KANTOVSKY SBORNIK

Selected articles

2008—2009

Academic journal

Kantovsky Sbornik. Selected articles. 2008—2009: academic journal. — 2011. — 100 p.

Web site: http://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/

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The *Kantovsky Sbornik* is an academic journal published in Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg) and dedicated to Immanuel Kant's philosophy. The journal publishes articles focusing on different aspects of Kant's philosophy and other related topics. Among its authors are both eminent scholars from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Germany, the USA, Italy, Luxembourg, Estonia, Brazil, and other countries and young researchers. The journal does not limit itself to theoretical articles, particular attention is also paid to the reception of Kant's philosophy in Russia, the history of Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism, and archive research. Each issue features Russian translations of texts by Kant and related thinkers. The journal sets out to develop Kant studies in Russia and encourage philosophical research based on the achievements of Kantian tradition. The journal publishes four issues per year with the support of the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University. Research and organisational assistance is also provided by the Kant Institute, which was established at IKBFU in 2007.

This year IKBFU starts publishing selected articles, which appeared in the *Kantovsky Sbornik* over a certain period, in the English language. This is the first digest covering the period of 2008—2009, when the renewed journal first came out. The digest aims to give the English-speaking audience an insight into the development of Kant studies in the Russian-speaking world. Thus, we publish English translations of original articles written in English, as well as conference and book reviews. We hope that this publication will contribute to the internationalisation of Russian research and help Russian philosophers join the international research community.

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the editor-in-chief of the Kantovsky Sbornik

Vladimir A. Zhuchkov

THE SYSTEM-BUILDING ROLE OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

All three meanings of the notion "thing-in-itself" (object, subject and the transition between them), despite the evident opposition, constitutes the object of the central problem of philosophy in Kant's system. Kant is an innovator in both posing and answering the question. This answer is agnostic but not in the empirical or scientific sense, but rather in the solely philosophical meaning of these notions. The answer to his question — regarding both the world and the human being — is infinite as human freedom of creativity.

Key words*: thing-in-itself, polysemanticism of notions, central problem of philosophy, subject-object relation, agnosticism, cognition, humanism, moral law.*

The title of the article might cause some confusion: is it acceptable to attach such significance to a notion that, as we know, relates to the most controversial ones in Kant's philosophy and is still disputed within Kant studies? I think it is not only acceptable but also necessary, since, in my opinion, contrary to Jacobi's well-known views, without this notion, it is impossible not only to penetrate Kant's system and remain there, but also to understand it, unveil its meaning and essence, its genesis, sources and targets, its philosophical significance, etc.

Such claim seems to be an exaggeration: indeed, the notion of thing-in-itself is marked by extreme vagueness and embraces not only different but also contradictory meanings. Kant relates it to both the objective, real world, and to the subject, the human being, their souls and even to certain otherworldly beings — God, afterworld, the realm of moral, transcendental ends, etc. Even the very assumption of such notion and the way it is introduced in the system of classical philosophy is not beyond doubt: the analysis of the a priori abilities of the subject, the use of the category of causality of sensibility as a source of sensations and of the content of experience (at the same time, the very distinction of the thing-in-itself and objects of experi-

ence remain ambiguous), as well as its interpretation as an unconditioned or free causality of will or practical reason (Kausalität durch Freiheit) as the basis of moral law, etc. We should also recall the thing-in-itself as a notion of noumenon that serves only as a limitation to sensible cognition and the sphere of possible experience. We do not discuss the assignment of another "extra" function to this notion in the *Critique of Judgement,* where, alongside the meaning of the "super-sensible substrate both in us and without us", it denotes the inexplicable and in-cognisible transition, leap from the supersensible world to the sensible, etc.

Due to these and other reasons, the notion of thing-in-itself became a symbol of agnosticism, subjective idealism, obscurantism, etc. for many (but, I hope, not the most perspicacious) researchers. Thanks god, in the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, owing to some of Lenin's statements (regarding the materi-alistic aspect of the doctrine of the thing-in-itself, the theoretical sources of Marx-ism, etc), Kant was partially rehabilitated, which allowed Russian scholars to study his heritage, and publish articles and books that were far from "condemn-ing" style.

There is another circumstance that questions the appropriateness of the arti-cle's title, namely, the wide usage of the notion of system in Kant's philosophy. Beginning with the first edition of the *Critique*, he constantly emphasised that his philosophy was a system, an integral whole built on the basis of dogmatic method with the help of lawful establishment of principles, strict definition of notions, accurateness of proofs derived from valid principles [A XXIII, XXV/B XXXV, XXXVIII etc]. He reiterated similar ideas in all *Critiques*, although, in the third one — the *Critique of Judgement*, which appeared not only much later than the previous ones, but, as Kant himself confessed, appeared unexpectedly — he presented a complete system of his philosophy in the form of the table of all fac-ulties of the mind and a priori principles of pure reason [3, p. 144—145; 4, p. 942—943].

But it was this systematisation that provoked sharp and constructive criti-cism from the researchers, who indicated its extremely artificial, for the most part exterior, decorative and, to an extent, involuntary character, which, never-theless becomes evident even on slight acquaintance with the texts of the *Cri-tiques* and even their contents.

Nevertheless, despite these arguments, I will try to explain and justify my opinion regarding the system-building role of the thing-in-itself within Kant's philosophy. This function rests on the three above-mentioned meanings (object, subject, and the transition between them), which only as an aggregate constitute the framework or backbone of the *internal* system of critical philosophy that does not coincide with the *external* system, which is indeed rather artificial and inade-quate (to his extent, I fully agree with its critics).

In my opinion, the three meanings of the thing-in-itself convey clearly and unambiguously the general structure or content of the so-called central problem of philosophy, which, however, for me and, it seems for Kant too, is dominated not by the question of "primacy" but rather by its triunity, i. e. the simultaneous "presence" of all three components: the subject, the object and the transition be-tween them — a "tripartite alliance" instead of monism and dualism. The inter-nal system of Kant's philosophy is constituted by these three meanings of the thing-in-itself, or, otherwise, these three meaning underlie the emergence and existence of the internal system of critical philosophy comprising its links, com-ponents, moments, i. e. fulfil the function of the system-building factors.

The Copernican turn carried out by Kant in the history of philosophical thought consisted, in my opinion, not in the rejection of the traditional or "dogmatic" central problem of philosophy, but in its agnostic interpretation, i.e. the indication of the incognisable character of all its three links (object, subject and the transition between them). And, I think, it is the only reason why the problem mentioned could acquire the status of a truly philosophical one, i.e. get rid of inadequate, extraneous elements borrowed from the everyday or scientific experience, mythological, religious and other traditions, within which philosophical thought had abided before Kant. In my opinion, it is that what Kant spoke of in his numerous references to the "change of method", with the help of which he hoped to "strike a blow at the root" of materialism, fatalism, atheism, freethinking, fanaticism, and superstition [B XX, XXXV, etc].

Here, the reader might feel bewildered: does Kant's major contribution to philosophy consists merely in... his agnosticism, i.e. boils down to the statement of the incognoscibility of all: the subject and the object, the human being and the world, as well as the relation between them? I dare assert that it is the case! I only want and have to add or ask or even demand that the reader scrutinise this principle of Kant.

I do not want to return to the popular but erroneous interpretations and assessments of Kant's agnosticism, however, once again, I would like to draw attention to the fact that, in this case, he speaks of the negation of cognoscibility of the world, the human being and their relation not within concrete, empirical or scientific cognition, but in solely philosophical meaning and content of these notions. Strictly speaking, they are not notions in the "usual" logical sense: it is philosophical postulates or hypothesis that human mind is forced to formulate, put forward, admit and take into account in the perpetual process of cognising the world, themselves and their relation to nature and the world in general.

A "regular" person does not have to do it, as they do not have to become and be a philosopher (although, from time to time, all of us turn out to be and become philosophers). But if, willing or not, for reasons unknown, we became philosophers or started philosophising, we inevitably stumble, feel the "bottomless abyss" (Kant's expression!), the eternal incompleteness of the problem, its connection with something incomprehensible and inexpressible, i.e. to face an infinity that does not reply. This is the horror and the splendour of philosophical thought, about which Kant figuratively and expressively wrote in the Conclusion to the *Critique of practical reason*: "the starry heavens above and the moral law within" [1, p. 728].

However, I admit that the word "horror" was hardly an appropriate one. And that is why. Kant speaks of not only the beauty and splendour of the limitless starry heavens, but also of a human being, and this reveals the deep humanistic sense of his philosophy. A human being as a sentient being is infinite. Being a mortal element of the infinite universe, an "animal creature", a human being is infinite within their invisible I, their personality, within which the moral law, or more specific, the underlying freedom moral law "reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and limits of this life" [1, p. 729—731].

I would like to mention that it concerns not only and mostly the moral law and the problem of immortality, it concerns the inexhaustibility, infinity of human freedom, the human ability and faculty to set and achieve different goals in

the process of cognising and transforming the world, nature, and themselves, i. e. to hold the title of lord of nature, the creator of the whole human civilization and culture, etc. [2, p. 699 etc.]. It is hardly the place to discuss Kant's concept of culture, which crowns the grand edifice of Kant's philosophy, but it is necessary to emphasise once again that it is underlain by his teaching on human freedom as a faculty for infinite creative activity.

In my opinion, it constitutes not only the pathos, but also the problem content of the whole system of critical philosophy and it is the actual problem meaning and system-building role of the notion of the thing-in-itself considered within the inseparable unity of all its three main meanings.

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ON LOGICAL ERRORS
IN KANT'S TABLE
OF JUDGEMENTS[1]

This article focuses on the logical inconsistency of Kant's classification of judgements presented in the "Critique of pure reason". The author shows how Kant's division of judgements violates elementary logical rules. The article analyses an earlier attempt by G. Ryle to detect logical errors in the table of judgements. It is shown that the correct divisions were not unfamiliar to the 18th century German logic, nevertheless, they were not accepted by Kant. The author proposes possible explanations for Kant's violation of logical rules and offers a critical analysis of K. Reich's arguments in favour of the consistency of Kant's table of judgements.

Key words: logic, judgement, table of judgements, division rules, dichotomy, trichotomy, transcendental logic, categories.

While developing his transcendental philosophy as a critique of pure reason, Kant looks for its justification, the proof of its consistency. The central position of the system of categories in the structure of transcendental logic compelled Kant to focus on the search for a solid foundation for this system. Opposing it to Aristotle's "rhapsodic" set of categories, Kant aspires to detect the principle of necessity of each category, as well as that of the system's consistency. He finds this principle in general pure logic. Logic, according to Kant, is a complete a priori science of pure reason [B VIII], thus, one can rely on it when proving the apriority and completeness of the system of categories. The metaphysical deduction of categories begins with the classification of judgements in general logic as expressed in the table of judgements, and ends with the table of categories. Thereby, the validity of Kant's thesis about the apriority of transcendental logic depends on the consistency of metaphysical deduction. In this respect, the table of judgements claims the role of the starting point of transcendental philosophy. This article will focus on Kant's assertion that his table of judgements is a complete and based on general pure logic division of the logical functions of thought.

The inconsistency of Kant's Classification of Judgements[2]

Let us consider Kant's approach to the classification of judgements in general logic following Kant's grouping.

Quantity

According to quantity, Kant distinguishes universal, particular and singular judgements, which raises a question as to the place of empty judgements, whose subject is an empty concept. One can claim that Kant proceeds from the traditional for the logic of the time premise regarding the non-emptiness of the subject of judgement. But, in the *Note to the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection*, Kant himself *distinguishes empty concepts, which include, by the way, the notion of noumenon – the judgements containing which belong to the class of empty judgements*[3]. However, the analysis of empty judgements can be easily omitted in this context without interfering with further reasoning. Another question concerns singular and universal judgements. In the comments to the table of judgements, Kant uses a strange phrase stating that singular judgements "have no domain at all" [CPR, A71/B 96]. It seems that, by "domain" (or "extension"), Kant understands a set consisting of more than one element. But further he says that, if we "compare a singular judgement with a generally valid one, merely as cognition, with respect to quantity, then the former relates to the letter as a unity relates to infinity…" [CPR, A71/B 96]. Therefore, a singular judgement has a certain extension ("unity")[4] and, what is more important, the extension of a general judgement can be only an infinite set. So, how should we tackle the problem of judgements, whose subject is represented by concepts, whose extension is a set of more than one element, but that are not infinite? The Kantian table introduces singular judgements without extension (i.e. whose subject has no extension), however, as *unities*, they are opposed to general judgements, whose extension is *infinite*. However, Kant states with certainty and in accordance with conventional word usage that it is characteristic of general judgements that "the predicate... holds of that concept without exception" [CPR, A71/B 96]. Here, the notion of subject concept is not relevant. If we consider all terms that Kant used or should have used in the table of judgements regarding quantity, we arrive at the following classification:

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[2] I came up with the thought that Kant violated the rules of division in his tables of judgement several years ago while delivering a lecture on Kant's logic in the framework of the history of logic course. When sharing this thought with colleagues, I was constantly surprised that this obvious thought had not been mentioned in logical literature before. But only after finishing this article I came across a similar thought in Gilbert Ryle's *Categories* (Ryle G. Categories // Ryle G. *Collected Papers. Vol. II: Collected Essays.* New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971. Originally published in 1936).However, instead of changing the argument presentation structure, I will analyse Ryle's arguments below.

[3] The need to use such concepts and judgements in reasoning resulted in the development of logics with no existential presuppositions or free logics.

[4] In his lectures on logics, Kant says that the domain (sphere) of a singular judgement is a point.

Fig. 1

Even if we set aside judgements with empty subject, the division into universal, particular and singular judgements seems to be a cross-division[5], since the principle for the division into universal and particular judgements is that of predicate's relevance/non-relevance to the whole extension of the subject or a certain part of it[6]. And when identifying singular judgements, one deals with the extension of the subject itself regardless of the act of ascribing predicate to the subject. If we assume that only one characteristic of division is applied here, for instance, that of relevance/non-relevance, we arrive at the error "the members of division do not exclude each other", since, in this case, singular and universal judgements belong to the same class.

Quality

According to quality, Kant divides judgements into affirmative, negative and infinite. This division is inconsistent as a trichotomy, since it violates the rule of exclusion (the members of division should exclude each other). The problem is that infinite judgements are also affirmative. One cannot say that Kant does not realize this circumstance. Although he does not mention that infinite judgements are also affirmative in "The Critique of Pure Reason"[7], in Logik Pölitz (1789), he says that affirmation and negation are properties of a judgement. If negation does not affect the connective, it is not a negative, but affirmative judgement, since the connective establishes the connection. Therefore, it refers to both affirmative and infinite judgements [AA, XI, p. 578][8].

If we admit that there are two successive divisions:

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[5] I will not reproduce here the list of division rules and possible errors. It can be found in any textbook on elementary logic.

[6] It raises the question as to the meaning of the word "some", which can be interpreted as "only some" or "some or may be all". It seems that Kant assigns the first meaning to the word. This interpretation excludes some of logical square relations.

[7] Nor does he in the lectures preceding "The Critique".

[8] The difference between the pre-Critique and post-Critique lectures on logic is of certain interest in this context. In the pre-Critique lectures, Kant does not mention infinite judgements as affirmative and sometimes even does not identify them as a particular group. In the post-Critique lectures, he attempts to construe this relation and find arguments in favour of recognising infinite judgements as an independent group.

judgement

affirmative   negative

(finite)   infinite

Fig. 2

where affirmative judgements are those with a positive predicate (representing a property or relation), and infinite ones are those with a negative predicate (representing the absence of a property or relation), then we arrive at the following conclusions:

• Negative judgements are opposed not to affirmative judgements in general but rather to a certain type of them. Kant disguises it with the term "affirmative judgement" denoting (finite) affirmative judgements, which is an obvious violation of the law of identity — substitution of notions.

• Different level members are tackled as those of the same level, which is a violation of the continuity of division — a leap in division.

Even if we set aside the continuity of division and focus on the extent relations, we should still distinguish finite affirmative, negative and infinite affirmative judgements. However, in this case, we face the fallacy of cross-division: finite and infinite affirmative judgements differ in the quality of predicate (positive/negative); negative judgements are distinguished by the quality of connective (positive "is" and negative "is not"). Moreover, for the sake of logical consistency, one should also introduce negative infinite judgements, for instance: "The soul is not non-mortal". Then, we obtain the following classification:

judgement

positive   negative

(finite)   Infinite   finite   (infinite)

Fig. 3

At the same time, Kant's trichotomy — which is of crucial importance for his table of judgements — is ruined. This division raises a question as to whether infinite affirmative judgement are equipollent to finite negative judgements and infinite negative to finite affirmative ones. This question is equivalent to that whether the law of double negation is applicable for the negation of connective (propositional negation) and the negation of the term (term negation)? If the answer to these questions is positive, the identification of infinite judgements does not affect the division into negative and affirmative ones. But it seems that Kant entertains another opinion. In Logik Pölitz, he writes: "In infinite judgments I imagine that the subject is contained in a different sphere than that of the predicate. For example, *anima est non-mortalis*; here, I imagine that the soul does not belong to the mortals, but I think still more, namely that it belongs to the immortals, I imagine it in a different sphere as contained in the concept" [AA, XI,

S. 578]. The phrase "I think still more" implies that term negation, unlike propositional negation, does introduce something new. But under what conditions is such introduction possible? It is possible only if we take into account not only the extensional relations of terms but also something beyond them. This 'something' relates to the content (substance) of the judgement. And it is no surprise, since Kant himself classifies only the quality of connective as the form of judgement, while terms (and their types) are classified as the substance of judgement. Thus, the identification of infinite judgements transcends logic, which, according to Kant, judges only by the form of thoughts and leads to tetrachotomy rather than trichotomy, which ruins Kant's design.

Relation

The situation in this section is similar to that above. Kant suggests dividing judgements into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Evidently, categorical judgements on the one hand, and hypothetical and disjunctive on the other hand belong to different types of judgements — the former are simple judgements, while the latter complex ones. So, we identify the fallacy immediately — it is cross-division. After this error is rectified, the division looks as follows:

Fig. 4

I do not intend to analyse Kant's understanding of categorical judgements. It seems that he adds singular judgements to the four standard types of categorical judgements (**A, E, I, O**). However, it is difficult to understand what happened to the so called judgements with relations or relational judgements. Distinguishing them from categorical judgements was not unfamiliar to the logic of the time. Anyway, if we speak of a comprehensive display of all functions of thought, it constitutes a gap that destroys the trichotomy structure of the table. It is also evident that the division of compound judgements into hypothetical and disjunctive ones violates the rule of exhaustive division, which results in the fallacy of "too narrow division". Hypothetical and disjunctive judgements do not exhaust the "sphere" (in Kant's terminology) of the concept of compound judgements. It is hard to understand why Kant ignores such type of complex judgements as conjunctive ones, which were familiar to the logic of the time, or "neither… nor" judgements, which were familiar even to stoics. It means that, in the division of relation judgements, Kant makes at least two logical errors: cross-division and too narrow division. Thus, one can hardly speak of a comprehensive display of logical functions.

Modality

At first sight, the division of modality judgements is the least problematic. Although, if we tackle this division seriously, we should divide judgements as follows:

judgement

modal   non-modal (assertoric)

problematical   apodeictical

Fig. 5

In this case, there is a fallacy of *cross-division.* The first dichotomous division is based on the presence/absence of the property "to be modal", the second one on the type of modality (possibility, necessity). However, it is difficult to understand the absence of such traditional class of modal judgements as contingent ones. Nevertheless, it is a minor error; they can be easily introduced through the negation of necessity. Similarly, the traditional class of impossible judgements can be derived from the negation of possible judgements. Kant's mistake on modality is the slightest of all present in this work.

