{"id":606,"date":"2014-09-12T20:43:22","date_gmt":"2014-09-12T20:43:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.kant-online.ru\/en\/?p=606"},"modified":"2014-09-12T21:06:07","modified_gmt":"2014-09-12T21:06:07","slug":"nikolay-milkov-the-historical-achievement-of-kants-critique-of-pure-reason","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/nikolay-milkov-the-historical-achievement-of-kants-critique-of-pure-reason\/","title":{"rendered":"Nikolay Milkov. The Historical Achievement of Kant\u2019s Critique of Pure Reason"},"content":{"rendered":"<style type=\"text\/css\"><!--\np.sdfootnote-western { margin-bottom: 0in; font-family: \"Times New Roman\",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; }p.sdfootnote-cjk { margin-bottom: 0in; font-family: \"Times New Roman\"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; }p.sdfootnote-ctl { margin-bottom: 0in; font-family: \"Times New Roman\"; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 150%; }p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; direction: ltr; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); line-height: 120%; text-align: justify; widows: 2; orphans: 2; }p.western { font-family: \"Times New Roman\",serif; font-size: 12pt; }p.cjk { font-family: \"Times New Roman\"; font-size: 12pt; }p.ctl { font-family: \"Times New Roman\"; font-size: 10pt; }a:link { color: rgb(0, 0, 255); }a.sdfootnoteanc { font-size: 57%; }\n--><\/style>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>1. Opening<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Some fifteen years ago Hermann Schmitz asked the question \u2018What did Kant really want?\u2019 (<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Was wollte Kant<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">?) His answer was: in his critical philosophy Kant wanted to theoretically ground the spontaneity of Reason [11, 365]. <\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> In this paper we will see that Hermann Schmitz\u2019s answer to his question is correct. Indeed, in <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Kant wanted to secure the spontaneity of reason. Schmitz\u2019s book book, however, did not specify the theoretical resources with which he made this. Our task here will be to fill this gap.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> More precisely, we are going to show that according to Kant, the spontaneity of pure reason is only secured if it is accepted that it recurrently <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>examines<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> the world. Further, we shall show that this is the old Plato\u2019s idea of peirastic dialectics\u2014of an examination of any suggested argument or theory, but also of facts and events under consideration\u2014that Kant revived for good. So far, this interpretation was mentioned in the literature only cursorily and only in relation to the transcendental dialectics [1, <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">98\u20139n. 179]<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> The problem of this paper can be also articulated with help of this question: What is the real achievement of <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> as seen from bird-eye view\u2014from the perspective of the 2500 years of history of Western philosophy? Our concern will be what Kant <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>really<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> revolutionised in philosophy; what were the intuitions, understandings and theories that he radically changed in it?<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>2. The Great Bifurcation of Philosophy<a href=\"#sdfootnote1sym\" name=\"sdfootnote1anc\"><sup>1<\/sup><\/a><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">It took place in the antiquity\u2014in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Roughly, it was a bifurcation between applied philosophy and logical philosophy. At the beginning, Plato conceived philosophy as peirastic: as an examination of arguments, theories and facts. Incidentally, that is why he defined philosophy as a search for wisdom. Soon, however, he stared to look for some rigorous, formal discipline that can do this job with more confidence. Plato found it in the Theory of Forms, the Forms being supposed to be the objects of this autonomous discipline. This was the first attempt to systematise peirastic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">This task was carried out further by Aristotle. First, he combined the discipline of truth-searching (peirastic) with the Theory of Forms into a Theory of General Kinds. The result of this blending is to be seen in his <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Categories<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. The next step was the discovery of syllogism. That discovery was made by reducing the Theory of Forms\u2014central to both Plato and to his <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Categories<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">\u2014and<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> of the method of division (the analysis) to a new discipline. The novelty was that whereas the method of division accepted that the middle term is universal, syllogistic claimed that the middle term must be inferior to the first and the third one. Of course, syllogistic had not the heuristic power of peirastic; in compensation, it was much more rigorous.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> This move had two important results: (1) Ontology became much more formal than before. More precisely, the investigation of Forms was replaced in it by investigation of the being <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>qua<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> being, the task of which was to describe the necessary principles of all sciences. (2) The new science of logical forms radically diminished the role of mathematical knowledge. This was only changed in the Enlightenment when Vietae and Descartes rediscovered analysis and developed it further. This process gone hand in hand with the refreshment of the old Plato peirastic dialectics (in the works of Hume, for example), despite the fact that scarcely anyone recognised it as such.