{"id":404,"date":"2014-05-23T12:40:23","date_gmt":"2014-05-23T12:40:23","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.kant-online.ru\/en\/?p=404"},"modified":"2014-05-23T12:40:23","modified_gmt":"2014-05-23T12:40:23","slug":"patricia-kauark-leite-classical-reason-and-quantum-rationality-transcendental-philosophy-face-contemporary-physics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/patricia-kauark-leite-classical-reason-and-quantum-rationality-transcendental-philosophy-face-contemporary-physics\/","title":{"rendered":"Patr\u00edcia Kauark-Leite. Classical Reason and Quantum Rationality: Transcendental Philosophy Face Contemporary Physics"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Patricia<\/a>

Patricia Kauark-Leite<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n

Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason<\/i> in 1781 and the Metaphysical Foundations of<\/i> Natural Science<\/i> in 1786, taking as reference Newtonian physics. Naturally, we cannot expect that his doctrine be applied without any modification to the contemporary physics. Otherwise, we cannot ignore the challenges of the pragmatic-linguistic turn of contemporary philosophy post Wittgenstein. Thus, to evaluate the relevance and properness of transcendental thought we should take the Kantian philosophy, not as a fact, but as a method. This very powerful method, however, must be updated to support the new constraints of contemporary science. This science, indeed, that must be taken as a fact and not the Kantian philosophy itself. In the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics.<\/p>\n

In the1930\u2019s, efforts to extend transcendental analysis to the field of contemporary physics were made by Neo-Kantian philosophers, such as Grete Hermann, Ernst Cassirer and even Heisenberg himself. More recently, new approaches[1]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> began more exhaustively to explore <\/i>the potential of transcendental philosophy, anchored on current debates about the fundaments of quantum mechanics. It represents a welcome change of perspective from the view of logical empiricists and scientific realists who, for decades, rejected the transcendental method, as a potential tool for providing new insights on the epistemic basis of scientific knowledge.<\/p>\n

This work supports a transcendental pragmatic position <\/b>in the philosophy of science, beginning with an overview of the key elements <\/b>necessary to understand the transcendental locus of ordinary language <\/b>in quantum mechanics context.<\/b><\/p>\n

A controversial issue is whether or not the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of Kantian philosophy. <\/b>Heisenberg, <\/b>in several of his essays, <\/b>takes a clear stand in regards to the limits <\/b>of Kantian epistemology <\/b>in relation to quantum theory. <\/b>There is even a chapter <\/b>entitled \u201cQuantum Mechanics and Kantian Philosophy\u201d in his book \u201cPhysics and Beyond: <\/b>Encounters and Conversations\u201d. By contrast, Bohr makes no explicit references to Kantian philosophy[2]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>, <\/b>even though <\/b>he received an education <\/b>during a period <\/b>strongly <\/b>influenced <\/b>by Neo-Kantianism. <\/b>This absence <\/b>of philosophical references <\/b>may in part <\/b>explain the divergences between <\/b>Bohr\u00b4s interpreters\u2019 <\/b>characterization <\/b>of his philosophical affiliation. <\/b>For Peter Mittelstaedt (1994, \u0440. 119\u2014120), Bohr is the first to bring the empiricism <\/b>of David Hume <\/b>into the field of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, <\/b>scholars like Clifford A. Hooker <\/b>(1972), John Honner <\/b>(1982), Catherine <\/b>Chevalley <\/b>(1994) and <\/b>Steen Brock <\/b>(2003) establish the parallelism between Kant and Bohr\u2019s thought. Although <\/b>no explicit reference to Kant <\/b>can be found in Bohr\u00b4s texts, these authors <\/b>claim <\/b>that implicit Kantian elements <\/b>can undeniably <\/b>be found therein.<\/p>\n