Ryle's Attack

In his work "Categories" that analyses correlation between Kant's table of judgements and table of categories, Gilbert Ryle (1936) [10] emphasises that Kant made significant progress in comparison to Aristotle and critically assesses both Kant's choice of categories and, what is more important for us, the means of category derivation[9]. In this context, Ryle stresses that the classification presented in the table of judgements violates certain rules of division. Let us consider Ryle's arguments. He starts with an evident problem, i.e. infinite judgements: "His sub-variety of 'infinite' judgments is a fraud" [9]. Here, Ryle does not mention that infinite judgements can be derived properly, if the term "negation" and the class of "finite" judgements are introduced. In this case, we obtain Table 2a. Ryle: "there are several sorts of 'universal' judgments, but the sort which he was considering should come under the heading of hypothetical judgments; the division into assertoric, problematic and apodeictic is wrong-headed, the two last being special cases of hypotheticals" [10]. It is peculiar that problematical and apodeictical judgements are a subgroup of hypothetical ones. Both in Kant's classification and in general, modal judgements can be represented by simple judgements with modal operators, while hypothetical judgements, according to Ryle himself, are complex. Ryle's idea that Kant's universal judgements relate to the class of hypotheticals may stem from the standard translation of general affirmative judgements in to the language of predicate logic:

$$\text{A: } \forall x(S(x) \supset P(x)) \, ,$$

where a simple categorical judgement is transformed into a hypothetical judgement. But to demand it from Kant is an obvious anachronism. Ryle: "the division into categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive embodies a cross-division and contains one glaring omission, for (a) what he had in mind was the distinction be-

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[9] "Kant's of approach was, in principle, much more enlightened than Aristotle's had been. Unfortunately his execution was hopelessly misguided" [9].

tween simple and compound propositions and *(b)* he omitted from this latter class conjunctive propositions of the 'p and q' form" [10]. Here, Ryle speaks of the violation of division rules regarding quality. He is absolutely right about conjunctive judgements, however, he expresses a strange opinion reproaching Kant for the fallacy of non-exclusive division, since categorical judgements, on the one side, and hypothetical and disjunctive judgements, on the other side, belong to different types. Furthermore, Kant did not intend to distinguish between simple and complex (compound) judgements, which is one of the sources of fallacies in his table of judgements. This error was analysed in our critique of judgement classification by quality. One cannot deny the "too narrow division" fallacy. However, in the XVIII century and, of course, contemporary logic also distinguishes other classes of compound judgements. Ryle: "Only of simple proposition is it true that they must be either affirmative or negative and either universal or particular or singular, since in a two-limbed conjunctive, disjunctive or hypothetical proposition, for instance, one of the conjoined propositions may be one while the second is one of the others" [10]. Here, Ryle is not absolutely right. He apparently relies on propositional logic, while it is possible to consider compound judgements as universal or particular ones in compliance with the well-known equivalencies of predicate logic:

$$\forall x(A(x)\,\&\,B(x)) \Leftrightarrow \forall xA(x)\,\&\,\forall xB(x)$$

or

$$\exists x(A(x)\vee B(x)) \Leftrightarrow \exists xA(x)\vee \exists xB(x).$$

Ryle: "The distinction between the disjunctive and the hypothetical forms is false". It is difficult to say what Ryle means by this. If he means that disjunction is defined trough implication, or vice versa, there is a need for propositional negation that is neither mentioned by Kant in this context nor introduced by Ryle. Ryle: "No overt distinction is drawn between general and non-general propositions". Apparently, Ryle believes that non-general judgements should be divided into particular and singular ones. But here he makes a mistake himself, because there is no common principle for such division, since particulars are distinguished on the basis of the extension of subject in the judgement, while singulars on the basis of the number of subject extension elements. Ryle: "no place is found for such propositions as 'seven cows are in the field', 'most men wear coats', 'John is probably dead'." [10]. One can formulate numerous statements of this kind, but the methods of their classification depend on the initial mechanism chosen for such classification. Ryle: "And lastly, in simple singular propositions no distinction is drawn between attributive and relational propositions" [10]. One cannot but agree with this remark of Ryle, which is reflected in table 3.

Possible explanations of the inconsistency of the table of judgements

It seems that Kant, when compiling the table of judgements, which, in his own words, is borrowed from general pure logic and contains the whole system of thought functions, violates all possible rules of division, while the table itself is evidently incomplete. An attempt to explain this strange circumstance suggests three hypotheses: 1) Kant did not know the rules of division; 2) he neglected them on purpose; 3) he did not notice the violation of the rules in his table.

Let us consider them one after another.

Kant did not know the rules of division

This hypothesis is evidently erroneous. It is not only that these rules were mentioned in every logic course of the time, but Kant included them in his own lectures. For instance, in Wiener Logik in the section dedicated to logical division, Kant explicitly formulates the rules of exhaustive and exclusive division [AA, XI, S. 927—928]. In the same work, when speaking of Unterteilung, he formulates the rule "division must proceed gradually" and demands that mathematicians observe it. He writes that all triangles are either equilateral or non-equilateral. Non-equilateral triangles are either scalene or isosceles. Thus, when triangles are divided into equilateral, scalene and isosceles, the division makes a leap and is therefore false [AA, XI, S. 928]. It is not difficult to see that this example proves the need to observe the rule of continuity of division, therefore, Kant emphasises that mathematicians commit the fallacy of "a leap in division". But this is the very fallacy that Kant commits in all parts of his table. The Jäsche logic also offers the rules of division: «§ 111. Universal rules of logical division. In every division of a conception we must see to it: 1) *that the members of division exclude* or are opposed[10] to one another; that furthermore they, 2) belong under a higher concept (*conceptus communis*) and finally that 3) taken together they constitute the sphere of the divided concept or are equal to it" [6, p. 636—637]. Here, Kant formulates the rules of exhaustive and exclusive division. The same rules can be found in the majority of Kant's lectures on logic.

Kant consciously neglected them.

This hypothesis is also erroneous. This statement could hold true if we considered Hegel, for example. In "The Critique of Pure Reason" as well as in other works, Kant emphasises that general logic is the canon for any kind of thinking, the rules of general logic apply to all knowledge — both empiric and a priori [CPR, B VIII] — and, consequently, to his table of judgements, which, Kant's opinion, is an example of a priori knowledge.

Kant did not notice the violation of division rules in the table.

In view of the above considerations above, this hypothesis seems to be the most plausible. But before we confirm it and analyse its consequences for transcendental philosophy, let us answer the question as to whether it is possible that the divisions analogous to those presented in Tables 1—4 were unknown to the logic of the time? The answer to this question can be found in the Giorgio Tonelli's article "Die Voraussetzungen zur Kantischen Urteilstafel in der Logik des 18". Jahrhunderts" [11]. Tonelli analyses all important 18th century logic textbooks that were popular in Germany and other countries and could influence Kant. Let us see whether the textbooks of the time offered examples of correct division following the headings of Kant's table of judgements.

Quantity

G. F. Meier's "Logic", which Kant used in his lectures on logic, presents the following division: judgements are divided into singular [einzeln] and common [gemein] ones, while common judgements are divided into general [allgemein] and particular [besonders] [11, S. 141]. This division corresponds exactly to the

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[10] Further, Kant explains that it is a contradictory opposition.

division given in Table 1. It means that Kant had an example of correct division at hand, but he did not use it. Kant fully understood the problems related to the identification of singular judgements and the grounds for such identification. Thus he provided the first Critique with a long (and quite confusing) section on the need to distinguish singular judgements, although the grounds for it, according to Kant, are not logical (the extension, in which the subject of judgement is considered) but rather empirical, relating to the number of elements of the extension of subject concept regardless of the act of judgement. In this sense, the identification of singular judgements is carried out due to external to logic reasons. The analysis of logic textbooks conducted by Tonelli shows that the variant of judgement division by quality supported by Kant was quite popular. Thus, Kant shares this error with many logicians of his times, however, at least one textbook, with which Kant was undoubtedly familiar, contains the correct division. Nevertheless, Kant ignored it.

Quality

Tonelli's analysis shows that Kant was not the only one who identified infinite judgements. Many textbook authors distinguished infinite judgements alongside affirmative and negative ones. However, there are examples of correct division, for example, in the textbook of a Wolffian, Boehm, which came out in 1749. *Quails* judgements are divided into *finita* and *infinita*, and the former into *affirmativa* and *negativa* [11, S. 140]. The *infinita* are not divided further, but, nevertheless, the scientific literature of the time did offer an example of a more correct division. Although, one cannot be sure that Kant was familiar with it, but, as Meier's example shows, it hardly changes anything.

Relation

In this case, the situation is a little more complicated than in the previous two. Tonelli remarks that difficulties arise with relation judgements mentioning that before Kant, the term "relation" had not be used in connection with the corresponding type of judgements [11, S. 151]. His analysis shows that twenty nine authors distinguish these types, usually, alongside other types of judgement, in the context of a broader division into simple and compound judgements. [11, S. 151—152]. For example, Ch. Wolff distinguished simple and compound judgements and divided the latter into copulative and disjunctive. Corvinus divided judgements into simple and complex and the latter into hypothetical, disjunctive, copulative, excluding, limiting, and comparative ones [11, S. 138]. In other words, the correct division was widespread in the literature of the time. However another popular division of judgements was that into categorical and hypothetical ones (10 authors, four of them mention additionally disjunctive judgements, which are, nevertheless, complex) [11, S. 152]. Only two authors — Schütz and Rösser (in 1773 and 1775, respectively) — divide judgements the way Kant does in his table. At the same time, it was conventional to distinguish copulative judgements. Kant elucidates that within such judgements one predicate relates to two subjects. Thus, copulative judgements are an analogue of conjunctive judgements. Tonelli addresses Lambert to prove that copulative judgements were mentioned in division similar to that of Kant, stating that Lambert refers to categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements only alongside copulative ones [11, S. 153]. The identification of copulative judgements indicates that logic of the time acknowledged the incompleteness of division of compound judge-

ments into hypothetical and disjunctive ones. Even relational judgements[11] were identified as a particular group. Crusius, who was very familiar to Kant, distinguishes relational judgements (the subject and the predicate are members of a relation, for example, "a movement presupposes a cause" [11, S. 139]. Thus, one cannot say that the division into simple sentences into categorical and relational ones was unknown to 18th century logic and even that it was unknown to Kant, since he was familiar with the works of Crusius.

Modality

A conventional method to divide judgements by modality in the 18th century was the division into necessary, contingent, possible, and impossible judgements (24 authors according to Tonelli) [11, S. 153]. Only Lambert offers a division of judgements into possible, actual, necessary and their opposites [11, S. 153]. From a modern perspective, assertoric judgements are not modal. Moreover, Kant, when speaking of assertoric judgements, emphasises that in this case "we regard the proposition as *real* (true)" [CPR, A75/B100]. The addition of the word "true" in brackets indicates that the "real" is considered not as a modality, i. e. a supplementary characteristic of the judgement connection, but rather as a relation of the judgement in whole to the reality, the judgement refers to. If we take into account the rule of exclusive division, apodeictical judgements, according to Kant, cannot be true, since in this case they would coincide with assertoric ones regarding their principal characteristic — being true. Of course, it raises a number of further questions. For example, what should one do with false judgements that claim to describe the reality? Should they be classed under the heading of problematic? According to Kant, problematic judgements state something that could be accepted "for the moment" [CPR, A75/B101].

The considerations mentioned above lead us to the following conclusion: *in his table of judgements, Kant violated all known[12] rules of division, although the logical literature of the time[13]contained examples of correct division*. It means that Kant *did not realise the erroneousness of his divisions, despite its obviousness.*

This conclusion raises two interesting questions: 1) why did not Kant recognise the violation of division rules? 2) what effect does the admission of the erroneousness of Kant's division have on the further course of reasoning in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as well as the relation between formal and transcendental logics?

The answer to the first question, although it partially relates to the field of psychology, is quite simple: he had already identified the relations between categories, which the table of judgements was meant to prove relying on the authority of logic. Kant needed substantiation for his table of categories, the image of which he already had in mind. This answer to our question is popular in literature. Even the first critics of Kant, Herbart and Hegel, already reproached him for the empirical character of his table of judgement, which represents an arbitrary set of judgements that were known to the logic of the time[14]. The hy-

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[11] A relational judgement is a judgement, whose predicate is a relation characteristic. Unlike categorical judgements, relational judgements refer to more than one subject and do not include connections.

[12] And known to him as well.

[13] Including that familiar to Kant.

[14] See, for example, Hegel's critique [1, p. 157].

pothesis about the gradual compilation of the table of judgements alongside the development of the conception of the table of categories is, for instance, supported by the fact that, under the heading of quality judgements, Kant initially distinguished only affirmative and negative judgements, while infinite ones seem to be introduced for the sake of ternary structure of categories. Another proof is that a collection of Kant's lecture notes and drafts for his published works contain the following fragment: "Quality of judgements: affirmative or negative" [7, p. 60].

All other sections of this initial draft contain three division members. The quality section is indicative of further development. It is this section that gives rise to the triadic structure of categories — the concept (reality), its negation (negation), the synthesis of the initial concept and its negation (limitation). It also holds true for the quantity section: singularity-plurality-totality. This structure is less evident in the relation and modality sections. However, two first sections are sufficient to make a general conclusion: Kant *sacrificed logical rigor for the sake of triadic structure of categories.* It is this consideration, due to which he had to resort to cross-division and neglect the rules of exhaustive and exclusive division. In his lectures on logic, Kant continually repeats that only dichotomous division is a priori and purely logical, while any polytomy rests on experience and is empirical. In *Logik Pölitz*, he emphasises that the fault of any polytomy lies in the fact that it is empirical, while dichotomy is apodeictic, since every object should be either A or non A [AA, XI, S. 577]. However, when it concerns the table of judgements, his position changes. There is a note in *Logik Pölitz* immediately below the table of judgements — a copy from the first *Critique* — that claims that, although logics indicate that, when applied, affirmative judgements have the same effect as infinite ones and universal as singular, it is a logical distinction. The actus of mind, Kant continues, is always tripartite [AA, XI, S. 577]. Step by step, Kant arrives at a conclusion that trichotomy is peculiar to synthetic a priori divisions. In the *Critique of Judgement,* he clearly states that "If there is to be an *a priori* division it must be either *analytical,* according to the law of contradiction, which is always twofold … or it *is synthetical.* And if in this latter case it is to be derived from *a priori concepts* …, the division must necessarily be trichotomy… [4, p. 43]. As to the table of judgements, this change in position, as I see it, was an adjustment of the method of logical division to the earlier designed structure of categories[15], since general logic is not familiar with the problem of synthetic a priori judgements. And Kant's principal claim to the a priority of his system of categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* consisted in that the classification of judgements belongs to general logic. Here, one cannot but notice the germs of future Hegel's enmity towards formal logic. It was Hegel who made triad the underlying principle of his system of categories. Kant's example shows that, for the sake of triadic structure of categories, logic had to be violated.

It is much more difficult to answer the second question.

Kant himself assesses his metaphysical deduction of categories based on the table of judgements as follows: "In the **metaphysical deduction**, the origin of the a priori categories in general was established by their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking" [B159—12, p. 261]. The a priori origin of categories is closely connected with the completeness and consistency of the

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[15] I will analyse this position in more detail when scrutinising the arguments in favour of completeness of Kant's table advanced by K. Reich.

table of judgements. However, our analysis of the violation of division rules in Kant's table shows that a classification produced with a violation of logical rules cannot be considered as consistent. Thus, the table of judgements does not rest on logic and, therefore, does not offer a complete and consistent system of logical function of thought. Apparently, Kant suspected the devised method of classification was not logical. Let us consider, for example, the modality section. The correct logical division does not allows us to place assertoric judgements *between* possible and actual ones, since assertoric judgements belong to the class of non-modal judgements. Kant, trying to overcome this problem, described not the logical characteristics of judgements, but rather their *cognitive* statues through linking them gradually to the reason and altering, on this basis, their cognitive characteristics. The incorrect logical division in the table of judgements shows that Kant did not succeed in substantiating the a priori origin of categories, while the metaphysical deduction of categories loses its basis. However, Hegel understood it immediately and started to develop a system of categories from a scratch, maybe, in order to avoid the resistance of material that Kant had confronted[16].

Reich's defence

An attempt to prove the consistency of Kant's approach to the development of table of judgements was made in the 1930s by Klaus Reich [8]. However, Reich does not consider the application of division rules to Kant's classification and focuses all his attention of the justification of completeness of Kant's table from the perspective of general logic and the soundness of division principles, especially in the relation judgement section. While achieving this target, he solves two problems. He tries to prove that: 1) Kant's division into four sections — modality, relation, quality, and quantity (this is the order Reich insists upon) — is exhaustive on the basis of a reconstruction of Kant's definition of judgement; 2) Kant's division within each section is exhaustive. Reich solves the first problem through reconstructing Kant's definition of judgement: "A judgment is an objectively valid (Modality) relation of representations (Relation) which are representations of parts (consequence: Quality) as analytic grounds of cognition (consequence: Quantity)" [9, p. 102]. Avoiding a comprehensive critique of such reconstruction, I will only point out that this definition lies beyond general logic. It is a transcendental definition of judgement that takes into account the characteristics of cognitive ability. Therefore the division into sections also lies beyond general logic and represents a philosophical organisation of judgement types. It might be extremely good, but, in Reich's interpretation, it does not solve the problem of justifying Kant's table from the perspective of pure logic. However, for us, Reich's solution to the second problem is of more importance. Let us analyse Reich's arguments suggesting that categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements represent an exhaustive and consistent division of relational judgements from the perspective of general logic. Firstly, Reich mentions that 18th century logic knew other divisions of relational judgements and that categorical

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[16] Nevertheless, several works dedicated to Kant's table of categories claim that the table of categories is independent from the table of judgement. For instance, Heidegger voices this opinion saying that it is not only that categories are not derived from the table of judgements but they cannot be derived from it at all [2, S. 56].

judgements were often related to simple judgements, while hypothetical and disjunctive to complex ones. Secondly, he emphasises that, usually, such divisions distinguished copulative (conjunctive) judgements as well as many others. Thus, Reich has to prove that, within this section, one can — on the basis of a single principle — identify between categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements and only them. "The perspective that allows Kant to view only categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments as belonging to pure general logic, and which is at the same time the criterion for determining whether they are differences in judgments as such, is the view that they must be differences in that relation of concepts or problematic judgments in which such thoughts in general (apart from their specific content) "first become cognitions of an object" (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science). This is what we mean when we say that they are related to the objective unity of apperception. It can easily be seen from this perspective that thoughts that are not given as true, but rather as some thought or other that one could assume, are, for the first time, related to possible truth in the combination … of inherence, consequence and disjunction" [9, pp. 80—81]. Later, Reich tries to prove that conjunctive judgements do not belong to the section of relational judgements, since "in a conjunction … it is essential that the individual terms should be true in order that the combined content be true" [9, p. 81], which, in his opinion, indicates only that whether a conjunctive (copulative) judgement is true depends only on that whether its terms are true or false and, hence, does not relate to logical functions of thought in Kant's understanding. However this argument is not valid, because, in this relation, there is no distinction between conjunctive (copulative), hypothetical (conditional, implicative), and disjunctive judgements. Reich's argument apparently supports our thesis that there is a distinction between simple (categorical) and complex (conditional, disjunctive, conjunctive, etc) judgements. Furthermore, Reich's argument based on the "cognitions of an object" is not valid either, in part at least because Kant constantly speaks of general logic as a theory of forms of thought and draws a clear distinction between thought and cognition. When we address the specific characteristics of cognition (as opposed to thought), we leave the confines of general logic. As to relational judgements, Reich also failed to justify Kant's position. He even puts greater stress than Kant on the identification of assertoric judgements through their relation to the reality. However, it is obvious that here both Kant and Reich speak of the actual truth of judgements, which is not a modal characteristic and lies beyond general logic. Nevertheless, in his notes on the metaphysics of the 1770s, Kant claims that assertoric judgements express logical truth [3, S. 37], but, in this context, the word "logical" is rather a metaphor. Moreover, strictly speaking, logically true judgements belong to the judgements of necessity. One can analyse Reich's arguments further, but, I believe, it is already clear that in the cases where Reich succeeded in justifying the completeness of Kant's table of judgements, he leaves the confines of general logic, appeals to transcendental consideration, object of cognition, etc. It is impossible to prove the completeness of Kant's divisions within general logic. This general conclusion is also supported by the principle for the justification of division completeness that Reich introduces at the end of the book. He adheres to the principle introduced by Kant in his Reflexion 5834 from the manuscripts on metaphysics. "For this reason there are three logical functions under a certain title, hence also three categories: because two of them demonstrate the unity of consciousness in two *oppositis,* while the third in turn combines the conscious-

ness of the two. Further kinds of unity of consciousness cannot be conceived. For if *a* is a consciousness that connects a manifold, and *b* is another which connects in die opposite way, then *c* is the connection of *a* and *b*" [7, p. 300]. Reich shows that the table of judgements rests on this principle, but since this principle is evidently non-logical, the proof of completeness provided by Reich shows that Kant's systematisation of judgements rests on non-logical principle and, hence, does not belong to general logic and does not rest upon it[17]. However, this conclusion can be also drawn from the evolution of Kant's attitude towards the logical character of division.