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>3. Kant\u2019s Rediscovery of Dialectics<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Kant was the greatest synopticist in philosophy. In his masterpiece, <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, he deduced all <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>a priori<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> concepts from one single principle, and in one system. His synopticism, however, was not only logical; it was historical as well. Indeed, it was often being claimed that <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> was an attempt to put into one empiricism and rationalism. In contrast, we put stress on another side of Kant\u2019s historical synopticism: he successfully combined into one the just discussed two philosophical traditions that were advanced apart for more than 2000 years: peirastic dialectics and philosophical logic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Apparently, this step of Kant was prompted by the published in 1765 of <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Nouveaux Essais<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> of Leibniz [15, 234]. Leibniz\u2019s point was that the \u2018new philosophers\u2019\u2014Descartes and Locke\u2014\u2018have carried the reform too far\u2019. Instead, he pleaded \u2018to rehabilitate the old philosophy and restore the all but banished substantial forms\u2019 [7, 11]. Kant followed this advice of Leibniz closely.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Toward the end of the 1760s he was a brilliant analyst. Indeed, when in 1763 the Berlin Academy of Science in Berlin organised a philosophic competition asking \u2018Are the metaphysical truths at all open for the clear proofs of geometry?\u2019, he won the second price (the first price won Moses Mendelson [<\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">3, 26 f.].<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">After Kant read Leibniz\u2019 <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Nouveaux Essais<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, however, he turned back to the Greeks. Indeed, in contrast to Leibniz, he did not remained by the Aristotelian substantial forms but revived a long forgotten philosophical outfield\u2014the peirastic dialectics. We have already noted that dialectic was discovered by Plato and developed further, but in the same time made harmless, by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages it was extensively discussed, but often misinterpreted. After the analytical revolution of Descartes and Locke, it was totally forgotten. Not in Germany, however. It was preserved there in the seventeenth century\u2014in K\u00f6nigsberg even in the eighteenth century [15, 241]. That is where Kant picked it out from.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>4. A Short History of <\/b><\/span><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><i><b>CPR<\/b><\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Historically, Kant\u2019s masterpiece was composed in three steps. <\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>(1) 1765\u201369<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. His first step was the discussion of the antinomies. Indeed, today it is widely accepted that \u2018the problems of antinomity were developed prior to . . . Kant\u2019s transcendental philosophy\u2019 [12, 398]. What is more, exactly the antinomy of the pure reason helped Kant to \u2018wake up from the dogmatic slumber\u2019.<a href=\"#sdfootnote2sym\" name=\"sdfootnote2anc\"><sup>2<\/sup><\/a> Our guess is that his work on the antinomies in 1765\u20139 made Kant to go back to the technique of peirastic dialectic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>(2) 1769<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Kant\u2019s discovery from 1769 was nothing but realising of the subjectivity of space and time as <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>a priori<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> forms of the sensitive intuition [12, 393]. Now, our guess is that <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Kant found a dialectical solution to the antithetical problem when working on the subjectivity of space and time: he first made use of peirastic dialectics in the transcendental aesthetic (see the next section 5), and then resolved the antinomies in a dialectical way.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>(3) 1769\u201380<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Finally came the task of elaborating his new science (why it was new we shall see in section 7): the transcendental deduction of the categories. This task was accomplished slowly and in very hard work which, in a sense, remained unfinished (see [9, 169]). For it Kant himself has said in <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Prolegomena <\/i><\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">that \u2018this deduction was the most difficult thing that was ever made in metaphysics\u2019<\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><b>5. Epistemological Peirastic<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Our main thesis in this paper is that in <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR <\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Kant managed to transform the idea of examining dialectic into the idea of origin-testing activity of human mind. He thus substantiated the understanding that \u2018knowledge is an activity, not a state, of the mind\u2019 [17, 323]. On this understanding, the subject has a highest grade of creativity\u2014of free action. <\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Now the origin-testing of our knowledge is realised in three forms.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>(1) Intuition<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Our perception (intuition) is accomplished in combining <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>noumena<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> and forms. Indeed, every judgement of perception <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">tests<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> the matter and choices out of its multiplicity some <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>elements<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> that it orders in a certain <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>form<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> (pattern).