The principle of complementarity <\/i>is, doubtlessly, one of the most original contributions of Bohr\u00b4s contextual interpretation <\/b>of quantum theory. <\/b>It is introduced <\/b>in very <\/b>different ways <\/b>in his many articles. <\/b>It is sometimes defined <\/b>in terms of the complementary <\/b>and mutually exclusive <\/b>aspects of atomic phenomena: the corpuscular <\/b>and <\/b>the wave. <\/b>In the light of uncertainty relations, he also <\/b>presented <\/b>his principle <\/b>as an expression of the complementary use <\/b>of classical concepts, <\/b>such as position <\/b>and momentum. However, <\/b>I would like to draw attention <\/b>to yet a third <\/i>expression, <\/b>one that is formulated in strictly <\/b>Kantian terms <\/b>and which was disclosed <\/b>during <\/b>the Como <\/b>Conference<\/i> <\/b>in 1927: <\/b>the complementarity <\/b>between <\/b>space-time intuition <\/b>and the principle <\/b>of causality. <\/b>Bohr <\/b>claims <\/b>that: <\/b>\u201c[Quantum postulate] <\/b>implies <\/b>a renunciation as regards <\/b>the causal <\/b>space-time <\/b>co <\/b>-ordination of atomic <\/b>process. <\/b>[5, p. 52]. In fact, <\/b>Kantian vocabulary <\/b>pervades Bohr\u2019s writings. <\/b>Heisenberg [15, p. 62\u201465] also expresses <\/b>the essential complementarity between space-time intuition <\/b>and the principle of causality. In quantum theory we have either phenomena <\/b>described in terms <\/b>of space and time or causal <\/b>relationships <\/b>expressed <\/b>by mathematical <\/b>laws. These alternatives are related statistically.<\/p>\n

Thus, <\/b>Bohr <\/b>and Heisenberg <\/b>recognize <\/b>that <\/b>the principle <\/b>of complementarity <\/b>introduces <\/b>a limited <\/b>validity <\/b>to Kant\u00b4s a priori<\/i> <\/b>notions. <\/b>On the one hand, <\/b>they realize <\/b>that it is impossible <\/b>to intuitively <\/b>describe <\/b>the quantum object, <\/b>in terms of space and time, <\/b>given that <\/b>the formalism of quantum <\/b>theory does not <\/b>take place <\/b>in the ordinary <\/b>three-dimensional <\/b>space <\/b>but, rather, <\/b>in a <\/b>multidimensional vectorial space. <\/b>On the other hand, <\/b>they claim <\/b>that it is not possible <\/b>to discard <\/b>classical <\/b>intuitive <\/b>representations to take into account the physical description of experimental phenomena. <\/b>The principle of complementarity <\/b>precisely defines the role played by intuitive pictures and the principle of causality into microphysical context.<\/p>\n

It may, however, <\/b>be argued <\/b>that the somewhat <\/b>Kantian <\/b>elements, which <\/b>Bohr <\/b>and Heisenberg <\/b>use <\/b>to interpret <\/b>quantum <\/b>formalism, <\/b>is coherent <\/b>with Kant\u00b4s <\/b>epistemology.<\/b><\/p>\n

I do not <\/b>agree. In my opinion, from a Kantian <\/b>point of view, <\/b>it does not <\/b>make sense <\/b>to consider <\/b>the space-time intuition isolated <\/b>from <\/b>the principles <\/b>of understanding, <\/b>among which the principle <\/b>of causality <\/b>is <\/b>but one. It should not <\/b>be overlooked <\/b>that, <\/b>for Kant, <\/b>intuition <\/b>is connected to the two <\/b>mathematical principles <\/b>of <\/b>pure <\/b>understanding: <\/b>the axioms <\/b>of intuition <\/b>and the <\/b>anticipations of perception. <\/b>These <\/b>are the two principles that justify, <\/b>a priori<\/i>, <\/b>the mathematical <\/b>constitution <\/b>of nature. <\/b>It does not seem <\/b>to me <\/b>that the state vector <\/b>evolution <\/b>equation <\/b>can, purely and simply, <\/b>be considered as an <\/b>expression <\/b>of the causal law. For Kant, <\/b>the principle <\/b>that governs <\/b>continuous <\/b>temporal <\/b>evolution, <\/b>such as <\/b>is the case of the mechanical <\/b>laws expressed by partial <\/b>differential <\/b>equations, <\/b>is not the second analogy <\/b>of experience, <\/b>but, rather, <\/b>the principle <\/b>of anticipations <\/b>of perception. <\/b>Curiously, there are <\/b>almost no references <\/b>to this principle <\/b>in the <\/b>epistemological <\/b>discussions <\/b>about <\/b>the relationships <\/b>between <\/b>Kantianism <\/b>and quantum theory.<\/b><\/p>\n