Conclusion

The analysis of logical consistency of Kant's table of judgements, its connection to the 18th century tradition of logical research, and the methods to prove it carried out in this article leads us to the following conclusions:

— Kant's table of judgements is logically inconsistent, since each section violates the rules of division, which were familiar both to the logic of the time and Kant himself;

— the analysis of reasons for the violation of division rules in each section shows that Kant failed to abstract "all content of a judgement" and "consider only the intellectual form thereof". It means that the table of judgements does not belong to general logic and is compiled according to some other, non-logical principles;

— the basic principles of the table of judgements are not logical, but rather transcendental, connected with the possibility of the object of cognition. It is indicative of the circular character of Kant's metaphysical deduction of categories. Kant obtained in the table of categories only that what he introduced in the table of judgements.

— the appeal to the authority of logic in justifying the division and its completeness both in case of judgements, and categories, turns out to be invalid.

All in all, it indicates that Kant indeed began to develop a different — transcendental — logic, whose rules deviate from the rules of general logic and, maybe, are incompatible with them. The appeal to general logic seems to be a tribute to tradition and, apparently, the prospects of the development of a different logic were best understood by his followers in the framework of German idealism. At least, its most prominent representative — Hegel — based his own system on the triad (trichotomy) principle that was formulated by Kant and underlay his table of judgements, which resulted in the violation of simple rules of general logic. Although one can assume that Kant would not agree with Hegel's limitation of general logic, as he did not agree with the development of his philosophy carried out by Fichte.

I have all reasons to suspect that if Kant had considered his table of judgements impartially, he would have called it a "pseudo-a priori overintellectualising".

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[17] I will not focus here on Reich's analysis of infinite and singular judgements, which he rightfully excludes from the list of logical functions of thought and derives from logical function by means of the above mentioned triadic principle. It is the proof of their non-logical nature.

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INFERENCES OF UNDERSTANDING AND REASON AS FACTORS OF TEXTUALITY IN I. KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

On the basis of Kant's texts, the author attempts to prove that two and three-element logical-semantic structures — called the judgements of understanding and reason by Kant — represent logically organised complexes of propositions grouping around the structural core of both types of inferences and are communicative forms of textual material "packaging" and, thus, are forms of textuality in I. Kant's discourse. Moreover, they give assertoric and apodictic modality to Kant's discourse.

As we know, Kant's classification of inferences is based on the method of derivation of the consequent from the previous premise (explicit or implicit one). If the consequent (the conclusion) derives from the previous premise immediately, such inference is called an inference of understanding and if it derives mediately, such inference is called an inference of reason, however, they belong to different levels of reflection: understanding operates with the rules meant for the acquisition of empirical knowledge, and reason operates with the rules meant for the acquisition of transcendental knowledge, i.e. understanding is an object for reason. Inferences of understanding provide material for inferences of reason; understanding judges, reason infers. Moreover, inferences of understanding engage, according to Kant, all three cognitive faculties: power of judgement, reason as an ability to produce immediate inference, and understanding as an ability to produce mediated inferences. In the works of the pre-critique period, Kant stresses the difference in functions of these two cognitive faculties. Understanding is an ability to generate such judgements that make concepts clear and valid, i.e. the ability to clearly cognise, while reason is considered as an ability to generate logically mediated inferences, make them complete and real. However, both of them are based on the same ability to generate inferences. Kant of the critique period adds the ability to generate evaluative judgements, ability to reflect, ability to imagine, etc.

Inferences of understanding, from the linguistic point of view, have a two-element (implicative) form of the "if... then", "since... then" type or a two-element disjunctive form of the "not... but", "neither... nor... but" etc., i. e. they follow the antecedent — consequent model in wide sense; in other words, the function of antecedent is implemented by judgements that, this or that way, represent the basis a judgement (consequent) is generated from (or for).

Kant himself, in his work *On a discovery... (against Eberhard)*[1], calls the two-element judgement a mediated statement (Satz), in particular, he writes as follows:

> Die Kritik hat den Unterschied zwischen problematischen und assertorischen Urtheilen angemerkt. Ein assertorisches Urtheil ist ein Satz. Die Logiker thun gar nicht recht daran, daß sie einen Satz durch ein mit Worten ausgedrücktes Urtheil definiren; denn wir müssen uns auch zu Urtheilen, die wir nicht für Sätze ausgeben, in Gedanken der Worte bedienen. In dem bedingten Satze: wenn ein Körper einfach ist, so ist er unveränderlich, ist ein Verhältniß zweier Urtheile, deren keines ein Satz ist, sondern nur die Consequenz des letzteren (des consequens) aus dem ersteren (antecedens) macht den Satz aus. Das Urtheil: einige Körper sind einfach, mag immer widersprechend sein, es kann gleichwohl doch aufgestellt werden, um zu sehen, was daraus folgte, wenn es als Assertion, d. i. als Satz, ausgesagt würde. Das assertorische Urtheil: ein jeder Körper ist theilbar, sagt mehr als das blos problematische (man denke sich, ein jeder Körper sei theilbar etc.) und steht unter dem allgemeinen logischen Princip der Sätze, nämlich ein jeder Satz muß gegründet (nicht ein blos mögliches Urtheil) sein, welches aus dem Satze des Widerspruchs folgt, weil jener sonst kein Satz sein würde[1] [1, S. 304—305 (Anmerkung)].

This statement stresses that Kant's two-element structures with antecedent-consequent (cause-effect, or implicative) logical relations are a means to give the discourse an assertive modality, since the antecedent contains, as a rule, a condition, under which the consequent is presented as a true statement. For example:

> 1. (1) *as* the proposition "I think" (in the problematical sense) contains the form of every judgement in general and is the constant accompaniment of all the categories, (2) it is manifest that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of the understanding excludes all empirical elements; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable conception beforehand of its procedure[2] [2, S. 423].

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[1] The Critique emphasised the difference between the problematic and assertoric judgements. The assertoric judgement is an assertive statement. Logicians define it erroneously as a judgement expressed by words, since when thinking we have to use words to formulate judgements that are not assertions. In the mediated judgement "if a body is elemental, it is unchangeable", there is a relation of two judgements, none of which is an assertion, but only the relation of consequence of the second (des consequens) from the first (antecedens) makes it such. The judgement "some bodies are elemental" can contain a contradiction, nevertheless, it can be expressed in order to understand what can derive from it, if it is presented as an assertion, i. e. a statement. The assertoric judgement "any body is divisible" tells us more than just a problematic judgement ("one should assume that any body is divisible", etc.), since it comes under the general logical principles of all affirmative judgements, namely: any statement should have grounds (rather than be just possible), which stems from the principle of contradiction, anyway, it will not be an assertive statement.

[2] Italics and numeration mine — I. K.

Here, antecedent (1) contains a condition, under which the consequent (2) is a true proposition.

The disjunctive form is used, as a rule, in the cases when the purpose is the need to emphasise the content of the second part of judgement, which can be logically unrelated to the first part but, nevertheless, be presented as assertion. For example:

> 2. (1) Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, *but* is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions [2, S. 354].

Thus, in both cases, the two-element structure of propositions gives its second part assertoric (affirmative) modality.

The cause-effect relations in Kant's discourse are of such versatile and formal character that they become a composite form of textuality in general, i. e. the form of text construction; at the same time, the antecedent represents, as a rule, a number of premises turning into a textual antecedent. This antecedent entails a series of statements of consequential character (textual consequent); its markers are words and phrases of consequential semantic *thus, therefore, consequently, hence,* etc., thus, we can speak of a textual inference or a textual judgement-inference in general. For example:

> 3. (1) "I," as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. (2) *Thus* the expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine of the soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far as it appears in all thought [2, S. 415].

This super phrasal unit (SPU) is can be divided into two parts — the antecedent (1) and consequent (2) ones, which are linked by a connective word of consequential semantic (*thus*). The first contains the premises, the second their conclusions.

From the perspective of topic-focus articulation, i. e. the division of a statement into the "given" and the "new" or the "theme" and the "rheme", in Kant's text, new information is contained in the conclusive (consequent) part. Thus, further development of the text takes place, as a rule, through the consequent, by means of further expansion of the content of its rhematic part or the rhematic core. At the same time, both parts of the logical two-element structure participate in the process of discourse generation resulting in structural cyclicity, which, according to Kant, is an a priori form. For example:

> 4. (1) [If] Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical propositions. (2) [Then] By antithetic I do *not* understand dogmatical assertions of the opposite, *but* the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical cognitions (thesis cum antithesis), in none of which we can discover any decided superiority. (3) Antithetic is not, *therefore*, occupied with one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes [2, S. 509].

As follows from the example above, the logical-syntactic structure of this SPU is based on the "if... then" (1) and "not... but" (2) relations, where the latter is

subordinated to the former, since it is given in the consequent in order to emphasis by logical and rhematic means the main thought of this statement. The text is developed through the repetition of the "not... but" structure (as a manifestation of cyclicity) with an apodictic-conclusive modality. In effect, we deal with a three-element structure that resulted from the absence of the usual meaning of logical conclusion in the consequent (2), which takes place only in (3). It is worth mentioning that both structures under consideration can serve as the forms of expression for different illocutionary speech acts. In our example, the "not... but" form accounts for the speech act of definition in (2) and that of conclusion in (3), which is indicated by the *therefore* operator.

If the conclusive part of the "if... then" formula is expanded, i.e. includes a number of propositions, the following conclusion can be moved to the next paragraph, which leads to the formation of a super-paragraph SPU. For example:

> 5. (1) *If* a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, (2) it is necessary that the object be given in some way or another. (3) Without this, our conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking we have not, in fact, cognized anything, we have merely played with representation. (4) To give an object, if this expression be understood in the sense of "to present" the object, not mediately but immediately in intuition, means nothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience, be that experience real or only possible...
> (5) The possibility of experience is, *then*, that which gives objective reality to all our a priori cognitions [2, S. 252].

As follows from this illustration, the consequent is presented by propositions in (2), (3) and (4). In (5), the content of statements (2), (3) and (4) is formulated more concisely and clearly with the help of the conclusion operator *then*. Therefore, the content of consequent is presented in the assertoric mode; there emerges a hidden syllogism with the following premises.

1. In order to give objective reality to cognition, it is necessary that the object be given.
2. To give the object means to apply its representation to real or possible experience.
3. Then, the possibility of experience gives objective reality to all our a priori cognitions.

Therefore, we can arrive at a conclusion that, although Kant tries to distinguish between inferences of understanding and reason, as well as their functions, in effect, his texts do not always reflect this difference. The point is that the middle member of syllogism in an inference of reason is often an extension (a turn) of the content of the consequent of "if... then" structure, i.e. an inference of understanding. It takes place in those cases when it is necessary to give maximum logical apodicticity to the statement, especially in speech acts aimed at a proof. It can be illustrated with the text of the proof of the first antinomy stating that the world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space.

> 6. (1) Let us assume that the world has no beginning in time; (2) up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive states of things in the world. (3) Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact, that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. (4) *It follows* that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible, and that consequently a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be proved. [2, S. 514].

In this example, the rheme of the consequent (2) is the phrase "an infinite series of successive states of things", which is later thematised, i. e. becomes the initial point (theme) of the middle premise of the syllogism (3). Both premises exclude each other, which makes it impossible for the thesis to be true.

Thus, we approached the discussion of the three-element logical structure that Kant calls the inference of reason. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes as follows:

> The logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive syllogism, the major of which contains the logical division of the extent of a general conception, the minor limits this extent to a certain part, while the conclusion determines the conception by this part [2, S. 315].

From the perspective of text linguistics, a syllogism as a mediated judgement is a means of text material "packaging", which can be seen in the following example:

> 7. (1) Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representation to an object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united. (2) Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. (3) Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself [2, S. 181].

This example is remarkable, because the major premise (1) represents a sum of several consecutive propositions (premises), only the third of which is used to construct the minor premise (2), thus, we should rather speak of the complex nature of the major premise. The conclusive part of the syllogism (3) is also a complex of propositions:

1. The unity of consciousness constitutes the possibility of representations relating to the object.
2. It also constitutes the possibility of their objective validity.
3. It transforms representations into knowledge.
4. It makes understanding possible.

The major premise also consists of several propositions:

1. Understanding is a faculty of cognition.
2. Cognition determines the relation of given representation to an object
3. Object is a conception.
4. This conception unites the manifold in a given intuition.

If we add to these propositions the proposition of the minor premise (2), the total number of propositions will be nine. From the above, one can make a conclusion that syllogisms in Kant's discourse are of *complex-propositional (textual) character and represent the composite form of organisation of textual material* and all three elements of the inference structure (main premises and the conclusion) can "develop" in the text different auxiliary propositions and forms of speech, the addition of which seems inevitable to the author as a result of their aspiration to the clarity, lucidity, soundness, and apodicticity of the propositions put forward. Such syllogisms could be called *propositional* and *contextual*. Here is an example of a contextual syllogism.

8. (1) All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and time, which lies a priori at the foundation of all without exception. Phenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that is, received into empirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a manifold, through which the representations of a determinate space or time are generated; that is to say, through the composition of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifold (homogeneous). (2) Now the consciousness of a homogeneous manifold in intuition, in so far as thereby the representation of an object is rendered possible, is the conception of a quantity (quanti). (3) Consequently, even the perception of an object as phenomenon is possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition, through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous manifold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated; that is to say, all phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as intuitions in space or time they must be represented by means of the same synthesis through which space and time themselves are determined [2, S. 258].

As follows from the example, the major premise (1) and the conclusion (3) are textual (propositional) formulae, which leads us to the conclusion that inferences of understanding and reason represent, in Kant's texts, the ***factors of textuality in general***. This conclusion is supported by the fact that both structures can take different forms and modes of speech. A typical mode of argumentative speech is, for example, ***introspection***, i. e. argumentation from the subject of empirical theoretical cognition. For example:

9. (1) The "I think" must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. (2) That representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition. (3) All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think," in the subject in which this diversity is found [2, S. 173].

This example is representative, since it contains different modes of speech. The major premise (1) presents the ***introspective modes of speech*** of a transcendental I-subject, whose speech acts are used, as a rule, for the creation of a theory of transcendental method to obtain theoretical knowledge.

However, the ***"if... then" structure in its introspective mode of an empirical I-subject of cognition*** is used, as a rule, to justify, prove or illustrate the formulated theoretical statements, as in the following example.

10. (1) The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according to time. (2) *If*, for example, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause, *then* it is simultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two through the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. (3) For if I lay the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface [2, s. 296].

In this case, (2) and (3) offer arguments from the subject of empirical cognition represented usually by the author themselves with the help of the "if... then" structure.

The same type of inference can acquire an ***objectified pragmatic mode*** with the help of a generalised inclusive ***we-subject*** or an indefinite-personal subject ("man" in German). This type of inferences with an affirmative (assertoric) mo-

dality is a logical means of ***objectifying*** the obtained knowledge, since it implies the presence of previous argumentation stages and according to Kant, postulates a priori the universal voice of reason. For example:

> 11. Accordingly, *when we* know in experience that something happens, *we* always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule [2, S. 285].

The ***pragmatic mode*** of inferences of understanding and reason emerges in that case when they are formulated ***from the addressee***. i. e. the author offers the addressee to make the inference. This method makes it possible to give logical arguments maximum persuasiveness and forcefulness and, hence, vividness and expressiveness. For example:

> 12. *Let one assume* that the world itself, or something in it, is a necessary entity (Being), then in the series of its changes there would be a beginning which was unconditionally necessary and consequently without cause... Or else the series itself would be without a beginning... [2, S. 539].

At the ***level of expression and assessment***, Kant as an author uses the above mentioned inference from exclusive I- and we-subjects, for example:

> 13. Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps he conceptions which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions, hut merely as acts of pure thought (which are therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor aesthetical origin) — in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a priori [2, S. 13—131].

Thus, we can arrive at a conclusion that inference of understanding and reason in Kant's discourse are of ***complex propositional (textual) character*** and represent the ***composite form of organisation of textual material*** and all three elements of the inference structure (main premises and the conclusion) can "develop" in the text different auxiliary propositions and forms of speech, the addition of which seems inevitable to the author as a result of their aspiration to the clarity, lucidity, soundness, and apodicticity of the propositions put forward. Such syllogisms could be called ***propositional*** and ***contextual***, while the two- and three-element structures could be called ***factors of textuality in Kant's discourse in general.***

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KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AS A SUBJECT OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS

This article is an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the core of Kant's ethics — the categorical imperative. The author considers and analyses critical comments of different philosophers and specialists in Kant's philosophy regarding the categorical imperative.

Key words: *metaphysics, ethics, Kant, categorical imperative.*

Metaphysics, whose concept developed in connection with the classification of Aristotle's works carried out by Andronicus of Rhodes, was understood as the *first*, i.e. main, philosophy. Natural philosophy, theory of knowledge, philosophy of history, ethics and aesthetics were not considered its elements, i.e. were regarded as secondary philosophical disciplines. Kant was the first philosopher to include the "secondary" doctrines into metaphysics. Thus, metaphysics became, according to Kant, the whole content of philosophy. However, he put stress on *ethics* as the principal metaphysical discipline. Morality (practical reason in Kant's terminology) has *primacy* over theoretical reason, theory of knowledge and natural philosophy.

What did encourage Kant to carry out such radical turn in formulating the subject matter of philosophy? It cannot be explained only by personal features of the philosopher. A more important circumstance is that he was active in the age of the early accumulation of capital, which was critically described by famous Thomas More in his *Utopia* with sharp criticism. Emerging capitalism destroyed mercilessly not only patriarchal community relations but also the associated system of moral rules. E. Solovyov stresses that, as a result, the mercantilising feudal elite cultivated in the society an *amoral interpretation of morality* [12, p. 127]. It is that interpretation and the increasing *relativisation* of moral rules that Kant stood up against. Opposing ethical subjectivism, Kant absolutises and universalises moral rules defining their sum as the *categorical impera-*

tive — an unconditional command of pure, i.e. independent of sensual incitement, reason. Such theoretical position is fraught with one-sidedness; it *ignores* historical development of morality, its dependence on the living conditions. However, this one-sidedness is not only a weakness but also the foundation of historic importance of Kant's moral doctrine, which accentuates the *eternal* in diverse development of moral consciousness. A talented researcher in the field of morality, O.G. Drobnitsky, was absolutely right to mention that Kant would not have been a classic of philosophy and ethics if he had not succeeded in expressing the contradictions, problems and spiritual experience of his age. His theory was an important landmark in the history of ethical thought, which is still of importance today [4, p. 142].

The principles of morality, according to Kant are a priori and immanent to human consciousness, although not inborn. It leads us to a conclusion that morality is self-sufficient and, therefore, independent of religion. Ethics, from Kant's point of view, is a sphere of internal human legislation. Ethics implies that a naturally free person (which, of course, means pure practical reason) formulates their own moral law. However, Kant's understanding of relation between morality and religion is, in effect, more complicated and controversial than the thesis that morality is independent of religion. A truly moral person inevitably comes to faith. This provision is, of course, incompatible with the thesis about morality's independence of religion. Nevertheless, there are quite a few incompatibilities of the kind in Kant's philosophy (as well as in any other great philosophical doctrine). I am far from calling it a flaw: on the contrary, the immediate incongruity is, at the same time, the *problemaisation* of the question constantly faced by a person, society, and humanity.

What creates the need to believe in God? Surprisingly, Kant, meaning its a priori nature, refers to everyday experience, which indicates that good works are often not rewarded and, on the contrary, prove to be harmful to the person, while one benefits from evil and crime, which lead to success and are not always punished. But equity, Kant accentuates, is something absolute. Defied equity will inevitably prevail. Since it is not always the case in the real world, consequently, one should assume the existence of the other world and divine retribution. This belief in the unconditional triumph of equity is characterised by Kant as the "moral proof" of God's existence, which, as he constantly stresses, should not be confused with a *theoretical, logical* proof, the latter being impossible.

The crucial element of the categorical imperative is the concept of duty. Thus Kant says "For I must first be certain that I do not act contrary to my duty; only then am I allowed to look toward such happiness" [16, p. 67]. The word *duty* is characterised by Kant as great and sublime, something that does not flatter people but demands obedience. All sensual incitements — that oppose it secretly — fall silent before the idea of duty. Thus, the concept of duty — the a priori concept of practical reason — is opposed to the ethics of eudemonism.

The categorical imperative *specifies* the concept of duty, i.e. indicates how one *should* act in order to follow the commands of conscience. It is of interest that Kant does not limit it to one formula, which would inevitably lead to its one-sided understanding. The first formula is as follows: "The categorical imperative, which as such only affirms what obligation is, is: act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law" [15, p. 17]. The second formula of the imperative, which is of no less importance, says: "*Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only*" [13, p. 87]. It is worth noting that it is the very formula of the categorical imperative that Kant italicised attaching to it an important meaning. A person, as a sentient being, is an end in itself; consequently, no one should treat them as a means to achieve

a certain end. If the first formula is, to a great extent, formalistic, the second one characterises the *content* and moral orientation of actions. It results in the rejection of class privileges (and classes in general), the rejection of dominance of one person over another, the rejection of power if it is not recognised (directly or indirectly) by the free will of a free person.