<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>(2) Experience<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Kant claims that our <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">experience<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> is not merely a calculation. This means that the mere assimilation of the data of experience is not enough in order to receive new knowledge. By perceiving single individuals, we <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>ipso facto<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> penetrate \u2018to [the] empirical or experimental <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>conditions<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> of their application\u2019 ([13, 16] my italics; see also [13, 78]). These formal conditions\u2014conditions of object\u2019s pertaining to a certain <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>kind<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, conditions of their <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>identity<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, etc.\u2014form a part of the unified objective world.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>(3) Understanding<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. The <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>ideas<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> of pure reason don\u2019t refer to objects; rather, they strive to make reason complete, this completeness being secured by <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>principles<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. The need of principles of human understanding is a consequence of the discursive nature of the latter, which requires from us to ascribe a subject to every predicate, and to this subject a subject again, and so on ad <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">infinitum [8, 333].<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> According also to the ordinary usage, the principles are polices for acting, including cognitive acting. Something similar goes for <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>ideas<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Truly, the peculiarity of Plato\u2019s ideas, for example, is that they both have their own being, and in the same time are related to reality. This is exactly what Kant\u2019s ideas are. They are formulas for testing, examining reality, according to a supreme <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>principle<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. <\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Evidently, ideas are not <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>constitutive<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> but rather <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>regulative<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. So they do not directly refer to objects. The great mistake of the pre-critical metaphysics is that it followed the <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>reason<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, who often gives way to the inclination to use ideas as if they do directly refer to objects. An example: we neither have an experience with infinite, nor with finite space\/time. These are only ideas of adding\/dividing phenomena which we often treat as directly referring to objects.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>6. Judgement\u2014The Uniting Element of Pure Reason<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">The examining function of human reason, that we just have followed on three levels, is its unifying element. In the formal (general) logic it is called <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>judgement<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. The centrality of judgement makes Kant to define reason as \u2018the ability to <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">judge\u2019 [6, A69\/B91].<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Indeed, the judgement is a necessary element of any form of examining: <\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">In perception (in the synthesis of apperception) the judgement unifies the multiplicity of experience into one notion;<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">In thinking (the synthesis of apprehension) it connects notions to concepts; <\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">In understanding it puts the multiplicity of the concept under ideas.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> That explains why both the deduction of the categories and the exposition of the antinomies of reason are based on the conventional classification of judgements in formal logic. The difference is only that while the sources of the categories are the four logical functions of the judgement of the pure reason, the sources of the ideas are sough in the three functions of the inference of understanding <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[8, 330].<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> This function of judgement is the same both in the synthesis of the apprehension, i.e. in our<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i> ability to imagine<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, as well as in the synthesis of apperception, i.e. in our <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>ability to judge<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. However, while the judgement used in our ability to imagine is a blind function of the soul <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[6, A78, B103], <\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">in our ability to judge it requires a talent that cannot be learned but exercised <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[6, A133\/ B172].<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>7. Kant\u2019s Transcendental Idealism as a New Logic<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Kant\u2019s project for transcendental idealism was nothing but an advancement of a new formal discipline in philosophy\u2014of a new logic.