Moreover, it should be <\/b>remembered that, when it comes <\/b>to Kant, it is senseless <\/b>to talk <\/b>about causality without <\/b>correlating it <\/b>with <\/i>intuition. <\/b>According to his definition of the second analogy, the principle <\/b>of chronological <\/b>succession in accordance with the law <\/b>of causality is a rule <\/b>that intervenes <\/b>in order to connect <\/b>the empirical manifold. <\/b>Kant <\/b>puts it as follows: <\/b>\u201cin the perception of an event <\/b>there is always <\/b>a rule <\/b>that makes <\/b>the order <\/b>in which <\/b>the perceptions <\/b>(in the apprehension of this appearance) follow <\/b>upon <\/b>one another <\/b>a necessary <\/b>order\u201d <\/b>[A193\/B238]. Thus, <\/b>considering Schr\u00f6dinger\u00b4s <\/b>equation as an example <\/b>of a causal <\/b>law one does not <\/b>find any bearing in the Kantian <\/b>principle <\/b>of causality, <\/b>which is <\/b>applicable <\/b>only <\/b>to a succession within <\/b>the order of perceptions. Outside <\/b>the experimental <\/b>context, <\/b>Kant\u00b4s second <\/b>analogy <\/b>no longer <\/b>plays its role <\/b>of justification <\/b>of knowledge.<\/b><\/p>\n

Therefore, <\/b>a more detailed analysis <\/b>to determine <\/b>any similarity between Bohr\u00b4s <\/b>and Kant\u00b4s respective approaches has brought about <\/b>some unsurmountable <\/b>problems leading us <\/b>to suspect <\/b>that such similarity does not, in fact, exist. <\/b>However, <\/b>should we take <\/b>the term \u2018transcendental\u2019 <\/b>in a wider <\/b>sense, <\/b>as suggested by John Honner <\/b>in his 1982 article <\/b>\u00abThe transcendental <\/b>philosophy of Niels Bohr\u00bb, an intimate <\/b>relationship <\/b>may be established between transcendental philosophy <\/b>and <\/b>Bohr\u00b4s <\/b>doctrine. <\/b>According <\/b>to Honner, Bohr <\/b>can no <\/b>longer <\/b>be considered <\/b>a Kantian <\/b>philosopher, <\/b>but, rather, <\/b>a transcendental <\/b>philosopher. <\/b>For this, it is <\/b>necessary <\/b>to admit <\/b>that strictly <\/b>Kantian <\/b>forms <\/b>have an extremely <\/b>limited <\/b>range <\/b>of validity <\/b>and that transcendental <\/b>arguments <\/b>contain an epistemic legitimacy <\/b>that goes far beyond the realms <\/b>of classical <\/b>mechanics.<\/b><\/p>\n

As Bohr narrows the focus of his interpretation on the limits of the applicability of our concepts, he, in fact, does nothing but extend the Kantian analysis to a totally different epistemic situation. He states that the essence of the quantum postulate should be searched for on the inevitable limit of our possibilities of definitions[3]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>. It is worth remembering that the issue concerning the limits of knowledge \u2014 which plays a central role in the Bohrian approach \u2014 is an essentially <\/b>Kantian issue. If we consider that the meaning of ‘transcendental’ must extend and comprise <\/i>all the investigation about the conditions that limit our experience, then Bohr\u00b4s philosophy must undoubtedly be viewed from a transcendental angle rather than from the angle of a strict Kantianism.<\/p>\n

A typically <\/b>Bohrian <\/b>transcendental argument concerns <\/i>the so-called \u2018conditions of an unambiguous communication\u2019, which are conditions that limit the very experience of human beings. The result of his analysis of the role of the ordinary language in quantum contexts extends into two directions. On the one hand, <\/i>it is impossible to use the concepts of ordinary language to produce any type of a univocal description of the microphysical nature without inevitably producing imprecisions and ambiguities. On the other hand, Bohr points to the inexorable fact that, in their concomitantly experimental and communicative practice, physicists cannot refrain from using ordinary language, the terms of which denote both observable properties of objects and the equally observable relations between them. Classic concepts are necessarily used to describe experimental devices and results. For Bohr, these concepts are merely refined versions of our ordinary concepts about our daily experience and always appear interconnected in terms of space and time. The idea is that our experiences, which consist of actions and observations, should always be described within <\/b>ordinary language terms.<\/p>\n

This problem concerning the limitation of ordinary language does not appear in the context of classical physics. Laws of classical mechanics are expressed by means of mathematical equations whose symbols must be related to experimental facts or, more specifically, to measuring results. Associated with quantities and physical constants, the value of some of these symbols can be determined by means of measuring processes. While such a connection between symbols and measuring results remains, all phenomena will be represented by mathematical formalism. In this context, a biunivocal correspondence may be established between a pair of conjugated variables \u2014 such as position and momentum, the temporal evolution of which is given by a partial differential equation \u2014 and the simultaneously measured values of the said variables.<\/p>\n