The third formula of the categorical imperative proclaims the free will of a person to be the architect of universal laws: "Thus the *principle* of every human will as a *will giving universal taw through all its maxims*, provided it is otherwise correct, would be very well suited to be the categorical imperative by this: that just because of the idea of giving universal law it is based on no interest and therefore, among all possible imperatives, can alone be *unconditional* [17, p. 82][1].

The last formula of the categorical imperative determines the moral behaviour of a person as a *citizen* a full-fledged member of a *constitutional* state, who freely abides by the established laws, since they took part in their formulation or at least approves of them. This approval as an act of transcendental will (for only it is free) is, consequently, not only a psychologically (empirically) explicable action, but a *social* action. It deciphers the concept of transcendentality in terms of its relation to a citizen who perceives themselves as such. The point is that a human individual is social, socialised creature that is inseparable from society, in the framework of which their individual social consciousness has developed. As A. Drobnitsky mentions, the "superindividuality" of the subject is the actual sense of the notion of *transcendental subject,* the sense, which was apparently rejected by Kant. He emphasises that the secret of a free will lies not within the mechanisms of human psychic but in the method, by which personality relates to social reality. Drobnitsky calls this conclusion a possible solution to Kant's "transcendental being" [4, p. 146].

The categorical imperative becomes more clear and admissible when it is interpreted as a moral prohibition against certain actions, which was accentuated by A. A. Guseinov. Thus, Kant illustrates his reasoning with the example of a moral rule: "thou shalt not lie". From times immemorial, this formula has been considered the primary condition of morality. Falsehood is not compatible with a free will, which represents moral consciousness. Of course, a liar cannot be called a moral person. With his intrinsic ideological courage, especially striking in the context of spiritual atmosphere of the then Prussia, Kant gives examples, in which, despite the everyday routine, a by no means amoral human consciousness has to choose between the truth and a lie. Let us assume, Kant reasons, that your house became a shelter for an innocent man pursued by a murderer. The would-be murderer asks you whether that person hid in your house. You are aware that you are facing a murderer. Do you have the moral right to say that that person is not in your house? Kant answers this question *negatively*, since one should *always* say *only* the truth. This example points out a flaw in Kant's rigoristic understanding of the requirements of moral law. Accepting the

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[1] Expounding his third formula, Kant writes: "It was seen that the human being is bound to laws by his duty, but it never occurred to them that he is subject *only to laws given by himself but still universal* and that he is bound only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however, in accordance with nature's end' is a will giving universal law" [ibid]. Kant's comment regarding this formula of the categorical imperative — "among all possible imperatives, can alone be *unconditional"* should not be understood as a statement of the conditional nature of the other formulae of the categorical imperative. It refers to "all possible imperative", in particular, the hypothetical and assertoric ones. One can also conclude that this phrase is an unhappy expression of Kant's actual thought. There are numerous examples of the kind in his works.

universal significance of the categorical imperative, a real person in real conditions *is obliged* to take into account all evident circumstances. If, for example, during a war, a soldier is taken captive, should they tell the enemy about the location of their unit, of how many people it consists of and what other units are located on the same territory? It is evident that the soldier is *morally* obliged to *lie,* to misinform the enemy. Otherwise, he is a traitor, an obviously amoral creature.

Kant's categorical imperative demands: "thou shalt not kill"! It can hardly be objected in the everyday life. A murder is not only amoral but is a crime liable to severe punishment. However, our world is still not free of wars. There is no need to say that the moral commandment "thou shalt not kill" proves completely senseless in the battlefield. One should not kill prisoners of war, it is amoral. It is amoral to raid occupied territories. It is amoral to inflict violence against civilians. But the enemy, if they do not capitulate, should be destroyed.

It is worth noting that, in everyday life, the principle "thou shalt not kill" requires that all circumstances are reasonably taken into account. Should a doctor, when asked by a dying patient, who, as it often happens, still hopes for the better, tell the whole truth? I think that, in this case, the doctor should not tell the patient the truth. For example, in regular, even happy, married life, it is hardly reasonable to answer every question truthfully. In my opinion, if people always told each other the truth, the life would become unbearable. However, "thou shalt not lie" retains its significance in all cases when its violation is not called for by adverse circumstances. Indeed, as I will show below, Kant admits the need for such reservation regardless of the categorical imperative.

All this arguments against the absolutisation of categorical imperative have been put forward by a number of specialists in Kant studies. For instance, A. Riel writes that categorical imperative is only a formula, which should provide, in certain situations, that we are aware of our duty; however it is not a principle of our behaviour [10, p. 26]. Of course, one cannot agree with the statement that the categorical imperative indicates our duty only in certain cases. On the contrary, it indicates our constant duty. The statement that the categorical imperative is not a principle of our behaviour is true in the sense suggested by Kant: nobody has ever acted in *all* cases according to this moral law. However, Kant did not think that the requirements of the categorical imperative are impossible to meet. If it were the case, this moral law would lose the status of a law and turn into a utopian recommendation. From Kant's point of view, if the due were impossible to fulfil, it would cease to be the due.

One can agree with A. P. Skripnik, who wrote that a person cannot worship morality as an idol, but when it comes to this, the idolater can sacrifice the interests of the others for the sake of their own interests [11, p. 147][2].

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[2] However, it is difficult to agree with Skripnik when he states that the categorical imperative, being an expression of the formal aspect of moral thinking about the world is as incapable to guide a person in the choice of morally right actions as formal logic can help in the pursuit of the truth [ibid]. Formal logic helps avoid logical errors and, in its contemporary form, as a symbolic (mathematical logic), play even a more significant role in the process of cognition. As E. Yu. Solovyov mentions in a number of his publications, the categorical imperative gives a universal character to moral requirements that have been formulated throughout the history of civilization. Kant, Solovyov writes, expressed in a strict form something that people had always understood. He adds that there is no human society that would deny the absolute difference between good and evil, would not condemn lies, perfidy, and ungratefulness, would not understand that a good deed performed selflessly (for its own sake) is more valuable than a good deed performed in fear, for a reward or due to other external motives [12, p. 122].

The categorical imperative is, according to Kant's teaching, an authentic manifestation of an a priori, independent of sensual incitements, free will, which is understood, in particular as freedom of choice. An empirical will, the motives of which are of inevitably sensible character, cannot be free, it is held captive by sensible inclinations. Only transcendental will, i.e. the "thing-in-itself (or noumenon) is free. Kant defines this freedom as an ability to choose what the reason deems good. A free will is a good will. It leads to an unambiguous conclusion: "a free will and a will under moral law are one and the same" [14, p.53]. In other words, practical (moral) freedom is independence of will from any law except the moral one, i.e. the categorical imperative. Here arises a question that is, for some reason, not discussed by Kant. Moral actions, including felonies, are not performed by an empirical will, which is not free, according to Kant's doctrine. These deeds contradict morality, since they are done by an individual and are manifestations of a transcendental (free) will. Some hints at this circumstance can be traced in Kant's interpretation of the *subjectivity* of radical evil intrinsic to human nature. However, Kant never says that a free will is not always subordinate to the moral law. Nevertheless, he cannot admit that "moral evil... must originate from freedom;... a propensity to evil can only attach to the moral faculty of choice" [18, p. 54].

The accentuated duality of Kant's understanding of the freedom of will — as both moral and amoral, good and evil — was mentioned as early as 1888 by an English philosopher, H. Sidgwick, in an article published in the *Mind* magazine (later, this article was included in his book *Methodes of Ethics* — its most recent issue appeared in 1962). Many specialists on Kant's philosophy, in particular, L. Beck, the author of *A commentary on the Critique of pure reason*, J. Silber, and N. Potter, set out to disprove Sidgwick's point of view. All of them opposed the freedom of will to choice, which was characterised as something akin to negative freedom restrained by sensible inclinations. However, Kant does not oppose freedom to choice, which he regards as a necessary form of the manifestation of a free will. At the same time, he distinguishes a choice under the influence of sensible inclinations, but even this circumstance does not make choice not free. Such choice is, according to Kant, non-pure freedom. Kant distinguishes it from pure choice. "That choice which can be determined by *pure reason* is called free choice... *Freedom* of choice is this independence from being *determined* by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the ability of pure reason to be of itself practical" [15, p.13].

Thus, we cannot but admit that here we face the intrinsic to any great philosophical system *ambivalence*, incongruity, inconsistency of the basic provisions. And this, as mentioned above, should not be considered as only a flaw, the lack of logical consistency, etc. This ambivalence is rich in content. In effect, it does not boil down to the ambivalence of Kant's doctrine. Here we should speak of the ambivalence of cognition and morality.

The critics of Kant's ethical doctrine usually reproach him for *rigorism* defining the latter as an excessively strict and categorical interpretation of moral rules. Of course there are solid bases for the accusation, as we can see from the above reasoning. Even Kant's article *On a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives* (1797) certainly supports this accusation. But Kant, being quite consistent in this case, agrees entirely with that he takes the position of ethical rigorism. Moreover, he stresses that the rejection of rigorism in ethics questions the unconditional obligatory nature of moral rules. However, Kant mentions, experience prefers the interim position between the two extremes,

It is of great consequence to ethics in general, however, to preclude, so far as possible, anything morally intermediate, either in actions (adiaphora) or in human characters; for with any such ambiguity all maxims run the risk of losing their determination and stability [18, 47—48]. In my opinion, one should accept this argument. Ethical principles should be formulated without any reservations, however, when applying them, volens-nolens, one should take into account the circumstances — which Kant did not want to admit and thus was wrong. At the same time, the above statement points to the need to take into account the circumstances. It was Kant who called "*to preclude, so far as possible*" any deviations from the proper fulfilment of moral requirements. It means he almost allows that this or that moral requirement can be impossible to fulfil. In my opinion, there is no other way to interpret this reservation.

Thus, the ethical principle formulated as an abstract judgement should be *specified* for everyday application. A proverb says, there are no rules without exception. It also relates to the field of morality, if the exception is justified. It can be justified by moral arguments.

Kant's categorical imperative is usually criticised as ethical formalism. We should consider this circumstance. In my opinion, any principle — not only in ethics, but in every field of knowledge, provided it is formulated as apodictically universal — entails inevitably certain formalism. It is also applicable to the formulation of natural laws, since such formulation requires something "ideal", for example, absolute vacuum, perfect gas, perfect fluid, etc. However, Kant's categorical imperative is characterised not only by *necessary* formalism, but also its limitation and, in certain cases, even its rejection. I mean the second and third formulations of this moral law. A person should not be treated as a *means*; they should be an end both for themselves and others. A person should abide by only those judicial requirements that are adopted with his immediate or mediate concern. Of course, these formulae are abstract and, thus, to a degree, not free from formalism, but they have certain *content*, which implies the rejection of formalism.

Of course, the problem of the content of the categorical imperative does not apply to actions aimed not at fulfilling the duty, but rather achieving something else. Such actions are characterised by Kant as corresponding not to the categorical, but the conditional (hypothetical or assertoric) imperative. For example, a merchant never cheats his clients, assuming (not without a reason) that such behaviour will help him make most profit. In this case, the obedience to moral rules is of *legal* character, and does not have an immediate connection to morality. The categorical imperative, unlike the conditional one, has only one foundation: the recognition of duty. It means that moral behaviour is defined not only by actions but also by the underlying motives, or, in Kant's words, the maxim. In this sense, the categorical imperative is formulated by Kant regardless of the possible, certain content of an action. "There is one imperative that, without being based upon and having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by certain conduct, *commands* this conduct immediately. This imperative is categorical. It has to do not with the matter of the action and what is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which the action itself follows; and the essentially good in the action' consists in the disposition, let the result be what it may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality" [17, p. 69].

Marxists were especially critical of the "ethical socialism" based on Kant's doctrine deeming it an inconsistent theoretical concept and opposing it to the *economic* substantiation of historical necessity (and, moreover, inevitability) of

the socialist transformation of society. However, the socialist system sustained a defeat in peaceful competition with the capitalist system, since it could not ensure higher labour productivity, nor did it bring about democratic transformations. As for the mottos of socialism: shorter working hours, better working conditions, adequate remuneration, sickness and unemployment benefits, medical services, retirement benefits, etc — all of them came to life in the developed capitalist countries[3].

All of the above leads us to a conclusion that Kant's ethics, despite its enormous historical significance and applicability in modern times, is still subject to fundamental criticism. His belief that the idea of freedom makes everyone who recognises it a member of transcendental world is, without doubt, inconsistent. Another inconsistent belief is that all of us exist both in this and the other world, since everyone immanently possesses pure reason and a good or free will, which, as well as pure reason, is a thing-in-itself. The existence of the transcendental was questioned by Kant more than once, but he could not do without this merely postulated reality. Freedom, which, according to Kant, belongs not to the empirical — existing in space and time — but to the transcendental (or transcendent) subject is incognisable not only in this form, but in the way it is manifested in real, empirical conditions, whose objective, independent of human consciousness existence is denied by Kant. As German scholar J. Pothast mentions, in Kant's philosophy, freedom is transferred to the area of trans-empirical so that it cannot oppose unfreedom within real social relations. The dichotomy of the two worlds, alias the dichotomy of freedom vs. unfreedom turns into the dichotomy of sciences [3, S. 301].

P. N. Novgorodtsev, a leading representative of Russian Kantianism, while accepting Kant's ethical doctrine in general and agreeing that the moral law is a fact of pure reason, which we recognise in ourselves a priori and which is unconditionally real for us, however, mentions that Kant's categorical imperative is scared of a contact with the outer world and confines moral life to the sphere of pure will [9, p. 177].

A French Kantian, F. Alquié emphasises that Kant is convinced that if every person poses this question themselves, they will reveal this moral fact and discover moral judgment within themselves. If they ask themselves what the object of this moral judgement is and what is truly good, they will answer that nothing is good in this world unless it is a good will [1, p. 35]. Alquié does not agree with this idea, although he shares Kant's perspective that moral consciousness does not depend on education and cultural development. However, unlike Kant, Alquié believes that moral judgements and reflection about moral issues imply a certain level of culture. Thus, not everybody is equal to the task to conclude what is the crucial element of moral consciousness. This argument can hardly be rejected.

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[3] While orthodox Marxists criticised "ethical socialism" as a doctrine hostile to the interests of the working class; a modest non-orthodox Marxist, L. V. Konovalov, wrote "So, what is the positive idea, from the aspiration to solve which ethical socialism emerged as an independent philosophical school of thought? We call this idea positive, since it is real and expresses an actual historical interest" [7, p. 317]. One of the first representatives of ethical socialism was the head of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, who insisted that neither ethics, nor socialism should eradicate the idea of God as the crown of their structure. This ideas is a belief in the power of the good and hope for the triumph of equity [2, S. 10]. Contemporary social democrats, having rejected the ideology of "scientific socialism", take the position of ethical socialism converting voters from different social layers to their cause.

A. France believes that the highest moral principle should be not equity but leniency. Leniency, from his point of view, eliminates the limitations to a just moral decision. But leniency implies good will, it needs good will even more than equity. Thus, A. France's ideas are not that different from those of Kant, who believed that the categorical imperative is situated beyond compassion, lenience, and pity.

The founder of English analytical philosophy, G. Moore, put forward more serious objections against Kant's ethics. The criterion of the good, as well as the concept of the good itself, is subjective, vague, and unclear. Kant, Moore stresses, "conceives the Moral Law to be an Imperative. And this is a very common mistake. This ought to be, it is assumed, must mean "This is commanded"; nothing, therefore, would be good unless it were commanded; and since commands in this world are liable to be erroneous" [19, p. 128]. Arguing against Kant, Moore stands up for what he considers freer and more concrete ethics, which could not be reduced to an imperative, moreover to a categorical, i.e. unconditional, one. Thus he objects to absolutisation of duty, i.e. the foundation of Kant's ethics. "When we assert that a certain action is our absolute duty, we are asserting that the performance of that action at that time is unique in respect of value. But no dutiful action can possibly have unique value in the sense that it is the sole thing of value in the world" [19, p. 147][4].

Moore's arguments deserve a thorough consideration; however, it is obvious that Moore aspires to disprove the significance Kant attached to the concept of duty in ethics. Above, I mentioned that the principle "thou shalt not lie", without doubt, reflects the essence of the categorical imperative, but we cannot exclude a situation when it is the moral feeling, love for humanity or an external need that makes the moral person act contrary to this absolute, in Kant's opinion, duty.

Thus, regardless of how serious the criticism of Kant's ethics is, it can undermine neither the significance of the categorical imperative, nor its importance for ethics, which, for the first time in the history of humanity, was emphasised in Kant's philosophy. Kant raised ethics to the position of being central part of philosophical study of humanity, without objecting that there are other philosophical heights, first of all, epistemology, the founder of which Kant also was, since prior to him, the theory of knowledge was developed by philosophers (J. Locke, É. Condillac) as a theory of *scientific* knowledge or philosophy of science. However, it is the doctrine of morality that is the most important theoretical achievement of Kant's philosophy, for it was he who revealed the origins of moral consciousness. Morality has deep roots stretching back to ancient history. It is absolute and this absoluteness is manifested as a universal system of rules of conduct, without which the universal history of humanity would not exist. It holds true for Immanuel Kant.

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[4] Commenting on the above statement Moore writes: " In order to show that any action is a duty, it is necessary to know both what are the other conditions, which will, conjointly with it, determine its effects... Ethics, therefore, is quite unable to give us a list of duties" [19, p. 149]. However, he admits here may be some possibility of showing which among the alternatives, *likely to occur to any one*, will produce the greatest sum of good [19, p. 149]. Therefore, although his objections point to the Achilles' heel of ethical rigorism, he does not disprove Kant's principal idea: ethics should be a doctrine of the due; the due is an action, the maxim of which can be universally accepted.

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IMMANUEL KANT ON THE FEATURES OF MORALITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE SYSTEM OF MORALS

The subject of this article is discussed with the help of an excursus into the history of morals and the perception of Kant's teaching on morals, as well as through a polemic with some of its interpretations. Kant's examples of the application of his theory of morality prove its practicality and stability.

Key words: *normative relationships, ethics, Copernican revolution, system of customs, moral, law, features and formulae of moral relationships.*

Alongside other "Copernican turns", Kant also carried out the Copernican turn that consisted in distinguishing morality within the system of morals and opposing it to law as the second fundamental element of his systems. Certainly, it is one of the greatest achievements of the abstracting human thought. Over two thousand years of history of philosophy, the great Königsberg sage was the first to identify this component in the system of moral rules, the component featured not in every rule but only in those that are likely to influence the future conditions of human society, the ideal component that brings the system of morals to its ideal state and controls the process of historical development of this system. His contribution is so great that he is often put on a par with Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, and the legendary Christ, although, in effect, he should be put above them all, since the problem of the essence of morality and its role in social morals was solved only by him.

How did Kant's discovery affect practical philosophy? What changed after the appearance of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* followed by Kant's works on the problems of philosophy of morals from *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* to *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*?

1. The construction of ethics as a science of morality

The point is that the process of narrowing the meaning of ethics from a *science of morals* to a science of *morality* per se, as a science of morality as an element in the system of society's morals did not happen at

once, but rather through bewilderment and perplexity. Although morality is a crucial element of the system, it is still *one of the elements,* which was always emphasised by Kant.

Kant uses the term *ethics* both in its traditional and the new, Kantian sense. In the traditional sense, this term is used in historical contest, when, for example, it describes the emergence of practical philosophy in Ancient Greece and characterises its different schools of thought. In the narrow sense, as a "doctrine of the elements of *ethics*" and a "doctrine of method of ethics", ethics is the second part of the *Metaphysics of morals*. The concepts of *ethics* and the *ethical* are opposed to *law* and the *legal*.

Kant understood that if he wanted to assign a new meaning to an established concept, he should do it so that no reader could overlook this intention. In my opinion, he succeeded, even over-succeeded. Here is Hegel's reaction to his effort: "... Kantian usage prefers the expression *morality* as indeed the practical principles of Kant's philosophy are confined throughout to this concept, even rendering the point of view of ethics impossible and in fact expressly infringing and destroying it" [16, p. 63]. Apparently, Hegel is so influenced by Kant's theory of morals with its extreme characteristics (which can only be welcomed at time of formation of the concept of *morality*) that he completely neglects the "metaphysics of morals" as a whole, within which, as a result of the behaviour of morality in a system, its properties are constrained and should not frighten anyone with their rigorism. Kant's words characterising the structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can also be related to the *Metaphysics of Morals*: "For explanations and examples and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its articulation or organization…" [17].