<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> More precisely, after his turn of 1769, Kant made something similar to what Aristotle did in regard to Plato\u2019s dialectic: He as if tamed it in the net of logic, inventing in this way a new formal discipline that he called <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>transcendental idealism<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> This point is manifested quite well in the fact that both Aristotle and Kant claimed to have discovered a totally new science. So Aristotle was adamant that he was first in writing down the science of syllogistic: I had no predecessors, said he in <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Soph.El<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> 184b1\u20133. Similarly, Kant uses to repeat: \u2018This [his transcendental idealism] is a totally new science of which nobody has ever thought of.\u2019 <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[8, 262]<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> In history of philosophy this claim of Aristotle\u2013Kant is unique.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Kant\u2019s new science is, above all, formal. First, similarly to Aristotle\u2019s syllogistic, transcendental idealism claimed that all parts of our pure knowledge are organically connected with one another. They are deducible from one principle (from the judgement) in a transcendental deduction of categories [4, 79]. Secondly, similarly to Aristotle\u2019s syllogistic, its function was to advance a strict chain of inferring\u2014not to support truth-discoveries. Indeed, Kant\u2019s transcendental idealism was restrictive, not heuristic: what was heuristic was tucked into what is formal.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Specifically, Kant\u2019s new logic was a synthesis between formal logic and peirastic. This was a new, \u2018vertical\u2019 kind of logic which, besides intuitions and notions, also included in itself free will and action\u2014the practice of judging. In other words, the new logic was a sublation of the conventional formal logic\u2014inasmuch as it suggested a formula for recurrent search of something that is basic to perception and experience. <\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> In a way, the transcendental idealism was developed <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>in<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>parallel<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> to <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Aristotle\u2019s syllogistic and so <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">seconded<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> it. Incidentally, Kant was explicit that his <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>table of concepts<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> corresponds to the [Aristotelian, in principle] <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>table of judgements<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Indeed, the <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">concepts are nothing but judgements<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, but applied to intuition <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[8, 302].<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Another characteristic of Kant\u2019s new logic was that it set out a program for content logic. More precisely, the content is involved in it through the procedure of examining the <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>matter<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Putting this in Wittgensteinaian idiom, we can say that while Aristotle\u2019s logic consisted only of rules, the new logic of Kant added to the rules the method of their application.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>8. The Aftermath<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">The introduction of Kant\u2019s new logic had consequences that pointed at quite different directions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> (1) Kant\u2019s new logic made conventional logic much more formal. This development was carried out further by Johann Friedrich Herbart. Later it was criticised by the neo-Aristotelians of the nineteenth century Adolf Trendelenburg and his pupil Franz Brentano.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> (2) The advance of new logic had as an effect the establishing of the <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Kathederphilosophie<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> in the German universities: this was the institutional effect of accepting the new method of doing philosophy. So within the next 25 years after the publishing of <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, the great men contemplating the world <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>sub specie aeternitatis<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> vanished from Germany without a trace.<a href=\"#sdfootnote3sym\" name=\"sdfootnote3anc\"><sup>3<\/sup><\/a> Incidentally, this process was related to what occurred after the victory of analytical philosophy in England in the late 1920s and early 1930s.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">(3) The introduction of the new logic in philosophy had, however, another effect on philosophy which was related to that of the introduction of the logical analysis in the twentieth century: \u2018[the] subsequent unavoidable dryness, and scholastic precision\u2019 <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[8, 262]<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. This was the result of the requirement that philosophy must develop not spontaneously but under the control of the logical schemes. Indeed, Kant was adamant that the critical reason \u2018keeps common reason in check and prevents it from speculating\u2019 [8,<\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">259].<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Thus, it is something like an intellectual police <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[6, B xxv]<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> which must keep philosophers away from speculation. (<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">The metaphor of intellectual police is also used in [8,<\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">\u00a7 57]).