However, the epistemic situation becomes very complex in quantum mechanics with regard to the absence of an adequate criterion that is capable of correlating the mathematical symbols of the formal language to the concepts of the ordinary language.<\/p>\n

The solution found by Bohr was to limit, in a complementary way, the use of concepts, renouncing the realistic ideal of producing space-time descriptions of the microphysical reality, within a framework of a predicative semantics. If physicists still use space-time descriptions containing classical terms they do so for purely pragmatic reasons. They must communicate their experimental results and, to do so, they must use ordinary language. None of the complementary descriptions in terms of wave and particle is compatible with a theory of reference that presupposes a microscopic reality of unobservable objects. The contradiction is avoided by <\/i><\/b>considering that formalism is consistent in itself and with each contradictory empirical description. The contradiction appears when we try to include in one single interpretation both formalism and more than one case of experimental application as if they refer to the same unobservable reality. The only way to avoid ambiguity is to impose upon it a limitation in terms of the pragmatic use of concepts from the ordinary language.<\/p>\n

I am of the opinion that the deep sense of Bohr\u00b4s interpretation presents an approach that is at the same time pragmatic and transcendental. With Bohr, we had to admit the fact that the conditions required for understanding a physical phenomenon are, at the same time, the conditions of the very possibility of communication. In my opinion, this performative dimension of language proves helpful in an attempt to interpret the complementary role of theoretical concepts in experimental context quantum mechanics. I argue <\/i><\/b>that the meaning of a proposition cannot be grasped independently from the contextual value of the proposition itself. The pragmatic-transcendental turn taken by contemporary philosophy started by Wittgenstein points to fact that, in order to understand certain propositions, the context in which they are made is a determinant of their meanings. Should we take the ordinary language as a part of a linguistic game also played by quantum physicists as they communicate experimental results, we would be in a better position to understand the role it plays in the very definition of quantum objectivity. This objectivity is no longer subjectively determined by a universal conscience \u2014 as claimed by Kant \u2014 but, rather, inter-subjectively limited by experimental contexts, which should always be communicated. I believe that such a perspective has important implications in terms of ensuring both a good interpretation of the quantum mechanics and the development of a sound theory of science.<\/p>\n

But, what exactly is the novelty introduced by this pragmatic-transcendental approach? In a constitutive level, the physical knowledge of the world, contextually dependent upon the conditions of observation, aims at reconstructing phenomena within their logical- mathematical structure. However, this logical-mathematical rationality does not suffice. It always presumes the existence of the discursive level, that is to say, the level of ordinary language, in the light of which the experimental performances are described. These two kinds of rationality \u2014 mathematical and discursive \u2014 must be considered as parts of an interpretation process where merely formal symbols are related to ordinary concepts which are simultaneously subordinated to the experimental act of measuring and to that of communication. Thus, new transcendental principles must be found not only in the constitutive level of experience but also in the performative level, where the constitutive statements will <\/i>ensure an intersubjective agreement.<\/p>\n

From a pragmatic-transcendental perspective, it is no longer matter <\/b>to think <\/b>that phenomenal <\/b>objectivity <\/b>is caused by <\/b>an unobservable reality, even if such reality be unknown <\/i><\/b>or hidden. <\/b>It is time <\/b>to seriously <\/b>take into account <\/b>the necessary <\/b>intersubjective <\/b>character <\/b>of objectivity <\/b>for which a <\/i>pragmatic <\/b>perspective <\/b>is required. <\/b>The highest principle <\/b>of all synthetic <\/b>a priori<\/i> judgments[4]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> <\/b>may be reworded from a Bohrian <\/b>point of view <\/b>to read as follows: <\/b>\u201cthe conditions <\/b>of the possibility <\/b>of experience <\/b>in general <\/b>are likewise <\/b>conditions <\/b>of possibility <\/b>of an unambiguous <\/b>communication of the results <\/b>of experience, <\/b>and that <\/b>for this reason <\/b>they have objective validity <\/b>in a priori<\/i> propositions\u201d. <\/b>The objectivity <\/b>of experience, <\/b>therefore, <\/b>can be understood <\/b>in the sense that it may be shared <\/b>in an intersubjective <\/b>way. <\/b>Quantum mechanics <\/b>is the best example <\/b>of the performative act <\/b>according to which <\/b>the statements <\/b>used to communicate experiences <\/b>are themselves <\/b>actions. <\/b>This <\/b>interpretation <\/b>of quantum theory <\/b>allows <\/b>us <\/b>to consider that <\/b>the mathematical rationality <\/b>of formalism <\/b>cannot be detached <\/b>from our condition <\/b>of beings acting <\/b>in the world.<\/p>\n