Prior to Kant, practical philosophy could be called ethics, philosophy of morality, metaphysics of morals, even philosophy of law, as is the case in Hegel's works, since the concepts of the *ethical* and *moral* were used as synonyms, which differ only in etymology.

At the same time *ethics* enjoyed the advantage of seniority. Ethos — the system of morals of the ancient Greek society — was an independent object of studies for Aristotle and the doctrine of ethos was called ethics. The Ancient Roman *morality* corresponds to the Greek *ethos* and also means *morals*. However, when Romans got interested in the subject, the science of morality — since ethics had already existed, and Greek culture underlay that of Rome — was also called ethics.

Roman theoreticians focused on the basic element of the system of morals — law. As non-traditional forms of behaviour emerge and spread, there arises a need for the development of positive (written) law that is shaped in the process of state institutionalization. It cannot be ignored anymore; morals are identified, first of all, with law; ethics is basically reduced to theory of law.

It is the very state of affairs that was assumed in medieval Europe and maintained through until the age of Enlightenment. Only Kant's phenomenon led to the emergence of ethics as a science of morality at the end of the 19th century, as well as philosophy of law — metaphysics of morals broke into these two independent parts, and the problem of interaction between morality and law as elements of an integral system ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the understanding of morality without its orientation towards other components of morals leads to complications and contradictions [3].

2. The difficulty of distinction of morality

Émile Benveniste's book *Vocabulaire des Institutions Indo-Européennes* [1] clearly shows the invariance of the development of social relations for all Indo-European peoples reflected in the commonness of languages. Their morals are represented through rites and rituals expressed in different norms, rules and rights, obligations and laws organically linked with the language, language formulae and speech. Economics, law, politics, religion and superstitions — both sacred and profane — are represented in an indestructible syncretic unity within morals as ritual traditions and conventional behaviour and actions. All these components of the system of morals are, to a degree, manifested and materialised and can be sensibly perceived. Only *morality*, as defined by Kant, is difficult to discern. It had not been explained before Kant what we should look for. Morality is represented through a certain quality of various forms of norms. On the one hand, this quality is the very essence of generic relations and, apparently, it does not matter to what level the generic relation belongs. Benveniste indicates as a general example the Ancient Greek-Roman parallel of three levels:

1) δoμos — domus (a big family, house);

2) γένos — gens (a clan bringing together several families);

3) φυλή — tribus (a tribe, a community of persons of common origin, a clan union).

However, he emphasises that, initially, there was a society in general rather than a family, and, later, a clan, and a city [1, p. 206]. Within a clan-tribe, relations are of one kind, beyond it, of another. It is not a coincidence that there is an established and universal opposition *domi − foris*, i. e. indoors—outdoors. Everything that is outdoors (fores) is foreign and strange. And a foreign territory is always animus. This opposition may include a different adverb — *peregri, peregre* ("abroad", derived from *ager* — "field"), a derivative of this noun — adjective *agrios* — means "wild" [1, c. 208].

All relations within a family are accompanied by a special affective meaning of a clearly expressed positive character: philos — dear, philotēs — love [1, c. 220]. This affection crowning all relations within the phyle is the very place where one should look for *morality*, more precisely, for the developing nucleus of morality. This affect is active and its development is linked to the expansion of the social community it applies to. For example, the actual meaning of the word *ciuis* is not *citizen* but *co-citizen* [1, c. 221].

Gradually, morality forms the ultimate community of the type — *humanity* as a whole or even the aggregate of sentient beings in general. On the other hand, morality is a phenomenon of individual consciousness; it implies the development of personality.

Thus Émile Benveniste draws our attention to the words with the reconstructed stem **swe-* and comments that, in general, these stems relate to two properties. Firstly, **swe-* denotes a relation to "one's own", secondly, **swe-* specifies "oneself" as an individuality. It is apparent that such notion is of great interest for both general linguistics and philosophy. *Self* also expresses the category of *reflexiveness*. It is the expression a person uses when referring to themselves in order to identify themselves as an individual and draw everything to themselves. At the same time, this subjectivity expresses a relation. **swe* is not reduced to the speaker, in its initial point, it implies a small group of people closed around "one's own" [1, p. 218]. The process of development of such concept has two opposite directions: the scope of *one's own* tends to both expand and reduce

to one's own *I*. The history of development of personality as the ultimate phase of individual development is closely connected with this process. *I* both constitutes the clan and distinguishes itself from it.

This is what Kant defines as *ungesellige Geselligkeit* (unsocial sociability) [5, p. 11] and considers as a property of a human being that facilitates the development of world history, unification of people within the global historical process, which foregrounds the development of each person.

Thirdly, morality in the morals of ancient societies is organically linked to *sacred* experience, constitutes the essence of such experience. Again, this fact became discernible only after Kant had formulated his theory of reducing the essence of religion to morality. The section dedicated to religion in Benveniste's fundamental work puts forward a number of arguments in favour of Kant's idea. The sacred is also of affective nature, which is manifested in the perception of something as *dear,* the reverential attitude to the highest value. The *saint* and the *sacred* are extracted from the meaning of plentiful and fertile force capable of creation and increasing natural productivity [1, p. 346], this force also belongs to the clan as a whole. Benveniste emphasises that, for example, the English *holy* is related to *whole* and that these meanings were closely connected in the ancient times. A clan as a whole is represented by a mythical forefather, a totemic ancestor, as a rule, a mother goddess, since this connection stems from the chthonic myth.

For an ancient human this overwhelming connection with the clan as a *whole* conceals the frightful, the mysterious, and the enchanting — the components of the *sacred* identified by the German theologian Rudolf Otto [8], who called spiritual phenomena of the kind "numinous experience. Such experience takes place long before the experience of religious faith as manifested in mature monotheistic religions. Benveniste's and Otto's points of view coincide here. Benvenistes proves it by the fact that there is no common Indo-European word for religion [1, p. 394], which indicates that the notion originated on a limited territory that had developed necessary intellectual conditions for overcoming mytho-epic consciousness. Initially, the word *religion* means 'following the prescriptions imposed by a cult'. As a proof, Benveniste draws attention to the derivative *religious* (attentive to the cult); the one who pays attention to the recognition of the ritual [1, p. 397]. Further, Benveniste stresses that this meaning, apparent within the ancient word usage, insists on the interpretation of *religio* given by Cicero, who attaches *religio* to *legere* [1, p. 397].

Kant, who admired and had profound knowledge of Cicero, could not leave it unnoticed. And if *legere* means *to return to the initial condition* and *religere* to *return to the previous action, make another attempt,* the link between this notion and the established ritual, zealously followed tradition becomes evident. It is of special importance for the crucial part of the ancient society rite — sacrificial offering — that everything is conducted as prescribed, according to the rules, since it is a matter of life and death.

Cicero also relates the notion of *law* to the word *legere* [13, p. 94—95]. It seems that Cicero provided inspiration for Kant's idea of *moral law*[1], which is of-

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[1] See my attempt to confirm Kant's orientation towards Cicero in the formulation of the concept of moral law and even towards the analogy between the moral law and the laws of starry heavens made in [4]. In section 7.1 "How close are the ties of kinship between heaven and morality?", I emphasise that an analogous connection can be found not only in Cicero's dialogue *De legibus*, which was mentioned above, but also in the dialogue *De officies*. Cicero was Kant's favourite Roman author.

ten characterised by the creator of categorical imperative as sacred. The idea of man-god stems from the understanding of religion as morality as its most essential component, as a "religion within the boundaries of mere reason".

3. Some negative consequences of the distinction of morality and its isolation from morals

Since theoretical works on practical philosophy are still dominated by the tendency towards isolated consideration of morality and law when addressing Kant's ideas, it results in the substantial criticism of both the former and the latter. At first glance, it corresponds to the intentions of the great thinker, since he always followed the *methodological* rule, according to which, the understanding of the essence of a phenomena requires abstraction from external interactions and their consideration in *pure* form, the *purification* of the object under consideration from all extraneous and all that is concealing its true nature factors. In particular, it is the major task of the *Critique of Practical Reason*: to obtain *pure practical reason*, i.e. morality, in order to understand it per se. Kant solves this task elegantly, making experts take off their hats in admiration and proclaim that Kant has created *pure* or formal ethics as a science as exact as pure mathematics. These are the words of the greatest Russian philosopher, Vladmir S. Solovyov [9, p. 478].

However, the understanding of a phenomenon in its purity is a necessary but an interim and auxiliary step. After this cognitive operation, the *pure object* is inserted into the system, whose element it is. And now we see its true role in the system and improve our understanding of the system as a whole. Kant's thinking is entirely systemic: he is convinced that to understand something means to understand it within a system and as a system.

I would like to pursue this issue further in the light of the wonderful book by Norbert Hinske entitled *Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik: Studien zum Kantschen Logikcorpus*, where he demonstrates that the true innovation of Kant's concept of systems lies in the concept of *end* (author's italics) that underlies the "scientific idea of the whole" [12, p. 144]. N. Hinske finds the classical definition of system in the section *Architectonics of pure reason* in *Transcendental doctrine of method*. I will quote the definition in more detail than Hinske in order to address the problem of end as a factor that determines the system. Kant writes: "Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends of reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one idea. This idea is the conception — given by reason — of the form of a whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not only the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to occupy. The scientific idea contains, therefore, the end and the form of the whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of the end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through which all have a relation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system, so that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our knowledge of the rest; and it determines a priori the limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio); it may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase by external additions (per appositionem). It is, thus, *like an animal body* (author's italics), the growth of which does not add any limb, but, without changing their proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active" [17].

In accordance with the principle of identity of indiscernible, any comparison is insufficient; in this case, the comparison of the development of system of moral with that of an animal body, naturally, does not achieve complete similarity, since the emergence of positive law can be interpreted as a fact of evolutionary airomorphosis; the proportional significance of law and morality is obviously different in a civilised society and in the *childhood* of society characterised by ritual-traditional systems of moral norms.

N. Hinske emphasises that, in Kant's lectures on logic, the methodological principle is demonstrated in its most essential moments. He quotes Kant, who points out in the Logik Philippi that, when constructing a system, one should start with the whole, the basic concept, rather than with the parts. Firstly, Kant suggests drawing up a plan of the whole and then filling it in with parts. The ideal or the whole comes first; only within the whole, one can conceive parts [AA, XXIV, S. 399], [12, p. 151]. From the Logik Busolt, Hinske quotes the fragment stating that a system requires that the idea of the whole precedes the identification of parts, while in case of an aggregate, the knowledge of part precedes the understanding of the whole [AA, XXIV, S. 631], [12, p. 151].

What do we see here? The actual studies and interpretations of the practical philosophy of the Königsberg sage are, as a rule, limited to the first — preparatory and auxiliary — task. It never comes to the consideration of the role of ethics, as well as law, in the *system of metaphysics of morals*; the actual role of morality in the system of morals of society remains unrevealed. Instead of a system, there is an aggregate with all its consequences.

I will give a representative example. This year we celebrate the 285th anniversary of the birth of the greatest philosopher in the world. But Kant himself, according to his precepts, should be considered in the system of equally great figures in world culture. This year we celebrate the 250th anniversary of the birth of one of them — the greatest poet and Kantian philosopher Friedrich Schiller. It is but reasonable to pay heed to him, since both geniuses contemplated each other with increasing and fruitful interest. I would like to consider Schiller's famous epigram *Scruples of Conscience*, which explains vividly what happens when morality is isolated from its natural environment and considered independently. Here is the epigram:

> I like to serve my friends, but unfortunately I do it by inclination.
> And so often I am bothered by the thought that I am not virtuous.
>
> Decision
>
> There is no other way but this! You must seek to despise them
> And do with repugnance what duty bids you. [18, p. 177].

Most philosophers of morality and historians of ethics, who address this epigram to prove the evident, from their point of view, rigorism of Kant's understanding of morality, its complete isolation from life and absolute inapplicability, read this epigram in its immediate interpretation. They assume that Schiller presented Kant's final point of view on the relation between morality and human inclinations: morality allegedly excludes inclinations, demanding their annihilation.

At the same time, they ignore the fact that art is not prone to impartial depicting of the facts of reality, that there is always a supertask; and there is one in this epigram.

In my opinion, it is still an important question: whom does Schiller ridicule in the poem — Kant or his inapt interpreters? If we keep in mind that the epigram is a part of a work entitled *Philosophers*, which presents satirically the widespread school interpretation of the major modern philosophical systems from Descartes to Fichte and Schelling depriving these systems of all details and, as a result, attaching to them almost the opposite meaning, we should read the epigram more carefully.

Schiller knew that, according to Kant's practical philosophy, inclinations differ. If an inclination ensures the *legality* of an action, such inclination is welcomed by Kant, since, sooner or later, the legal actions that are similar to moral ones in form but not motive can become truly moral. Schiller had more than a nodding acquaintance with university routine; the poem *Philosophers* ridicules not Kant's theory of morality but the superficial thoughts that come so often from university rostrums. Schiller dedicated his famous essay *On grace and dignity* to the motivation of behaviour: "That which we are rigorously forced to distinguish in philosophic analysis is not always separated also in the real" [20]. Schiller understood perfectly that Kant had been too scrupulous in his aspiration to prove the *autonomy* of morality and commented his epigram as follows: "Whatever precautions the great philosopher has been able to take in order to shelter himself against this *false* (author's italics) interpretation, which must be repugnant more than all else to the serenity of the free mind" [20]. However, these precautions were not enough.

The real Kant and not the Kant of Schiller's epigram often says quite the opposite attending to that inclinations towards goodwill and good deeds emerge in the souls of people. Even a misanthropes can develop such inclinations if they perform moral actions. For example, in the *Introduction to the doctrine of virtue*, there is a small section entitled *Love of the human beings*. Here, Kant instructs us: "To *do good* to other human beings insofar as we can is a duty, whether one loves them or not; and even if one had to remark sadly that our species, on closer acquaintance, is not particularly lovable, that would not detract from the force of this duty" [20, p.161]. Below, the philosopher expounds: "*Beneficence* is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. So the saying "you ought to *have* your neighbor as yourself "does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, *do good* to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general)" [20, p. 162].

However, inclinations might contradict morality in most cases. Moral imperative, Kant writes, applies "to *human beings,* rational *natural* beings, who are unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law, even though they recognize its authority; and even when they do obey the law, they do it *reluctantly* (in the face of opposition from their inclinations), and it is in this that such *constraint* properly consists" [20, p.145]. He continues this reasoning with an expressive passage "The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on, however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly (which means hesitations and internal struggle of motives — *L.K.*), when he finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very thing, that he cannot resist the voice of duty" [20, 148].

It means that morality hardly exists as a pure motive, i.e. as the only motive of soul. In effect, there is a complex interweaving of different motives both non-moral (strong desire to have enjoyment), moral and legal (necessity to perform an official duty), and solely moral (concern for the sick father). It is great that, in Kant's example, the moral (!) motive prevailed. However, it could have happened otherwise.

I would like to conclude my digression on the great Schiller with stating that his reliance on Kant gave him an opportunity to create a number of splendid works of art and treatises on aesthetics and philosophy of arts, philosophy of history and history proper.

4. The interaction between morality and law in the system of morals (some aspects)

According to Kant's practical philosophy, morality is just an element in the system of morals. This system is quite plain, since its major elements are morality and law, which, if we keep in mind that it consists of natural and positive law, complicates the system enormously. Natural law is unwritten law, most of its rules and requirements have not been formulated clearly, i.e. it includes traditional norms in the form of rites and customs, everyday and etiquette rules prescribing behaviour in all or almost all situations. In most cases, it relates to ethnic culture, which is, nevertheless, supplemented by the system of ethnic values.

A simplification of this conclusion might look as follows:

```
                    Morals
             (of a people or society)
                /              \
          Morality              Law
                            /        \
                       Natural      Positive
                       /      \
           Non-formulated    Formulated
            (expressed       in folklore texts
         in mytho-ritual    (passed down orally)
             actions)
```

In one of his crucial works dedicated to practical reason, Kant scrutinises the fundamental structural relation in the system of modern morals — the relation between morality and (positive) law. As to Russian Kant studies, this relation was analysed in the comprehensive works of Eric Yu. Solovyov [10; 11] as a *mutually supplementing* nature of morality and law: morality without law is incapable and tends to elude the consciousness of society, however, law without morality degenerates into a system of despotic violence. Russian 20th century history is a vivid example.

I suggest we analyse why it happens this way by means of a thorough examination of the supplementing relation between morality and law on the basis of Kant's practical philosophy. I would rely on, firstly, the *General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals* and, secondly, the *Introduction to the Doctrine of Right* and the *Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue.*

If we generalise everything said by Kant regarding the fundamental difference between the rules of morality and law, we obtain the following table:

Properties of rule-based relation	Rules	
	Moral	Legal
Relation to the subject	**Absolute rules** apply to all subjects — both individuals and groups of all levels up to humanity as an integral subject; they equally apply to everyone	**Relative rules** apply to some subjects: for example, they apply only to legal entities but not natural persons, are in effect in these countries but not the others...
Chronotopic relation to a) space	**Local rules** are valid on the whole territory of the Earth and even extraterrestrial space (in case of a contact with alien civilisations)	**Local rules** are valid in the confines of one municipality but not another, in one state but not another...
b) time	**Unlimited in time**, unchangeable, in effect from the emergence of human reason throughout the history of humanity — both the past and the future	**Limited in time**, their effect is stipulated by legislation, the relation to recurrence is taken into account. These rules can be introduced and abolished
Motivation, relation to motive	**Automotivated rules**, the rule is a motive for itself, they require no other motives or conditions and are, thus, characterised by maximum freedom	**Heteromotiveated rules**, their ends regularly lie beyond legal rules and could differ depending on peculiar conditions in a peculiar situation faced by the subject
Nature of sanction	**Autosanctioned rules**, the sanction is included in the rule and supplements it. Following the moral rule or rejecting it, the subject rewards themselves with moral satisfaction and good conscience or punishes themselves	**Heterosanctioned rules** are protected by the powerful state system, represented by public prosecution, judicial system, penitentiary institutions, police, army, etc. Both reward and punishment are in public rather than the subject's jurisdiction

Within the system of moral rules, morality is the end of the whole system of morals; it is the ideal of the system, while law is just a means. Law, regardless whether we understand it as *ius strictum* or *ius latum*, must be oriented towards morality, which Kant emphasises in his definition: "right is … the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another *in accordance with a universal law of freedom*" [19, p. 24]. Below, he continues: "thus the universal law of right: so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law" [ibid]. The universal law of freedom is the categorical imperative of morality. Kant also stresses that "we know our own freedom — from which all moral laws and consequently all rights as well as all duties arise — only through the moral imperative, which is an immediate injunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground of putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it" [19, p.31]. Thus, morality is a reference point for law, it penetrates law, trying to adapt legal rules to its own features, eliminating their relativity and facilitating the emergence of moral-oriented rules of law. Such area of law is, for example, human rights, which, under the influence of morality, trans-

form from natural law to positive law and claim the same level of subject absoluteness as morality. Is not there a tendency in the field of law towards the elimination of local limitations and the expansion of geographical and political scope of legal norms, which affects national legal systems? Such is the case of the European Union legal system. A similar tendency is evident in other regions of the world. And for us, the residents of the Kaliningrad region surrounded by the European Union states, the harmonisation of our legal system with European law is a pressing need. And this process rests on universal human morality, which brings people together and creates *humanity*, where everybody is a human being and a citizen of the world.

By all other normative parameters, morality strives to assimilate rules of law to itself, inspiring respect for law and motivating people to be law-abiding as a result of understanding of the significance of law for their own lives and society rather than out of fear of punishment. Morality cultivates the understanding of the importance of law as a necessary condition, without which normal life collapses. Without respect to the rights of others, one cannot respect themselves and be a true human being.

5. The formulae of moral and legal relations

The analysis of features of moral rules shows that all of them stem from the same source, namely, the *relation of equality* between all subjects of moral relations, since each moral subject subordinates his will to or, rather, contains in his will the same universal law. As to morality, all subjects are equal; if this initial equality is undermined, relations between people become amoral. Moral relations imply *innate equality* — Kant emphasises it in italics — *that is*, "independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them" [19, p. 30].

Mathematically, it can be expressed in the following formula:

$$a = b = c = d = e = f = g \text{ etc.},$$

where letters stand for subjects of moral relations.