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">In a similar way, the intellectuals of the twentieth century, foreign to the analytic tradition in philosophy, understood its function, when confronted with it, as that of \u2018philosophical police\u2019. This was also the impression of Albert Einstein when he read something of Russell\u2019s writings on epistemology [2, 281].<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> For our investigation it is interesting to point out that similar effects had also Aristotle\u2019s attack on Plato\u2019s dialectic. Indeed, it \u2018may usefully be compared with the attempt of the twentieth-century positivists to free science from metaphysics. Aristotle rejects the pretensions of a non-empirical discipline claiming to be a science and to prescribe to the genuine empirical sciences.\u2019 [5, 147]<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> (4) The theoretical effect of introducing the new logic in philosophy was the slow but steady increase of its influence. This finished with the victory of the analytic philosophy over continental philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>9. Kant\u2019s New Logic as Philosophical Logic<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Kant\u2019s new logic from <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> was developed in the next two centuries in the form of <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>philosophical logic<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. It was first called so by Trendelenburg in 1840, and advanced further by the neo-Kantians from the second half of the nineteenth century. It received a full-fledged form in analytic philosophy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> In this connection, it is of importance to mention that philosophical logic had a peculiar kind of progress, different from that of both peirastic dialectics and formal logic: Its progress was closer to the progress of rules-of-a-game than to a progress in style. This explains its rather slow advancement.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> This fact explains why Bradley, who, \u2018unlike many of his Oxford contemporaries . . . had no high opinion [of German philosophy]\u2019 [14, 7], nonetheless accepted practically all discoveries made in philosophical logic of the German neo-Kantians Lotze, Erdmann, Sigwart. It also explains the otherwise mysterious fact that Bradley, the Hegelian, strongly influenced Moore and Russell, the atomists: he influenced them through some theses of his (Kantian, in spirit) philosophical logic. Another typical example is the fight against psychologism in logic in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In fact, it was nothing but a fight for the assimilation of the new, philosophical logic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> The new, philosophical logic had as a result a further clarification of the conceptual scheme of the pure knowledge, as well as of the whole of philosophy. More precisely, it was developed as an extensive investigation of the being <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>qua<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> being. The latter was already treated by Plato, and, as mentioned, was developed in full (after the discovery of syllogistic) by Aristotle. Kant\u2019s merit was that he was the first to articulate it in a clear-cut form. But how did he made this?<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> The first example of the new (philosophical) logic was suggested by Hume. He, in particular, made the ontological discovery that causal connections have not a necessary character. An implication of this discovery was the requirement every philosophical theory to be tested is it free from accepting necessary causes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Picking up where Hume left off, Kant made this requirement of testing philosophical theories and statements systematic (<\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">cf. [8, 257\u201360]).<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Indeed, first declared task of <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> was to suggest a comprehensive philosophical theory, deduced from one principle, which to serve as an a priori <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>canon<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> for examining pure reason. This characteristic of the new, philosophical logic can be also expressed this way: \u2018[Kant] made all material questions dependent on solving methodological problems\u2019 [16<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">, 26]<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Indeed, Kant was adamant that <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>CPR<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> \u2018is a treatise on the method\u2019 <\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">[6, Bxxii].<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Further, Kant insisted that this is a specific philosophical method which is not merely an application of the methods of mathematics on philosophy, as it was accepted by Plato\u2013Descartes\u2013Leibniz\u2013Hume. In fact, this point of Kant was a revival of an old Aristotelian belief. This was, incidentally, a severe blow against the analytism in philosophy. Ironically, it was partly neutralised with the emergence of the analytic philosophy which, besides components of analysis, also embraced a Kantian, in spirit, philosophical logic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\" align=\"center\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\" align=\"center\"><span style=\"font-size: large;\"><b>Bibliography:<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Bittner R<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. \u00dcber die Bedeutung der Dialektik Immanuel Kants. Diss., Heidelberg, 1970.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Einstein A<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Remarks on Bertrand Russell\u2019s Theory of Knowledge \/\/ P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. La Salle (Ill.): Open Court, 1944. pp. 277\u2013292.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Engfer H.J.<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Philosophie als Analyse. Stuttgart\u2013Bad Canstatt: Frommann\u2013Holzboog, 1982.