightenment political theory. The account plays different roles and applies different concepts and principles – but despite of this complexity, Kant maintains to have developed a unified, systematic theory of what reason is.

Today, 'rationality', is a central concept not only in philosophy but also in the human sciences – such as psychology, economics, sociology, or political science (cf. also Mele & Rawlings 2004; Knauff & Spohn, forthcoming). Normative conceptions of rationality have changed considerably since Kant's times: in the twentieth century, the human sciences became dominated by formal theories of probability, decisions, and games, with strong impact in politics (Erickson et al. 2013). Descriptively, this "standard account" (Stein 1996) has functioned both as *explanans* and as *explanandum* (e.g. in the *homo oeconomicus* model); in normative perspective, it often embodies the rules and standards by which to judge judgments and decisions. Recently, however, the standard account has become highly contested. It is no longer the undisputed view of what we mean by 'rationality' and 'irrationality'. One speaks even of "rationality wars" (Samuels, Stich & Bishop 2002; Sturm 2012; Wallin 2013): the concept seems deeply fragmented. This creates fundamental problems for the empirical study of human thought and conduct and, moreover, for attempts to improve political societies and their institutions on the basis of a better understanding of human reasoning.

In any case, current understandings of rationality seem to have displaced Kant's ambitious understanding of reason, particularly in its moral aspects. On a closer look, the change has not been radical. Depending on what domains one looks at (from everyday decisions to the choices of scientists over which theory to accept up to large-scale political or economic planning), one can discover differences, but also similarities. Up to now, Kant scholarship has focused primarily on internal questions of his notion of reason – such as its relation to the faculties of the understanding and judgment, or the postulate of the primacy of practical reason (e.g. Neiman 1994, Willascheck 2013, Hutter 2015). Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the impact and significance of Kant's account to current models is lacking. Some attempts can be found in the area of philosophy of science (Friedman 2001, 2002; Guyer 1990;

Morrison 1989), but with deficiencies and problems (Sturm, forthcoming). To start filling the gap, the talk will focus on three related topics with relations to current scientific studies of reasoning in social domains:

- (1) First, a comparison between central distinctions that can be found in both Kant and current debates over rationality, but that have undergone a change in meaning: (a) formal versus empirical aspects of decisions and actions, and (b) descriptive versus normative perspectives. Similar distinctions can also be found in the works of social scientists such as Herbert Simon, Daniel Kahneman and others, but often lead to very different (e.g. paternalistic versus non-paternalistic) ideas about rationality in political decision-making.
- (2) Then, I shall consider an interpretation that emphasizes quite a different aspect, and which has been defended, as far as I can see, only by the philosopher of science and operations researcher C.W. Churchman (1970): On this reading, Kant's moral philosophy contains core assumptions of modern formal decision theory – such as the idea that most of our choices must be made under radical uncertainty, and that this places a constraint on what practical norms can be realistic. At the same time, Churchman claimed that management or systems research should incorporate Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative.
- (3) Finally, I will comment on the more familiar thesis of Rawls (1980) and others that we ought to differentiate between *the reasonable* and *the rational* roughly along the lines of Kant's distinction between „pure practical“ and „empirical practical“ reason. For Rawls, this distinction is important for recognizing limits of our ability to reach agreement about fundamental political frameworks. This intuitively appealing comparison has also been exploited for psychological research. However, this happens without an explication and justification of normative assumptions, resulting in ambiguities of empirical studies.

In reflecting on these issues, I will emphasize that Kant's conception is not merely of historical interest for current debates but that, due to its high degree of systematicity, possesses considerable potentials for a critical assessment of the current fragmentation of rationality. The broader aim is to use the results for developing a more unified account of reason in politics and society.

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Kant's Philosophy of Education and Modern Text Analytics

The paper reconstructs the key ideas of Kant's philosophy of education in connection with the problems of text analytics. It regards the problem of communication 'through centuries' accomplished by a dialogue with a text – a dialogue structured in the form of text analytics. The authors analyse the notion of the 'class of thinkers', the characteristics of Kant's dialogue method, and the place of logic in his system of education. An analysis of Kant's model of philosophy of education stresses the importance of returning different types of questions and the equal author/reader dialogue to the educational structures of all levels. The paper emphasizes that the dialogue method of education is crucial to creating the 'class of thinkers'.

This study is structured in a manner that helps to reconstruct Kant's philosophy of education in view of his ideas on the role of dialogue and question/answer procedures in learning. A necessary element to achieve this is the ability to work with scientific texts regardless of their external form. Texts addressing the same problem can represent different eras, positions, and perspectives. The primary goal of researchers – even student researchers – is to analyse different positions and hold an equal dialogue with them. Students must not only learn and remember. They must be able to consider a variety of opinions to define their own position.