A legal relation is not an immediate relation of equality, which was analysed by Plato in the dialogue *Republic*. Law rests on the relation of *equity*. Kant uses iustum and iniustum for what is right or wrong in accordance with external laws [19, p. 23]. Since Plato, it has been known that equity is an equal measure for the unequal or a measure of equality of unequal persons or their positions in relation to each other. When defining the nature of law, one should "be spun out into the most subtle threads of metaphysics". Legal relations between people are different, but they must carry an *equal measure* of rights and obligations, rights should be balanced by a sum of obligations. Thus, the formula of equity is a formula of equality of unequal magnitudes:

$$\frac{a}{a} = \frac{b}{b} = \frac{c}{c} = \frac{d}{d} = \frac{e}{e} = \frac{f}{f} ...,$$

where subjects are represented by equal fractions indicating the same measure of initially unequal rights and obligations, i.e.

$$a \neq b \neq c \neq d \text{ etc.}$$

The fact that unequal subjects can be equalised means that morality is an integral element of law. It is not a coincidence that Kant describes moral duty as duty in wide sense, since it is present in law, while the opposite is obviously impossible. It also means that morality is the true basis of the system of morals and,

at the same time, plays the role of the ideal all other moral rules aspire to, as well as that of entelechia, if we apply the term of Aristotle's metaphysics.

Morality as a measure of equality within law, as an integral part of the structure of law is not always found in a certain and balanced condition. Equality is regularly disturbed, balance is lost. Kant draws the following example, apparently, from his own experience: "a domestic servant is paid his wages at the end of a year in money that has depreciated in the interval, so that he cannot buy with it what he could have bought with it when he concluded the contract. The servant cannot appeal to his right to be compensated when he gets the same amount of money but it is of unequal value. He can appeal only on grounds of equity (a mute divinity who cannot be heard); for nothing was specified about this in the contract, and a judge cannot pronounce in accordance with indefinite conditions" [19, p. 27]. Indeed, no strict rule has been violated; civil right (forum soli) remains silent. However, morality has been compromised. The servant did everything he had to according to the contract. It means that the change in the economic situation did not affect his master but affected him personally. The equality of the contracting parties, as well as equity, has been disturbed. If it is a "silent god" and the court cannot hear it, equity is voiced by morality. The master has the right to add another clause to the contract and will be absolutely fair having restored equity.

The last example shows clearly how topical Kant is and how perfect his theory, which is also practically applicable, is. Indeed, there is nothing more practical than a good theory. Nor more long-standing.

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KANT'S INFLUENCE
ON RUSSIAN THOUGHT*

This articles sets out to give an overview as to how Russian thought was influenced by the ideas and personality of Kant — a bright exponent of German spirit, the genius loci of Königsberg — a city of calamitous history.

Key words: *Kant's philosophy, Kant's personality, Russian philosophy, Russian culture.*

Due to the immensity and inexhaustibility of the topic, whose sufficient exploration requires several PhD theses, monographs and collective works, I will focus on a few of its aspects. I will confine my attention to Kant as a *personality*, a *thinker* and an *exponent of German spirit.* Influence, in the broad sense, will be understood as not only the positive adoption of his ideas, but also as polemics with them, their rejection and even passing them over in silence [1—4].

Apprentice's imitation and trustworthy retelling of that once reflected and fixed in the texts were the first forms of disseminating the ideas of the great philosopher that Immanuel Kant has been and will always remain. The next, more complicated stage is the in-depth analysis of his teaching, discovery of new turns of thought, creative development and revision, as it would happen in a hundred years within different versions of neo-Kantianism and other movements genetically connected to Kant [20; 21; 29].

As to polemics, it is the most complicated, oppositionary but, nevertheless, not less and maybe even more efficient form of influence on connections, since it, as any conflict, captures human mind more strongly than calm attitude. This conflict about Kant's heritage perfectly corresponds to the antinomy of his philosophy and the challenge he issued to the traditional and outworn ways of thinking. It only amplifies the halo of his fame and

does not leave either adherents or opponents indifferent [5; 22]. In case of philosophy, which, by nature, poses questions more often than answers them, such situation is explainable, admissible and even desirable. It is much worse when there is no polemics and an indifferent mind scans through somebody's ideas and conceptions. And neither words of approval nor words of reproach are heard there.

Thus, we will say that there are *silence* and *silencing*. The former takes place when there is no desire or no opportunity to speak, the latter when words are not expressed publically due to internal or external prohibitions. Internal motivation can relate to both the unwillingness to enter into discussion and the desire to ignore those whom you do not agree with and prefer to draw no attention to. External limitations relate to deliberate regulation by certain circles, including civil and church authorities, ideological institutions and other public and private structures aiming to limit or prohibit the dissemination of undesirable ideas. So, the Soviet times did not welcome an in-depth study into the ideological heritage of the philosopher, of — as he was dubbed then — the idealist and agnostic Kant, although, as a representative of classical German philosophy, which was construed as a predecessor of Marxism, his works had to be selectively studied and partially used.

However, despite all prohibitions (and, maybe, due to them), the authorities' "non-recommendation" became a strong recommendation for the thinking classes. In the age of totalitarian state, one of the forms of intellectual protest was aspiration to learn that what was forbidden to be learned. And it holds true for so-called "bourgeois" Western philosophy, which, despite all prohibitions, was gaining popularity. Thus, the selective attitude to Kant as a thinker and Kantianism as a philosophical movement with all its modifications, as well as official silencing, do not indicate a lack of Kant's influence in the Soviet Union, on the contrary, the need for prohibitive measures emphasise the presence of the prohibited.

Let us outline certain aspects of the influence of Kant and his teaching on Russian thought and its individual representatives, which has been exerted for over two centuries. These aspects are as follows: 1) direct acquaintance with the philosopher, visiting his lectures, conversations and correspondence with him; 2) reading his works in the original or translation; 3) the dissemination of Kant's teaching in Russia by German and Russian teachers; 4) visits of Russian students and interns to German universities, where Kant's ideas were expounded; 5) studying the works of European experts dedicated to the philosopher; 6) the development of Russian Kant studies and consideration of different perspectives on I. Kant and his teaching; 7) the assessment of contemporary interest in Kant and his works in Russia. Each of the above mentioned topics deserves an in-depth study, thus, I will confine myself to an overview and several examples.

Dozens of Russian officials and military personnel had a happy opportunity to see and hear Kant, the then associate professor at Königsberg University, when visiting his lectures, mostly on applied disciplines. This opportunity arouse as, after the victorious Seven Years' War, East Prussia became for several years a part of the Russian Empire. However, no one from Kant's audience made a mark on the history of Russian thought. At the same time, one cannot but mention the name of A. T. Bolotov, who had a good command of German, was employed at the governor's office and expressed lively interests in philosophy in general, however, not in Kant's teaching, but rather in the ideas of his opponents, Crusius and Weymann. Although his religious faith was shaken under the

influence of the rationalism of Enlightenment, a bright exponent of which was Kant, Bolotov started to profess orthodox-style theocentrism following the concept of harmonisation of religion and science. Upon his return to Russia, he committed himself to intense social, pedagogic, and economic activities[1]. This example, typical of the years to come, shows that Kant's ideas were not entirely welcome in Russia.

Tumultuous and ambivalent, the 18th century witnessed different trends. Extremely busy Kant, who rarely condescended two communicate with anybody, found time to write a serious conceptual message to prince A.M. Beloselsky-Belozersky, who published a treatise in French entitled *Dianology*, which was called an excellent work by the German philosopher. This remarkable episode in the history of German-Russian philosophical ties indicates favourable attention of the great philosopher to the questioning thought of his addressee and Kant's interest in being understood correctly by the Russian enlightener. Another positive example is the famous three hour conversation with N.M. Karamzin that took place in spring 1789 in the study of the Königsberg professor, in the course of which, the sixty-plus year old, worldly-wise man revealed to his twenty-three year old interlocutor the reflections concluding his continuous mental efforts. If the first episode with prince Beloseldky-Belozersky was of limited significance and symptomatic character, the meeting with Karamzin, who immediately recorded the conversation on paper and published it in his *Letters of a Russian traveller*, gained much public attention and contributed to the positive perception of Kant's name, personality and doctrines in Russia [38, p. 117—119]. The three above examples illustrate how the educated classes of Russian society formed their opinion about Kant and what arguments were about to erupt over his name and teaching.

Russian intellectual elite could get acquainted with Kant's life works in the German language both in Germany and in Russia as soon as they were delivered. Prior to the passing of the Königsberg philosopher, an important event took palce — the first Russian translation of his *Metaphysics of morals* came out in the town of Nikolayev located in southern Russia on the coast of the Black sea. The work was translated by a teacher from a local navigator's college, Yakov Ruban [30, p. 786]. Throughout the 19th century, Kant's major writings were translated into the Russian language, as well as a number of works dedicated to him authored by Villers, Meiners, Rheinhold and other European — not exclusively German — experts. Today Kant's doctrine occupies a befitting position in the systematic reviews of Western philosophy, his ideas are scrutinised and introduced into the general cultural context [24]. In Germany, not only philosophers (Tieftrunk, Hufeland, Tinneman) but also poets (Schiller and Goethe) have exploited his ideas. However, all these trends made their way to Russia and took root there.

In Russia, Kant's authority was increasing gradually, especially, after he had been elected a foreign fellow of the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1794[2].

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[1] A.T. Bolotov became one of the typical representatives of the natural science movement in the Russian Enlightenment, who aspired, in accordance with his providentialist position, to develop the conception of *natural theology* as a Russia version of the popular in Europe *physical* and *cosmic theology*.

[2] However, for his natural science rather than philosophical works.

Alongside the distribution of books in German, Russian and other languages containing either the works of the Königsberg thinker, or analyses of his ideas, or explanation of his complicated terminology, the teaching process becomes the most important transmitter of Kant's doctrine [32]. One of the first adherents of Kant's teaching was a professor of Göttingen University, Mellmann, a devotee of critical philosophy, who was invited to Russia in 1786. He — and, later Schaden, Buhle, and Rheinhard — delivered lectures at Moscow University. Schad and Finke gave lectures at Kharkov and Kazan Universities, which were opened in the early 19th century, respectively. At the same time, dozens of Russian students studied at German Universities — the one in Göttingen, for example, where Kant's ideas were especially popular — and explored the heritage of the great philosopher in the German language.

Russia saw the beginning and development of in-depth exploration of Kant's works, analysis of his doctrine and the introduction of his ideas into the teaching process by Russian specialists. A professor of Saint Petersburg University, Galich, in his *History of philosophical systems*, dedicated to Kant a whole section equipped with a formidable bibliography (Saint Petersburg, 1819). Archimandrite Gavriil (Voskresensky), when considering German philosophy in his six-volume *History of philosophy*, allotted Kant a paragraph entitled *Kant's critical idealism* (Kazan, 1840). Professor Gogotsky dedicated to Kant his doctoral thesis entitled *Critical perspective on Kant's philosophy* (Kyiv, 1847) and the first four-volume Russian philosophical encyclopaedia compiled by him (*Philosophical lexicon*, Kyiv, 1857—1873) boasts an article on Kant. Since then, such article and, later, articles entitled "Kantianism", "Neo-Kantianism", "Kant in Russia", "Critique of pure reason", "Critique of practical reason", "Critique of judgement", "Categorical imperative", etc. have always been featured in Russian philosophical references, having become an obligatory part of philosophical knowledge [20—22].

Another topic is the specific features of Kant studies and the attitude to his heritage at Russian theological academies situated in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kyiv, and Kazan. All in all, ecclesiastical-academic philosophy had had a long history in Russia (the Slavic Greek Latin Academy was founded in Moscow in 1658, it was transformed later into the Ecclesiastical Academy and relocated to Sergiyev Posad, where it has been situated ever since) and demonstrated professionalism, especially, in the fields of philological, historical, and theological training. The scope of reactions to Kant's philosophy in general and his individual ideas in particular was broad — ranging from total rejection to deep appreciation; at least, he could not be but mentioned, for it was impossible to pass over such authority and such fundamental doctrine [1; 8].

It is quite obvious that Kant's ideas discussed in his work *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, whose mere title sparked protest among orthodox audience, were rejected.

As a professor of Kyiv ecclesiastical academy, Skvortsov, said, the best of Kant's ideas about religion belonged to the Gospel, and the worst to his rational philosophy. At the same time, his colleague Yurkevich rated highly Kant's contribution to contemporary philosophy and widely used his ideas and works comparing him with Plato in terms of influence. A professor of Moscow academy, Golubinsky, admired Kant's ideas in the field of epistemology but did not accept his proofs for God's existence.

It is remarkable that A. I. Vvedensky, a professor of Moscow Academy, became one of the most eminent Russian Kantians, having dedicated several works to Kant, including *Kant's teaching on space* (Sergiyev Posad, 1895). He was opposed by a professor of Saint Petersburg Academy, Karinsky, who had vast philosophical knowledge, visited Lotze's lectures in Göttingen and wrote a book entitled *A critical review of the recent period in German philosophy* (Saint Petersburg, 1873). In the monograph *On self-evident truths*, Karinsky conducted a comprehensive analysis of the *Critique of pure reason*, presuming that Kant's teaching on speculative truths was marked by subjective dogmatism, thus, new rationalistic philosophy had to look for new foundations for its judgements. Vvedensky wrote a polemical review of this monograph entitled *On real and imaginary Kant.* A comprehensive work entitled *Positive philosophy and supersensible being* was published by bishop Nikanor (Brovkovich) (Saint Petersburg, 1875—1888, volumes 1—3). Bishop Nikanor was an outstanding person. After he had graduate from Saint Petersburg Academy and become rectors' assistant, he was suspected of "unorthodox thinking" and exiled from the empire's capital; he changed several residential locations and settled on Odessa. While criticizing "antichristian" Western thinkers — from Voltaire and other Encyclopaedists to Marx and Schopenhauer, he tried to employ positivistic methodology to fight materialism and atheism and gained a reputation as a liberal theologian [22, p. 266—316].

By the end of the 19th century, Kant's philosophy found its rightful position in the intellectual life of Russian society, but the dry rationality of the Königsberg philosopher, as compared to the inspired pathos of Schelling and the fundamental style of Hegel, contributed to the initial success of Schellingianism and, especially, Hegelianism in Russia. However, Kantianism started to press its German competitors. Following Liebmann's slogan "back to Kant", it transforms into neo-Kantianism and finds new adherents. Of course, Kantianism did not attract as many followers as populist Marxism and was not as alluring as aesthetising Nietzscheism. A small community of its Russian supporters brought together those who were interested in intense work of human consciousness aspiring to cognise the world and itself, which always means a hard and, sometimes, exhausting labour.

One should mention that pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy of the late19th-early 20th century was thriving as never before or since. This period is characterised by a happy combination of good European training, independent development of own original conceptions, considerable freedom in expressing ideas, which resulted in the emergence of different schools of thought — from vulgar materialism to subtle mysticism, from statism to anarchy, from personalism to cosmism, and many others that fought with each other for human minds. All in all, it accounted for the perfect philosophical condition of Russian thought and the polyphony of thinking, which are of crucial importance for creative diversity [12; 13; 40].

Of course, in this situation, Kant could not be ignored. There appeared numerous connections, intersections, oppositions that could be labelled as Kant and Solovyov, Kant and Dostoyevsky, Kant and Tolstoy, Kant and Florensky, Kant and Bely. This list can be easily continued. The multitude of ideas under the heading "Kant: pro et contra" moves to Russian emigrant circles, which, in the framework of Russian philosophy abroad, continued to develop pre-revolutionary thought. One can mention Bulgakov, Frank, Berdyaev, Stepun, Yakovenko and others, whose works address Kant and his doctrine, evaluating and interpreting it in different ways [22].

There are numerous studies into the issue, and there is no need to list them. Let us confine to a few crucial questions. The first one is how Kantianism and neo-Kantianism relate to *sophiology* — one of the dominant currents of Russian thought and culture of the time. According to Florensky, sophiology is connected with Christianised Platonism, and Plato and Kant are two watersheds of thought, since they divide *theocentrism* and *autocentrism* into two contradictory currents, which are opposite, on the one hand, and supplement each other, on the other [35]. Moreover, Kantianism is explicated as a teaching by solely verbal and rational means of expression, while sophiology employs both verbal (not only rational, sometimes even irrational) and non-verbal (aesthetic, visual, symbolic — artworks and rituals) means[3].

The second question concerns the typology of Russian thought, which differs from Western European thought in a number of features. Despite the diversity of philosophising forms in the West, the dominating one has been the tradition of rational discourse stretching from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz to Wittgenstein, Russell and the adherents of contemporary analytical philosophy. The tradition of Russian philosophising, in view of the diversity of its forms, is based, first of all, on the above mentioned Christianised Platonism. The missionaries Cyril and Methodius planted into the orthodox soil *Slavia orthodoxa* — the Byzantine synthesis of philology, philosophy, and theology that can be traced back to metropolitan Hilarion of Kyiv, a 11th century author, and stretches to Vladimir Solovyov, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevsky [11, p. 472—475]. Proficiency in written word, philosophical depth of thought and appeal to sacred values is evident and inseparable in their works. It is where Kirieevsky's idea of "integral knowledge" and Solovyov's concept of "all-unity" stem from. With all due respect to the Western tradition, the Russian one should also be taken into account; together, they constitute the diversity of philosophical universe, where Plato and Aristotle supplement each other and rationalism and irrationalism balance our consciousness preventing us from being pulled to either side [36, 43].

Summing up my reflections and admitting that a lot of aspects remained untouched, I would like to say that Kant as a *personality* inspires respect in Russian people as an honest worker of thought, a selfless labourer, and a patient mentor [39]. He was a worldly ascetic, who sublimated and sacrificed all his mental and physical strength to the altar of philosophy. Maybe, a Russian person with their big Russian soul and poorer organisations shuns the excessive discipline, strict pedantry and even automatism of the German professor's behaviour, but this is a matter of national taste. At the same time, the external order of Kant's life contributed to internal concentration and strict and predictable life helped stay fit and conserved energy for the main task — intense mental activity.

As to the understanding of Kant as a *thinker*, a lot has been said above. One can only add that, in contemporary post-Soviet Russia, Kant, Kantianism and Kant studies represent a respectable component of philosophical and, to an extent, cultural and social life [14; 28; 29; 34].

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[3] The history of sophian tradition in Russia stretches over 4,000 years, it developed under Byzanthian and, partially, Western influence. Sophia the Wisdom of God was perceived as a manifestation of the divine Logos as early as the construction of Saint Sophia cathedrals in Kyiv, Novgorod, and Polotsk that imitated Constantinople's Hagia Sophia. In architecture, hymnogrphy, and icon painting, the idea of Sophia came across as clearly as in Biblical texts and the works of the Church Fathers.

As to the attitude towards Kant as an *exponent of German spirit,* I would dare offer the following interpretation. The influence of Germany, its culture and economic, political, and military power has been significant throughout Russian history [31; 42]. When the two countries were allies, it ensured stability in Europe, when they were rivals, it shook the continent. Russians ranked highly the great German spirit as represented by Bach and Beethoven in music, Goethe and Schiller in literature, Kant and Hegel in philosophy. However, a great nation with a great spirit is always inclined to subdue other nations and cultures not only by economic, political, and military, but also intellectual means. Thus, the neighbouring nations develop a natural defence reaction to the Germanisation of consciousness, which is easy to understand for the French, the Polish, and the Russians and is quite perplexing for the Germans. I think that, as to Kant, this cautious idea — not to become completely subordinate to the German giant of thought — can be found in the works of many Russian thinkers. With all due admiration, it is necessary to keep a certain distance between Kant and those who dare approach this colossus. It holds true to a greater extent for the adherents of Slavophile, irrational, religious and other currents that contradicted Kant's doctrine a priori, and to a lesser extent, to the followers of "Westernised", rationalistic, scientist and adjacent currents of diverse Russian thought [5; 8; 9; 37; 42].

In conclusion, I would like to mention the city, with which the German philosopher is closely associated and whose creature he is. Königsberg as a fortress, a working city, a port, the German outpost on the Eastern border had a long history (observable, unfortunately, only in the surviving pre-war photographs), which affected the traditions and mentality of its residents. The ascetic life of its founders, the warrior monks of the Teutonic order, the puritan ethics of Protestantism, the continuous struggle for existence with the animus nature of East Prussia among hostile tribes and nations left its mark on the residents of the unique city on the edge of German universe. At the same time, Königsberg became a cultural centre of the Baltic area, where the famous university, Albertina, attracted young people from throughout neighbouring countries. Thus, it was an intersection of different cultures, ethnic groups, and confessions [26]. All these accumulated over centuries peculiarities expressed themselves in Kant, who consciously did not want to move to any other city and has always been not only a sightseeing object and a brand, but, first of all, *a genius of thought,* the genius loci of this great city with turbulent history.