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Erdmann B<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Die Idee von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin: Reimer, 1917.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Irwin T<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Aristotle\u2019s First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Kant I.<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Kritik der reinen Vernuft (1787) \/\/ Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe). <\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Bd. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter Verlag, 1968.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Kant I<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Briefe. Hrsg. J. Zehbe, G\u00f6ttingen: Vandenhoek &amp; Ruprecht, 1970.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\" align=\"justify\"><span style=\"font-family: PhoneticTM,serif;\"><span style=\"font-family: Times New Roman,serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Kant I.<\/i><\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Times New Roman,serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic, with Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-family: Times New Roman,serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> (translated and edited by Gary Hatfield). Cambridge University Press, 1997.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Leibniz G. F. W<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Discourse on Metaphysics and Related Writings, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Milkov N. M<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Varieties of Understanding: English Philosophy since 1898. 2 vols. New York: Lang, 1997.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Sala G. B<\/i><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Bausteine zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kants \/\/ Kant-Studien. 1987. \u211678. 153\u2013169.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Schmitz H<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Was wollte Kant? Bonn: Bouvier, 1989.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Schmucker J<\/i><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Was entz\u00fcndete in Kant das gro\u00dfe Licht von 1769?<\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> \/\/<\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie, 1976. <\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">\u2116 58. 393\u2013434.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Strawson P. F<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen, 1966.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Taylor A. E. F. H<\/i><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Bradley \/\/ Mind, 1925. <\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">\u2116 34. 1\u201312.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Tonelli G<\/i><\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #00000a;\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-Aristotelianische Terminologie bei Kant w\u00e4hrend der Entstehung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft \/\/ Archiv f\u00fcr Begriffsgeschichte, 1964. \u21169. 233\u201342.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Vaihinger <\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>H<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>.<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.<\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> 2 B\u00e4nde. Stuttgart: Spemann, 1881.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><span style=\"font-size: medium;\"><i>Wolff R. P<\/i><\/span><span style=\"font-size: medium;\">. Kant\u2019s Theory of Mental Activity. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press (first ed. 1963), 1969.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div id=\"sdfootnote1\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><a href=\"#sdfootnote1anc\" name=\"sdfootnote1sym\">1<\/a><span style=\"font-family: Arial,serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: xx-small;\">\u0002<\/span><\/span> The remarks in this section are based on [9, 44\u201356].<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"sdfootnote2\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><a href=\"#sdfootnote2anc\" name=\"sdfootnote2sym\">2<\/a><span style=\"font-family: Arial,serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: xx-small;\">\u0002<\/span><\/span> See Kant\u2019s letter to Garve from Sept. 21, 1798 [7, 265\u2013266].<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"sdfootnote3\">\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><a href=\"#sdfootnote3anc\" name=\"sdfootnote3sym\">3<\/a><span style=\"font-family: Arial,serif;\"><span style=\"font-size: xx-small;\">\u0002<\/span><\/span> As Hegel deplores in <i>Sc.Log<\/i>. \u00a7 26.<\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><i><b>This article was firstly published in collected articles \u201c<\/b><\/i><i><b>Kant zwischen West und Ost<\/b><\/i><i><b>\u201d (2005):<\/b><\/i><\/p>\n<p lang=\"en-US\"><a name=\"_GoBack\"><\/a> Milkov, Nikolay. The Historical Achievement of Kant\u2019s Critique of Pure Reason\/\/ Kant zwischen West und Ost. Zum Gedenken an Kants 200. Todestag und 280. Geburtstag. Hrsg. Von Prof. Dr. Wladimir Bryuschinkin. Bd.2. Kaliningrad, 2005. P. 200- 209.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>1. Opening Some fifteen years ago Hermann Schmitz asked the question \u2018What did Kant really want?\u2019 (Was wollte Kant?) His answer was: in his critical philosophy Kant wanted to theoretically ground the spontaneity of Reason [11, 365]. In this paper we will see that Hermann Schmitz\u2019s answer to his question is correct. Indeed, in CPR [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":607,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[2],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/606"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=606"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/606\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":609,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/606\/revisions\/609"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/607"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=606"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=606"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=606"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}