We now <\/i>have <\/b>a wider <\/b>picture <\/b>of the different <\/b>a priori<\/i> <\/b>dimensions. The pragmatic <\/b>-transcendental <\/b>perspective <\/b>leads us to consider <\/b>at least three <\/b>such dimensions: <\/b>that of the <\/b>a priori<\/i> <\/b>as constitutive <\/b>principles of quantum objectivity (mathematical <\/b>and dynamical <\/b>dimension); that of the <\/b>a priori<\/i> <\/b>as regulative <\/b>principles of quantum theory <\/b>(ontological <\/b>dimension); <\/b>and that <\/b>of the a priori<\/i> <\/b>as performative principles of communicative and experimental <\/b>activity <\/b>(pragmatic dimension). <\/b>However, these three dimensions, <\/b>are not quite so independent from one <\/b>another <\/b>as they integrate <\/b>in order <\/b>that they may <\/b>constitute the field <\/b>of validation <\/b>of our scientific <\/b>practice. <\/b>The constitutive <\/b>and regulative <\/b>a priori<\/i> dimension <\/b>of experience <\/b>is, <\/b>in quantum mechanics, <\/b>inexorably <\/b>attached to the a priori<\/i> <\/b>dimension <\/b>of communication, <\/b>which assumes <\/b>that <\/b>ordinary language <\/b>plays a special <\/b>role. In the sense of a regionalization of reason, given by Jean Petitot, the quantum theory has shown us that reason has lost its purity and became a pragmatic reason. We have no more a pure reason detached from the practical reason, as we find in Kant\u2019s philosophy, but it is now a reason that is at the same time pure and practical, and, in that sense, pragmatic.<\/p>\n

The bibliography<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

1.\u00a0Bitbol M. <\/i>M\u00e9canique quantique: une introduction philosophique, Paris, 1996.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0Bitbol M. <\/i>Some steps towards a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics \/\/ Philosophia naturalis. 1998. \u0420. 35, 253\u2014280.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0Bitbol M. <\/i>Relations, Synth\u00e8ses, Arri\u00e8re-Plans; sur la philosophie transcendantale et la physique moderne \/\/ Archives de Philosophie. 2000. \u0420. 63, 595\u2014620.<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0Bitbol M.<\/i> Arguments transcendantaux en physique moderne \/\/ Chauvier\u00a0S., Capeill\u00e8res F. (\u00e9d.). La querelle des arguments transcendantaux; Revue philosophique de l\u2019Universit\u00e9 de Caen. 2000. \u0420.\u00a0 35, 81\u2014101.<\/p>\n

5.\u00a0Bohr N.<\/i> Atomic theory and the description of nature. Cambridge, 1934.<\/p>\n

6.\u00a0Brittan Jr. G.<\/i> Kant and the quantum theory \/\/ P. Parrini (ed), Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. Dordrecht, 1994.<\/p>\n

7.\u00a0Brock S.<\/i> Niels Bohr\u2019s Philosophy of Quantum Physics. Berlin, 2003.<\/p>\n

8.\u00a0Cassirer E. <\/i>Determinism and indeterminism in modern physics: historical and systematic studies of the problem of causality, trad. O. T. Benfey. New Have, 1956.<\/p>\n

9.\u00a0Chevalley C.<\/i> Glossaire\u2019, in N. Bohr, Physique atomique e connaissance humaine. Paris, 1991. \u0420. 345\u2014567.<\/p>\n

10.\u00a0Falkenburg B. <\/i>Bohr\u2019s Principles of Unifying Quantum Disunities \/\/ Philosophia-Naturalis. 1998. \u0420. 35, 95\u2014120.<\/p>\n

11.\u00a0Falkenburg B.<\/i> Kants Naturbegriff und die Begr\u00fcndung der modernen der Physik \/\/ Philosophia naturalis. 2000. \u0420. 37, 409\u2014438.<\/p>\n

12.\u00a0Falkenburg B.<\/i> Kant\u2019s architectonic principles for a metaphysics of nature \/\/ C. Ferrini (ed.), Eredit\u00e0 Kantiane (1804\u20142004): questioni emergenti e problemi irrisolti. Napoli, 2004. 127\u2014153.<\/p>\n