Supposedly, by his father's side, Kant was a Balt (according to one version[4]) and, maybe it is not a coincidence, that one of the last opuses of the great master of philosophy was the afterword to a German-Lithuanian dictionary. Living an honest and industrious life not unlike his craftsman father, in his ideas, he expressed the interests of the numerous third estate, which the enlighteners of the 18th century — his contemporaries — concerned themselves with throughout vast European space from France to Russia. Having fulfilled his professional and civic duty, Kant was interred in the ground of his small motherland, whose son and patriot he was.

As if foreseeing the tragic lot of his native city, Kant writes in 1795 a treatise entitled *Perpetual Peace*, where he voices hope for a peaceful Europe to come, a

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[4] There is another version of Kant's genealogy, according to which, his father was a German colonist, whose ancestors settled in East Prussia.

continent free of wars and violence. But the authorities and military leaders rarely pay heed to philosophers. The desire to rule over other nations that underlay German militarism led not to the domination but to the defeat of the great country and nation. Königsberg fell a sacrifice to that catastrophe [6; 23]. It is striking and, at the same time, providential that, in 1945, in the chaos of a destroyed smouldering city, Kant's tomb — the shrine to the Königsberg's genius loci — survived intact and still remains a symbol of continuous cultural tradition in the new historical conditions. Let us pay homage to the great thinker and the city that gave birth to such an honourable citizen.

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Natalya A. Kutsenko

FROM THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN KANT STUDIES IN THE 19TH CENTURY

This article is devoted to the dissemination and research on Kant's philosophy in Russia in the early 19th century. The author considers both the process of dissemination of information about Kant's teaching via printed materials and the analysis of his heritage in professional philosophical — in particular, ecclesiastic — circles. This process is illustrated by archive materials.

Key words: *philosophy, theology, categorical imperative, academic philosophy, Kant studies.*

The moral doctrine of Kant — one of the greatest European philosopher of the 18th century — did not only inspire educated Europeans throughout the 19th century but is also of considerable interest today. In this article, I would like to draw the attention of a wider audience of historians of philosophy to the need for an immediate analysis of the 19th century text material, which allows us to give a correct interpretation of the style of thinking and assess the philosophical positions of certain philosophers and theologians. Russian Kant studies offer a significant amount of such material; however, it has not been thoroughly studied, nor does it, due to various reasons, attract significant attention. Over the last decade, interest in professional philosophical studies, as well as Russian modern professional philosophical tradition has considerably increased in our country. Academic philosophy, as an element of professional philosophy, gradually receives due acknowledgement [see 1—4; 8; 11].

Western philosophical traditional had not only established corporations but also scientific and theoretical schools of thought. In the 18th-19th centuries, a professional philosophical school developed in Russia — which also affected the level of primary training — through investigation of the vast array of source materials and the teaching of basic philosophical disciplines. It existed and rested upon both its own training structure of academies, seminaries, and first universities

and the Western tradition, whose vast experience could not but be taken into account. When a balanced fusion of school, scholarly, scholastic and external, independent, creative tendencies take place, more favourable conditions for the development of philosophy and culture in general develop, as it was the case in Russia in the 19th — early 20th century.

The development of Russian scientific vocabulary in the field of humanities occurred in the 18th — early 19th centuries. It commenced during Peter the Great's language reforms in the early 18th century and continued through the whole century that was called the "age of translation".

Let us, first of all, clarify the general conditions of emergence and adoption of the ideas of German classical philosophy in the Russian Empire in the first half of the 19th century through defining Kant's position in this process. The first information about Kant reached Russia as early as the 1780s. In 1786, German philosopher Ludwig Mellman arrived in Moscow from Göttingen. In 1792—1794, he taught at Moscow University. Mellmann was one of the first Kantians and rather a populariser than a criticiser of Kant. The biographical dictionary of the teachers of Moscow University characterises him as a person who was excited about new philosophy, expressed one-sided and false thoughts regarding religious subjects freely and incautiously, as a result of which he was dismissed in January 1795 and had to leave the country [5, p.46—47]. If we keep in mind that Mellmann's lectures — delivered in German — gathered a sizeable audience, we can make a conclusion that Russian educated classes did have an opportunity to get acquainted with Kant's works immediately and through critical literature in the German language. In the *Letters of a Russian traveller* published in 1791, N. M. Karamzin tells about his visit to the famous philosopher Kant on the 18th of June 1789, which suggests that Kant had been known in Russia long before his works were published in the Russian language. Z. A. Kamensky, with a reference to the proceedings of the Imperial Academy of Sciences from 1725 to 1903, mentions that, in 1794, there was a discussion about the election of Kant to the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences [6, p. 55]. The lectures of the German professor Schaden on ethical philosophy given at Moscow University in 1795—1797 were also based on the principles of critical philosophy. However, decades had passed before the *Critiques* were published in the Russian language.

There are several scholarly perspectives on the time and place of appearance of Kant's works in Russian. E Radlov, in his *An outline of the development of Russian philosophy*, writes that Kant's name was first pronounced in the lectures of a Kharkov professor M. Osipovsky, while Kant's writings were translated later. So, the *Critique of pure reason* was translated by M. I. Vladislavlev in the 70s [9, p.16]. In the article *Russian philosophy*, V. Chuiko also mentions that the first critic of Kant was Osipovsky [12, p.15]. According to E. Radlov, the first Russian scholar to write about Kant was a professor of Kazan University, A. S. Lubkin. He published *Letters on critical philosophy* in 1805 [9, p.15]. One cannot overlook these authors, since their works are mentioned in bibliographical references on the history of Russian philosophy. However, a wider audience of readers and researchers do not always obtain correct information.

On the basis of the works of above-mentioned authors, as well as those of V. Zenkovsky, G. Shpet, archimandrite Gavriil, A. Galich, and Z. Kamensky, I will attempt to give an overview of Russian literature on Kant published in the 19th century in order to reveal the actual state of affairs in this field, however, I will not claim to have compiled the final bibliographical review.

So, the *Vestnik Evropy* magazine No. 6 of 1802 features an article entitled *Kant's philosophy in France* — apparently written by N. M. Karamzin — that considers the critique of Kant's idealism. In 1803, the first Russian translation of Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* made by a teacher of a navigator's school, Yakov Ruban, came out in the Ukranian town of Nikolayev. In the same year, the first critical account of Kant's works in Russian appeared in K. Sprengel's book *Kritische Übersicht Des Zustandes Der Arzneykunde in Dem Letzten Jahrzehend* translated by V. Dzhunkovsky. In 1805, A. S. Lubkin published his *Letters on critical philosophy*, where he gives an assessment of Kant's gnoseological ideas. His critique of Kant's ethical doctrine was included in the *Review of logic* published in Saint Petersburg in 1807. In 1804, K. Villers's article *Immanuel Kant — a great philosopher and man* is published in *Sankt-Peterburgsky zhurnal* No. 10. *Kant's philosophy* — translated from French by A. Petrov — came out in 1807. The *Vestnik Evropy* magazine of 1808 (No. 24) publishes *A letter to Kant from anonymous* as well as *Kant's reply.* The *Ulei* magazine of 1812 (Nos 14, 15, 16) publishes *The review of aesthetics extracted from Kant's critique of aesthetical judgement.* Kant's *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* comes out two years later. Translations of critical literature are published alongside these works of Kant. For instance, a work entitled *Odoyevsky's Eleatic metaphysical school and Kant* based on the notes of Madame de Staël appeared in the *Mnemosyne* magazine. Her work *Of the most celebrated Philosophers before and after Kant* was published in 1824. Most works also offered a bibliography on Kant as well as on critical literature — a good example is *The history of philosophical systems* by A. Galich published in Saint Petersburg in 1818—1819.

The above and, in my opinion, incomplete, overview of Russian early 19th century literature on Kant indicates a permanent interest in Kant's philosophy and its different assessments. As the influence of German classical philosophy on Russian cultural life increased, interest in Kant's heritage, especially his ethical doctrine, became more considerable. Initially, practical philosophy was more popular than critical philosophy, since it was free from excessively "heavy" gnoseology. It is worth repeating that the first Kant's work in the Russian language was published in Ukraine and presented his ethical ideas.

Russian 19th century literature on Kant — both manuscripts and published works — requires much research and replenishment. Among numerous manuscripts dating back to the first half-the mid-19th century and relating to Kant studies that I examined in the archive of Kyiv Ecclesiastical Academy, I would like to draw your attention to those immediately linked to teaching. First of all, it is the manuscripts of lectures on *Philosophy of Religion* by Professor I. M. Skvortsov, most of which are dedicated to the concept of God in Kant's philosophy [10]. We should not forget about I. M. Skvortsov's published work *Overview of Kant's Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, which came out in Saint Petersburg in 1838. Below I would like to quote excerpts from two manuscripts of Serafim Serafimov, a graduate and later a professor of Kyiv Ecclesiastical Academy. The manuscripts entitled *What is the difference between Christian and philosophical moral teaching?* and *On Kant's principle of morality* are dated 1837—1841 and are registered as student semester papers of 1837—1841[1].

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[1] For further information on the study of the manuscript archives of Kyiv Ecclesiastical Academy see [7].

1) No 766 of the register is a student composition of a 10th year student (1837—1841) of Kyiv Ecclesiastical Academy, Serafim Serafimov. This manuscript was delivered to the museum by Nadezhda Serafimova in Odessa on September 1904. Here and below, words and phrases are italicised by the author.

What is the difference between Christian and philosophical moral teaching?

The basic and crucial difference between philosophical and Christian moral teaching is the *end,* the former and the latter aspires to achieve. They are apparently similar in this relation.... The moral teaching of mind is limited only by the development of an internal law, the explanation of requirement, formulation of certain rules of activity, and indication of several means easing the way for virtues. But whether a person will do it and how — it is not a task of mind. <…> The purpose of Christian moral teaching is to develop in a person an ability to do right — rectify their will, make it such that it cannot deviate from the law, eradicate every inclination to evil. In a nutshell, to bring a person back to the state of innocence, restore the image of God in them, *revive* them. Philosophical moral teaching tries only to prevent a person from getting in a state that can destroy their nature. The purpose of Christian moral teaching is to elevate human nature up to its amalgamation with divine nature, up to the likeness to God. It demonstrates the spirit of both moral teachings. Philosophical moral teaching does not penetrate human nature, does not see and apparently does not want to see all corruptions of human heart, thus its rules only alleviate and conceal our moral diseases but do not cure them; it does not contain anything that can expel pride — the image of devil — from our hearts <…>

Being different in *spirit* and *purpose*, Christian and philosophical moral teaching are also based on different *principles*. <…> Before Kant..., all principles philosophers had built their moral systems on were amoral, which was proven by the wise Critic. <…> In Kant's teaching, it is *one-sided*, since it determines only the form of actions, saying nothing about their objects and purposes.... It is also based on conceit and egoism, since the assessment of actions is delegated to universal practical reason — a judge, who is not always correct and unbiased;... who lost much of the primordial light.

The organisational principle of Christian activity is the church — a safe and immaculate principle. (Thou shalt love thy God and neighbour as thyself). For a Christian, *love* is the motive for any activity. Philosophical love is a far cry from Christian love.

One can say that this text demonstrates the beginnings of polemical spirit peculiar to any theological tradition and cultivated in academy students, but it also proves that the moral theory of the "wise Critic" could not but arouse deep sympathy in theologians.

2) S. Serafimov. *On Kant's principle of morality*.

Quoted from the manuscript: Institute of Manuscripts of National Library of Ukraine — Kyiv Ecclesiastical Academy — 327 pp. (Mus. 909).

Part 1

(P. 1) "Two things", Kant writes, "fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: *the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me".* Kant's deep respect for the moral law led him to addressing the moral aspect of human mind and raising it above the theoretical ones. It encouraged him to rise in arms against

false moral systems and disprove all principles based on the concept of happiness and other irrelevant motives. What is Kant's moral doctrine? In order to see that, one should pay heed to the very principle of morality that Kant locates as a cornerstone of his teaching.

Kant's principle of morality is as follows: act only on a maxim that you can will to be a universal law". Evidently, this principle is completely different from the material principles that were rejected by Kant. There are no sensual motives and no external reasons determined by law. (P. 1, reverse). Here, the object of moral activity can be neither happiness, not self-perfection, nor the will of God: nothing has a direct, immediate relation to a person: all of it, Kant says (there is a teacher's comment — N. K.), is material.

A person, when taking a certain action, should keep the only thing in mind: how to act in order to be a moral being, how to maintain the rights of their practical reason without being guided by anything external. The moral law and freedom are the two guides on the way of a human being. Law, as a law, is a form of action; a person only needs to know this form, this example full well, so that his activity is always compliant with it, concordant with the legal activity of others, the true social good and moral order in general, which is universally accepted and must be followed by everyone. For instance, I want to get rich and employ the following means to achieve my end: instead of the real price of a good I charge twice or thrice more. (P. 2) But since such way of enrichment cannot be universally accepted, because it is not concordant with the universal good and everybody would not follow it, since everybody is more or less certain of its unrighteousness, thus, such way of enrichment could not and should not be the maxim of my activity. Apparently, a human being should renounce external profits and do everything to abide by the law in order to ensure that their action is universally beneficial, act only out of respect to universal moral legislation, which should be accepted and sanctified; at the same time one should imagine neither the outcome of such actions, nor a reward for it. What a wonderful idea! The more selfless human deeds are, the more elevated and noble they are. And the principle of morality expressing and prescribing such selflessness, such love to law (P. 2, reverse) as a law, deserves praise and approval. In this case, a person is an independent doer of the internal law, guided only by the conviction about the equity of its requirements. However, it seems to be the only merit to Kant's principle, since it is not devoid of flaws.

Kant's principle determines only the form of actions passing over its object and purpose. It is also an extreme! A person, while they have inclinations, a *heart*, cannot be bereft of aspirations on the way of their moral activity; they cannot but imagine the final end, where all their inclinations should be oriented to and ask themselves where the true end to their exploits and the rest from their labours are. Indeed, this person's sin is only that they do not know how to act, how to *think,* desire and act legally.

Part 2

(P. 3)… Does it not bring more suffering that a person does not know *where* to direct his aspirations to. Their heart does not know where to rush; it... clings to the false good. Of more virtue would be such teacher who would see the true good for a human being... that would satisfy his heart and quench his thirst of his god-like spirit. And only then would he determine *how* one can achieve the good.

(P. 3, reverse)... Consequently, it is necessary to point out not only the form of actions but also its purpose... Thus, to attach such principle to morality, without specifying *where* such action should lead, means to bereave morality of its consoling elements and ascribe cold stoicism to it.

... Kant is afraid of defining the object of activity, because he aspires to remain true to his system, within which practical reason is raised above all human faculties and God — the source of reason and all morality — can be hardly discerned behind it. <…> Kant seems to be convinced that a person does not need anything except a mere action. <…> Thus, his doctrine is one-sided.

(P. 4, reverse) Kant exhausts all subtleties of reasoning to exclude from the circle of human actions the most sacred of them — duties towards God. <…> But human heart will always rise in arms against it. Without love for God, morality turns into pure egoism.

(P. 5) Kant accepts the idea of God that can establish only a moral feeling, however, while obeying the law, one should be filled with love and respect not for God, but law (practical reason). Maybe it is better to stand in love to the Lawmaker. "The fear of the Lord", another sage, not lesser than Kant, once said, "is the beginning of knowledge" and, therefore, of all true morality.

Thus, all virtues will strive to please practical reason, as if there were nothing above it. <…> A righteous person, according to the spirit of Kant's rule, can easily sink into moral pride, but a person following the Christian rule... always has a reason to humble themselves... Thus, our principle leads to humbleness — the foundation of Christian morality, while Kant's principle to egoism.

Below this passage Serafimov quotes a story about a rich man who sacrifices all his property and emphasises that, according to Kant's logic, the actions that cannot be a universal law should not be the object of activity. If everyone follows this example, there will be no rich people in society, which stresses the contradictions of Kant's doctrine of moral law.

As the above texts show, for a long time, Russian philosophical thought was closely linked to theology, thus, their joint consideration was and is one on the most promising lines of research in philosophical knowledge proper and spiritual culture in general. The link between philosophical and theological issues, which implies not only harmony but also certain collisions, should be considered as interdependent aspects of the process of development of Russian thought. Even research on particular issues of this interconnection proves poor applicability of common historical-philosophical methodologies and requires recognition as an independent line of research in need of a specific methodology. Research on Russian Kant studies plays an important role in this process.

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HANNAH ARENDT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE MODERN AGE: THE INTERNET AS A PUBLIC REALM

On the basis of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy, the author analyses the capability of the Internet to fulfil the functions of public realm, as well as the significance and prospects of the World Wide Web as a communication medium for political being.

Hannah Arendt — an eminent American political philosopher — was a passionate fighter for the revival of political life akin to that of antique democracy of the golden age of the polis. In the modern world, she assumed, politics as a sphere of interpersonal communication is dying away. According to Hannah Arendt, in the 20th century, totalitarian regimes and the development of weapons of mass destruction discredited the politics among a wider audience. Most people, except professional politicians, developed a strong prejudice against active participation in political life. In the modern world, politics is perceived by many as the sphere of authority dominated by subordination relationships. Looking for the way out of the cul-de-sac politics found itself in the 20th century, Arendt addresses the antique idea, according to which freedom of a person could be actualised only in politics. To be political, to live in a polis meant that all affairs were settled with words capable of convincing rather than through coercion and violence. To inflict violence towards others, to order rather than convince — Greeks regarded it as a pre-political method of interpersonal relations characteristic of family relationships and barbarians.

Unlike, for instance, Aristotle, who considers a human being a "political animal" (zoon politikon), i.e. political by nature, Hanna Arendt believes that politics emerges within the space of human coexistence not only because people are capable of acting and speaking, but rather because, except maintaining life, a human being has a need to announce their exis-

tence to the world, which is impossible unless there are other active members in the world: "Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other" [4, p. 176]. Participating in the political life of society, a person actualises their individuality and the uniqueness of their personality. This uniqueness manifests itself in speech and actions the people perform in the public realm. At the same time, politics is the only sphere of human activity, where a person can be truly free. Freedom is feasible only in the public realm, i.e. at the place common to "I" and "we".

According to Hannah Arendt, a modern person, who cares only about their utilitarian needs, voluntarily refuses to act in the political public realm, misses the opportunity to reveal themselves to the world, show others their "I". Thus, a human being stops participating in the affairs of the world they live in. They are alienated from the world. Arendt supposes that the concentration of a modern human being on their private life, their retreat to the inner world, and the avoidance of public dialogue constitute the main reason of most social problems of the modern age. They can be solved only through reviving real politics, the politics, within which people, through opposing and trying to convince each other, care about the world common to them. In order to reanimate political life as a modern activity of people aimed at maintaining and improving the common world, a human being should be involved into political activity, be an active element.

But to live an active political life, one needs free time. The tempo of modern life is so high, people are rooted in work-consumption-private life so deeply that they have neither time, nor energy to be politically active. Thus, the political life of many would be limited to small talks and visiting poll station once in several years. Modern democracy, unlike the direct democracy of an antique polis is representative, i.e. the influence on political decision-making is exerted through vesting power in those who chose politics as a career. Maybe, this article is not an appropriate platform for the discussion of the flaws of indirect and representative democracy, however, it is worth noting that, in most modern states, democracy through "face-to-face" communication is just impossible. For example, if the number of full citizens of an average polis was 5—10 thousand people who could gather on the market square, it is difficult to imagine the size of a square that could accommodate more than one and a half billion population of China. Thus, one should admit that, however excellent and just the direct democracy of antique polis is in Hannah Arendt's interpretation, its implementation through "face-to-face" communication does not seem feasible.

However, the development of the Internet and, in particular, free and unrestricted access to it[1] creates a new non-contact communication environment with a high political potential. The political potential of the Internet lies, first of all, in the fact that it is a space that can accommodate an unlimited number of people and give them an opportunity to communicate in the virtual rather than physical space making it possible to participate in political life at any time in any place. Of course, in her books, Arendt described the contemporary condition of political being[2]; nevertheless, it would be of interest to assess the political prospects of the World Wide Web in the light of her political theory.

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[1] Actually, the development of a local network began in the USA under a defence contract as early as 1957. However the internet became generally accessible only in the 1990s.
[2] I.e. that of the 1950s—1960s.

In Hannah Arendt's lifetime, there was no Internet as we know it today. In 1957, the year Hannah Arendt passed away, it was still a project used only by the American military and scholars. Similar to the computer, the Internet was initially designed for military purposes. However, in 1991, the World Wide Web became generally accessible and the number of Internet users has been increasing since.

As of today, the Internet is a unified information space that had transcended state, confessional and ethnic boundaries a long time ago. The effect of the Internet on the development of human civilization is enormous and increasing, nevertheless it is difficult to assess the character of this influence. Many specialists in social sciences are prone to consider the Internet as a chance to renew democracy and encourage citizens to participate actively in political life. But is it reasonable to proclaim the Internet a new public realm, whose very emergence is capable of reanimating the sphere of the political, which Hannah Arendt fought so passionately for?