The proposed philosophical and methodological approach to the problems of Kant's philosophy of education is based on the authors' idea of informal text analytics (ITA). At the same time, ITA, in its turn rests on Kant's ideas about the methods for working with texts. Kant first introduced his methodological approach to text analytics in 'M. Immanuel Kant's *Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-6*'. In particular, Kant analysed different methods of teaching philosophy. 'The philosophical writer, for example, upon whom one bases one's instruction, is not to be regarded as the paradigm of judgment. He ought rather to be taken as the occasion for forming one's own judgment about him, and even, indeed, for passing judgment against him'. The authors believe that this idea is crucial to Kant's philosophy of education.

The Significance of Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics for Foundations of Mathematics

The problem of founding mathematical knowledge remains central to contemporary philosophy of mathematics. Such great thinkers as B. Russell, D. Hilbert, and L.E.J. Brouwer formulated main approaches to the problem, each utilizing central tenets of Kant's philosophy. Early XX century was the time of lively debates over Kant's views on mathematics. One has to admit that as a whole XX century saw severe criticism of Kant's philosophy of mathematics (for example, by logical positivists), and many mathematicians considered its significance for foundations of mathematics as dubious at best. This changed starting from 1960s, when works by J. Hintikka, C. Parsons, and P. Kitcher on Kant's philosophical foundations of mathematics caused a vibrant discussion. This led to a full-scale revival of interest in Kant's philosophy of mathematics. By end of XX century the failure of main programs of founding mathematics became obvious. New programs appeared, such as structuralism and naturalism, to offer alternatives to or reinterpretations of classical programs. At the same time working mathematicians found sufficient source of their ideas either in Platonism or in physics. Do Kant's ideas offer perspectives into current philosophical foundations of mathematics?

Kant tried to overcome the shortcomings of schemes of knowledge, including that of mathematics, found in rationalism (Descartes and Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke and Hobbes), by developing a new concept of subject's activity. "How is mathematics possible?", i.e. how are universal and necessary propositions of mathematics possible? – became one of key questions of Kant's philosophy. Main tenets of Kant's philosophy of mathematics, advanced in *Transcendental Aesthetic* and *Doctrine of Method* of *KrV* are as follows:

- 1) The idea of formality of mathematical as well as any other rational knowledge;
- 2) The doctrine of synthetic a priori nature of mathematical truths;
- 3) Idea that all mathematical knowledge is obtained through construction of concepts;
- 4) The immediate and necessary connection of mathematical knowledge to pure forms of intuition, i.e. with most basic spheres of experience.

It is possible that new philosophical and mathematical interpretations of Kant's views on mathematical knowledge will help find common foundation for contemporary competing theories of foundations of mathematics. For example, it could be the Kantian thought that mathematics is not a reflection of the experience, but also not part of logical syntax of language. It reflects cognitive activity of the subject in construction of mathematical objects, connecting logical forms of language to empirical reality.

The Enlightenment and the Scientific Method

In my presentation I attempt to clarify the relevance of the scientific methods and principles of the Enlightenment for the formation of new sciences and scientific fields. I analyze the applicability and viability of the scientific principles of Enlightenment in contemporary science and the future development of science in both the Humanities and Natural sciences. I pay special attention to the importance of the scientific concepts of Enlightenment in interdisciplinary research, which is often the beginning of new sciences.

Interdisciplinary research as an integrative process of modern knowledge plays an important role in the development of knowledge. At the time of Kant, the integrative processes in science were less developed, the encyclopaedic approach to scientific knowledge prevailed with the preservation of a general division of sciences. Therefore, it seems important to figure out, whether it is possible to relate Kant's apriorism and his ideas about scientific knowledge with an interdisciplinary approach of contemporary science.

The problem of the formation of new sciences is inextricably linked with the problem of constructing concepts. Categories form the diversity of nature in certain conceptual bundles. In scientific knowledge there is a constant construction of such bundles, concepts. Kant's theory of "the construction of concepts" has contemporary relevance, and manifestations of its actions can be observed in modern interdisciplinary research. Contemporary interdisciplinary research, if we look at it from the perspective of the science of the Enlightenment is just the tool for interrogating nature. It allows you to make the maximum number of questions to nature and "to force her to answer." It is a method that allows to create conditions for a unique, new way of constructing concepts, resulting in the formation of new sciences.


In my presentation I consider the current state of science both in retrospect and from the perspective of its future development. I analyze the role of mental experiments and the construction of objects of knowledge in science and in the formation of new fields of science; the problem of how science constructs the object of knowledge and how this construction is the basis for the creation of a new science; the knowing subject as a starting point for the choice of the method of knowledge; the problem of truth, necessity and universality of scientific knowledge; the problem of the preservation of independent and autonomous rational thinking in modern sciences.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

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