13.\u00a0Folse H. J. <\/i>Kantian aspects of complementarity. Kant-Studien, 1978. \u0420.\u00a069, 58\u201466.<\/p>\n

14.\u00a0Heisenberg W. <\/i>Physics and Beyond: <\/b>Encounters and Conversations. Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.<\/p>\n

15.\u00a0Heisenberg W. <\/i>The physical principles of the quantum theory. Trad. by Carl Eckart, Frank C. Hoyt. New York, 1930\u20141949.<\/p>\n

16.\u00a0Hermann G.<\/i> Les fondements philosophiques de la m\u00e9canique quantique. Trad. A. Shnell, introduction et postface par Lena Soler. Paris, 1996 (Translation from de \u2018Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantentheorie\u2019, Abhandlungen der Fries\u2018schen Schule, Neue Folge, cahier 2, 1935, \u0420.\u00a069\u2014152.)<\/p>\n

17.\u00a0Honner J. <\/i>The transcendental philosophy of Niels Bohr \/\/ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Sciences. 1982. \u0420. 13, 1\u201430.<\/p>\n

18.\u00a0Hooker C. A.<\/i> The nature of quantum mechanical reality \/\/ R. G. Colodny (ed.), Paradigms and Paradoxes. Pittsburgh, 1972. \u0420. 135\u2014172.<\/p>\n

19.\u00a0Kant <\/i>Critique of pure reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York, 1929.<\/p>\n

20.\u00a0Mittelstaedt P.<\/i> Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics. Trad. W.\u00a0Reimer. Dordrecht, 1976.<\/p>\n

21.\u00a0Mittelstaedt P.<\/i> The constitution of objects in Kant\u2019s philosophy and in modern physics \/\/ P. Parrini (ed.), Kant and contemporary epistemology, Dordrecht, 1994. \u0420. 115\u2014129.<\/p>\n

22.\u00a0Petitot J.<\/i> La philosophie transcendantale et le probl\u00e8me de l\u2019objectivit\u00e9. Paris, 1991.<\/p>\n

23.\u00a0Scheibe E. <\/i>Kant\u2019s apriorism and some modern positions \/\/ E. Scheibe (ed.), The role of experience in science. Berlin, 1988. \u0420. 1\u201422.<\/p>\n

24.\u00a0Von Weizsacker C. F. <\/i>The Unity of Physics\u2019and \u2018Niels Bohr and Complementary: the place of classical language \/\/ T. Bastin (ed.), Quantum Theory and Beyond. Cambridge, 1971.<\/p>\n

25.\u00a0Von Weizsacker C. F. <\/i>The preconditions of experience and the unity of physics \/\/ P. Bieri, R-P. Horstmann et Kr\u00fcger (eds.), Transcendental arguments and science. Dordrecht, 1979.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This article was firstly published in collected articles \u00abKlassische Vernunft und Herausforderungen der modernen Zivilisation\u00bb: <\/i><\/p>\n

Kauark-Leite, Patr\u00edcia. Classical Reason and Quantum Rationality: Transcendental Philosophy Face Contemporary Physics\/\/ Klassische Vernunft und Herausforderungen der modernen Zivilisation. Hrsg. Von Prof. Dr. Wladimir Bryuschinkin. Bd.2. Kaliningrad, 2010. S. 237\u2013 246.<\/p>\n


<\/p>\n
\n
\n

[1]<\/a> See, for instance, Carl Friedrich von Weizs\u00e4cker (1971\/1979), Peter Mittelstaedt (1976, 1994), Erhard Scheibe (1988), Brigitte Falkenburg (1998, 2000, 2004), Gordon Brittain (1994), Jean Petitot (1991) and Michel Bitbol (1996, 1998, 2000).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[2]<\/a> See, for instance, Henry Folse (1978), John Honner (1982) and Catherine Chevalley (1991).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[3]<\/a> See Bohr\u00b4s letter to Schr\u00f6dinger, dated 23\/05\/28 [5, S. 16].<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[4]<\/a> \u00abThe conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment\u00bb [B 197].<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in 1786, taking as reference Newtonian physics. Naturally, we cannot expect that his doctrine be applied without any modification to the contemporary physics. Otherwise, we cannot ignore the challenges of the pragmatic-linguistic turn of contemporary philosophy post Wittgenstein. Thus, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":406,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[2],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/404"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=404"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/404\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":407,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/404\/revisions\/407"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/406"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=404"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=404"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kant-online.ru\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=404"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}