In this article, I would like to analyse the capacity of the Internet to fulfil the functions of the public realm, which, as Hannah Arendt believed, is necessary for a healthy civil society. For Russia, as a post-totalitarian state, the formation of a true civil society is one of the most important tasks. Thus, it seems important to determine the role of the Internet in the political sphere, as well as its possible influence on the sphere of political being in the future.

Arendt's understanding of the public realm

What is the public realm Hannah Arendt spoke of?

Arendt gives a twofold definition of the concept of the public realm, which is vital for political activity. Firstly, the public realm is an intersubjective space. In *The human condition*, Hannah Arendt distinguishes three types of human activity: labour, work, and action. Action, in turn, consists of action proper and speech. Action and speech cannot take place in a vacuum, they require a platform common to everybody. Arendt's public realm is such place, which is common to "I" and "we". It always develops there, were people, when acting and speaking, treat each other this or that way: "action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but proclaim their appearance explicitly [4, pp. 198—199]. The *appearance* is the revelation of oneself, of one's position regarding the orders of the common world and, hence, the presentation of oneself and one's essence to "others". Only through *appearing* before others and the world, a human being can be seen and heard by other people.

Secondly, the public realm is the place where people express their opinion openly and expect to be heard by the others. The public realm does not emerge automatically anywhere where several people gather just because people are creatures capable of acting and speaking. On the contrary, even there where it exists, the majority prefers to remain without its boundaries. The public realm is a space, where will is manifested, authority emerges, and judgements and actions are possible, because it enables the manifestation of human diversity. It brings together and separates at the same time. Arendt compares the public

realm with chess, since a chess player is connected to his partner through the board, which brings them apart and together simultaneously, being a part of their own world [2, p. 523].

However, it is worth noting that Hannah Arendt distinguished between the private and public realms. It is a very important element of Arendt's political theory, since she clearly separated politics form all other spheres of human activity. Unlike the private realm, the public one is plural, i.e. contains a vast number of different and even contradictory perspectives. It is this plurality that creates the reality, which "*is not guaranteed primarily by the "common nature" of all men who constitute it, but rather by the fact that, differences of position and the resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, everybody is always concerned with the same object. If the sameness of the object can no longer be discerned, no common nature of men, least of all the unnatural conformism of a mass society, can prevent the destruction of the common world*" [4, pp. 57—58].

Only the public realm can guarantee that what the pure private life could never do. The essence of the private is the absence of the others. In private life, a human being behaves as if there existed no other person, their actions in the private realm have no significance for the public one, they concern no one except that very person [1, p. 58]. At the same time, private life creates the private realm — a condition for the possibility of showing one's worth in the public realm. The public and the private realms supplement each other and are integral parts of an organic whole. A lack or deficiency in any of them is distressing and negatively affects the quality and content of a human life in general.

The Internet as a public realm

Let us try to answer the question as to whether the Internet is a public realm in Hannah Arendt's understanding. And if it is, how does it influence the political life of society and what are its prospects as a public realm?

On the one hand, the Internet is, of course, a public realm, since it reveals human plurality. People interact with each other, express their opinions and expect an assessment of their perspective from the others. The Internet is a space that brings together people of different political beliefs. At the same time, its virtuality helps exclude violence, which is of great importance when the negotiating parties are at war. Moreover, the Internet is an alternative to "big-time" or "official" politics, the participation in which is technically possible but hardly practically feasible due to the preoccupation with work and consumption and the lack of free time. The Internet gives anyone who is willing to an opportunity to participate in the creation of a space for the expression of their opinion. The Internet facilitates the development of new forms of participation of citizens in politics, which do not depend on large political structures and mass media. As Ya. N. Zasursky stresses in his article *The Internet as a basis for the development of information society in Russia*, the Internet gives small groups, including ethnical ones, an opportunity to make their presence felt within the virtual space, bringing together their supporters regardless of state borders and geographical distances. Some peoples that do not enjoy statehood and are scattered on the territories of different states, with the help of the Internet, can create something akin to a virtual state formation, which can facilitate the interaction and communication between the representatives of the people. An example is the virtual state of the Sami, thanks to which a people residing in four different countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia) and divided by borders can feel its integrity,

maintain different contacts and coordinate joint actions. The Internet is of special importance for national diasporas: the Internet links them to the home country and gives them an opportunity to participate in the political life of the country and in discussions of pivotal issues even while being geographically distant from the motherland.

It also holds true for the residents of exclaves (such as the Kaliningrad region in Russia), for whom the Internet is a vehicle eliminating borders and distances that separate the exclave from the mainland. Thanks to the Internet, political parties have an opportunity to work with their electorate with the help of their own information resources, where everyone can get acquainted with the party's programme. In political forums, everyone can take part in a discussion or exchange of opinions on a certain political issue or problem.

On the other hand, communication with other people does not make the Internet a public space, since the private realm also acts as a platform for an exchange of opinions, judgements, and attitudes. However, judgements expressed in the private realm are not meant for public view, their target audience is a limited number of people, relatives, friends, etc., for whom this judgement is expressed. The Internet attracts a wider audience as an opportunity to immerse into a cosy community of likeminded people with similar interests and beliefs. In other cases, a person expresses their opinion regarding certain political issues but prefers to hide their name under a pseudonym. It means that they either are not ready or do not want their opinion to become a topic of a public discussion, enter the public realm, where all judgements are expressed openly. Within the public realm, a person reveals themselves to the world, they publicise that what they want to say to the whole humanity (at least, potentially), rather than an intimate circle of friends and likeminded persons.

The Internet, as a virtual space, should by no means be reduced to the public or private space — it is a more complex phenomenon, which contains the information, economic, commercial, public, and other components. Thus, the Internet brings together all aspects of human life differing from the real, physical public realm only in its virtuality. The Internet becomes a public realm in those cases when anonymity is taken away and a judgement is expressed under the real name rather than a pseudonym. However, there are numerous intermediate states, when it is quite difficult to distinguish between the private and public on the Internet or when this distinction is drawn differently than in the world of immediate communication.

The problems and prospects of the Internet as a public realm

Since Hannah Arendt understands politics as a process of communication, and communication requires an exchange of information, direct transition of politics into the digital dimension seems possible. The Internet as a means of communication has a clearly dual character. On the one hand, it is mass media, since it transmits information from a source to a large number of clients, establishing one-way communication and being no different from newspapers, radio, and television. However, at the same time, the Internet is a means of communication connecting independent from each other users, so that information is circulated in different directions. Due to the dual nature of its communicative function, the Internet has a greater potential for direct democracy, attaching a new meaning to the concept of publicity, and the development of an alternative public realm.

As a virtual public realm, an alternative to the physical one, the Internet has attractive prospects. Its development can activate the political life of society, encouraging an increasing number of citizens to participate in politics directly. The Internet makes it possible to restore the competitive character of politics, since it gives rise to the opposites that were forced out of public life by official politics. Thus, the Internet could play an important role in the reanimation of politics as a public component of human existence. The Internet creates new mechanisms of relations between social institutions and citizens. The Internet gives every individual an opportunity to participate actively in the creation of a platform where they can freely express their opinion.

However, alongside its positive effects, the Internet can have an adverse impact on the development of human society and a destructive influence on the public realm. In his work *The Internet and civil society*, Peter Levine describes five potential risks associated with the Internet: 1) the poorest groups of population lack an opportunity to access, use and produce the Internet content; 2) weakened social bonds; 3) the tendency of certain groups to isolate themselves and deny social contacts with those of other beliefs and avoid discussions with them; the transformation of Internet users into simple consumers, which also includes information and religious performances; 5) the impact of eroding privacy on freedom of association [6].

Another possible negative effect of the Internet relates to its employment by organised criminal groups and terrorists. Moreover, in many countries, there is an apparent increase in the attempts of authorities to control the content of Internet resources, in many cases they are supported by large providers and search engines (for example, Google in China). It is especially evident in totalitarian countries, as well as in those, where the rights and freedoms of citizens are infringed. For instance, in China, the Internet is censored; while in some countries (Cuba, North Korea), Internet access is granted only to certain groups of citizens; in other countries (Iran) Internet access is unavailable. In democratic countries, control over the content of websites is also being tightened, which is explained by combating terrorism and extremism.

Indeed, the Internet also accommodates the websites of extremists of every stripe and radical political parties, which obtain the part of the public realm they are refused by the governments of their countries. It is possible, firstly, because of the anonymity of website creators. Secondly, the founders and ideologists of extremist or criminal Internet resources are out of reach, since they reside without the borders of the state, against which or the citizens of which their activity is directed. It generates a difficult problem of establishing the level of possible state intervention into the Internet as a virtual means of communication. For example, recently, a Russian newspaper, *Novye izvestiya*, published an article claiming that the Ministry of the Interior of Russia entertains the idea of obligatory identification of all Internet users as a crime-fighting measure [8]. According to the head of the Hi-tech crimes department of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia, Colonel General Boris Miroshnikov, the compulsory registration of national ID data of each user will allow the authorities not only to identify the computer that, for example, was used for a hacking attack, but also the name of its owner. However, experts believe that compulsory identification will affect, first of all, law-abiding users. For example, one third of the respondents did not support the idea of control over website content. They explained their position saying that it "limits the freedom of speech", "does not let people communicate normally". They also mentioned that "censors will always go too far" and the "conscience is the best censor".

There are also other opinions. For example, a famous Russian politician, Sergey Mironov stated that "this sphere should be controlled. At the same, there can't be any censorship on the Internet. And I hold to this position". According to the RBC information agency [9], this statement was a comment on a recent discussion of the model law on the Internet by the Information policy commission of the Council of Federation. Sergey Mironov's opinion is shared by a member of the Council of Federation, Sergey Shatirov, who, however, believes that "there should be some restrictions": "almost the whole humanity participate in this project. It is a global problem, which requires legal restrictions so that Internet-assisted law violations can be prevented", he said. As to when such restrictions should be introduced, the senator emphasised: "It is a complex, long-term process, we should not be hasty, but we should start tackling the issue" [ibid]. Evidently, the state becomes increasingly aware of the importance of the virtual space, a part of which becomes a socially significant public realm. Of interest is a situation that took place in Syktyvkar recently. A Syktyvkar musician Savva Terentyev is the first person in Russia to face criminal charges relating to a comment in an Internet blog. The musician is accused under the article on incitement of national, racial, or religious enmity after posting a comment regarding law enforcement officers. The content of Internet resources cannot be always assessed unambiguously in terms of law, as it happened, for example, in the case of Terentyev. On the one hand, the musician calls for violence towards law enforcement agencies, which is a violation of law and is subject to prosecution. On the other hand, Terentyev, expressed his position in his personal blog, which cannot be regarded as mass media and is meant for the friends and relations of the author. In this case, control over the content of personal websites on the Internet becomes intrusion into privacy, which should not happen in a democratic state. Evidently, the problem of distinguishing between the private and the public on the Internet is of importance and should be, sooner or later, solved by all countries throughout the world. At the same time, hopefully, the Internet will not turn into a stronghold of extremist and radical groups, nor be totally controlled by the state, but rather be a platform for a free exchange of opinions and animated discussions.

Last years have seen the appearance of works questioning the role of the Internet as a potential means of the renewal of the political. The authors of these works rely on the traditional interpretation of social relations, according to which, social relations can be developed efficiently only on the basis of immediate contact between people. These authors believe[3] that the new virtual sociality destroys the bases of immediate human interaction. Thus, it destroys the public space and gives the state additional opportunities to exert control over its citizens. Apparently, for the Internet to develop as a virtual public space, it is necessary that its participants take responsibility for their messages. Bernardo Sorj suggests a system of certifying all Internet users in order to filter off all uncertified users. He believes that, soon, it will be possible to introduce a universal certifying system, which would ensure the certification of Internet users and develop a filtering system that would automatically delete the messages of uncertified users [7]. However, if Sorj's idea is put into effect, the Internet — a multiaspect virtual communication space bringing together the private and the public — will turn into a solely public realm, thus, impoverishing its content. It is worth

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[3] See, for example, [5].

recalling Hannah Arendt's definition of the public realm, which, although it was reduced to the physical public realm, holds true for the virtual public realm. Arendt believed that the public and the private realms supplement each other and are the parts of an integral whole. It means that the Internet, as a virtual alternative to the physical communicative environment should retain a sensible balance of the public and the private.

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Leonid N. Stolovich

ON THE FATE
OF KANT COLLECTION
AT TARTU UNIVERSITY

The essay is dedicated to the fate of the valuable Kant-related collections and manuscripts from the library of Tartu University, which, in 1895, were transported to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin for the publication of Kant's complete works and did not return to Tartu and escaped the notice of researchers for a long time.

Key words: *Tartu Kant collection, Kant's letters, Kant's death mask, Tartu manuscript.*

For a long time, the research library of Tartu University has housed four letters and a note by Immanuel Kant from different archive collections:

1) A letter to Johann Gottfried Herder (1744−1803) of May 9, 1768 from a collection of letters complied by K. Morgenstern.

2) A letter to Theodor Gottlieb Hippel (1741—1796) of March 15, 1764 from a collection of autographs of the archivist of Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences, Friedrich Ludwig Schardius (1795—1855) presented to Tartu University in 1852.

3) A letter to Johann Schulz (1739—1805) of August 16, 1790, presented to the university in 1862 by state councillor Averin.

4) A letter to Karl Morgenstern of August 14, 1795, in which Kant expresses his gratitude to the addressee for Morgenstern's thesis entitled *De Platonis republica commentationes tres.* However, according to the head of the Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Mare Rand, this letter disappeared in the early 1990s [22] = [10, S. 96].

5) A note of September 2, 1792 form Schardius's collection.

All these letters were published in the Complete Works of Kant (*Kants* gesamelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Bde. 10—12. Berlin, 1900−1902), while the note appeared in *Кант И.* Трактаты и письма. М., 1980. С. 635, 674—675[1].

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[1] The information about these manuscripts has been published several times. See. [2, p. 76—79].

As I started to work at Tartu University in 1953 and got acquainted with its library, I found out that once it had contained a part of Kant's archive.

Among the valuable books and manuscripts available at the library of Tartu University, there were 461 letters addressed to the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant, as well as two books from his personal library: *Baumgarten A. G.* Metaphysica. Halle, 1757 and *Meyer G. F.* Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle, 1752. The pages of the books were covered with the notes of the Königsberg thinker (the publication of these notes required three volumes of Kant's collected works). This collection was brought to Tartu by Kant's apprentice, whom Kant entrusted with the publication of his *Logic* and the lectures on metaphysics, Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche (1762—1842) (he was invited to Dorpat (Tartu) University as a professor of philosophy). Jäsche published Kant's *Logic* in 1800, but he did not manage to publish the lectures on metaphysics[2]. Jäsche presented his part of Kant's archive to his friend — the founder of the library of Tartu University, Karl Morgenstern, who bequeathed it to the library.

Karl Morgenstern described the present of his friend under entry No CCXCI as follows: "Kant collection. Letters to Kant. Written by their authors. In quatro. 772 pages. Name index on three unnumbered pages. Binding ordered by me. The collection was entrusted to me more than 35 years ago by my late friend Jäsche. Moreover, I collected, classified and bound those kept in an old box with a moth-eaten leather cover, in 1843, finally, they were preliminary divided into five packages, in March 1844, letters to Kant were bound in alphabetical order (1088 pages). Some of them are signed by Kant himself"[3].

The famous specialist in history of philosophy, Kuno Fischer, wrote in the preface to the fourth edition of the sixth volume of the *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* on August 28, 1897 that Kant's pupil and publisher Jäsche had presented the letter to Kant he had possessed to his friend librarian Morgenstern in Yuryev, who had bequeathed it to the Yuryev University library that kept 461 letters in two volumes in quatro, only 60 of which had been published before [9, p. 143].

However, this part of Kant's archive — the Tartu Kant collection listed in catalogues — was missing due to reasons unknown. Where did it vanish to? I started archive research and here is what I found.

The Kant collection had been kept in the university library until September 11 (23), 1895, i. e. until it was transferred to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin for the preparation of publication of Kant's complete works (*Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*). The permission to transfer the materials for temporary use was given by the Russian government. The *Rizhsky Vestnik* newspaper of November 2, 1895 wrote that the Ministry of Public Education had solicited the royal assent to transfer Kant's manuscripts that belonged to Yuryev University temporarily to the Berlin Academy of Sciences.

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[2] Kant handed another part of his archive over to the orientalist and theologian Friedrich Theodor Rink (1770—1811), who attended Kant's lectures in 1786—1789 and later studied philology in Leiden under the supervision of Prof. David Ruhnken, a school friend of Immanuel Kant. In 1795, upon his return to Königsberg, Rink became friends with Kant. Kant entrusted him with the publication of *Physical geography* and *On pedagogy*. See [23] and [19].

[3] The Department of manuscripts and rare documents of the Tartu University Library, catalogue.

The research library of Tartu University boasts the letters from the Prussian Academy of Sciences written by such eminent German philosophers as Hermann Diels, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Benno Erdmann; these letters help trace the movements of the Tartu Kant collection in Germany. An article by Prof. Arseny Gulyga, an employee of the Tartu University research library, Hain Tankler, and the author of the present paper entitled *On Kant's manuscript heritage at Tartu University* [3] traces the movements of the Tartu Kant collection in Germany on the materials of surviving documents and focuses on its publication in the academic collection of Kant's works, the 18th volume of which — the last one that contains the Tartu materials — appeared in 1928. Despite numerous reminders, pleas and demands to return Kant's works to Tartu (in 1930s, the director of the library, Friedrich Puksoo, insisted that the Kant collection be returned), it remained in Germany...

What happened to the Kant collection later? Did it survive or was it claimed by World War II? At the same time, after the war, the research library of Tartu University received letters regarding the location of the Kant collection even from German professors. Prof. A Gulyga made an inquiry about the Kant collection to colleagues from East and West Germany and West Berlin. The only fact that was established was that there was a photocopy of the collection in West Berlin. Thus, the saddest conclusion was made, and the article *On Kant's manuscript heritage at Tartu University* ends with the following phrase: "As to the originals, they apparently perished during the war".

However, I did not want to believe that. I continued asking people who had ever had something to do with the manuscript collections of the university or had ample knowledge of the Tartu valuable materials. I encouraged myself with the recollection of a recent success. In the early 1960s, I got interested in the fate of the books that belonged to the great German enlightener, *Johann Gottfried von Herder.* It was known that a part of Herder's library was purchased by the Tartu University library. But the illiterate bureaucrat, who supervised the library in the postwar years, ordered to put the books from Herder's library "in their right place", thus, they were scattered among the hundreds of thousands of library volumes. So, we had to look for a needle in the haystack! However, M. Liblik, the then employee of the Department of Rare books and Manuscripts, remembered that bibliographer Eduard Vigel dealt with Herder's library. M. Libik managed to find in the papers of the late E. Vigel an article entitled *On the history of J.G. Herder's library*, as well as a list of the books from the personal library of the great thinker. I published these materials in the sixth volume of the *Works on philosophy* [8] and a part of Herder's library was found...

Once, in an old lecture theatre of the main building of Tartu University, which served as a gathering place for teachers during breaks, I told Leo Leesment, a professor of law, everything I knew about the Tartu Kant collection. "Wait", he says, "I vaguely recollect a talk with a German, I think, in 1963, who saw those materials. I should look for the entry in my notes".

To tell the truth, I did not believe then that my interlocutor spoke of the Tartu Kant collection. That is why I did not hurry Leo Leesment. However, several months later, we ran into each other in Town Hall square and he handed me a piece of paper with the address of the archive of the Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic, where Leo Leesment's acquaintance saw the two volumes of letters to Kant.

Maybe, it was just photocopies? It was hard to believe that the materials sought for by many specialists had been in full view of everybody — in the Central archive of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR.

And, in late August of 1979, I happened to be in Berlin at the invitation of painter Kurt Magritz.

Of course, one of the first things to do is to visit the archive. So, here I am, in quite Otto-Nuschke-Strasse, at the building of the Academy of Science. I enter the Central archive and introduce myself. I ask, "Have you got the letters to Kant from Karl Morgenstern's collection? I'm also interested in the books by Baumgarten and Meyer with Kant's notes". I complete all the necessary archive formalities. The archivist asks me about my research interests that brought me there and asks to come back in three days without promising anything.

With a sinking heart, I enter the archive on the due date. I am taken to the working room and given two volumes in ancient bindings. I open them and see the familiar label of Karl Morgenstern.

The first volume contains 724 numbered pages of manuscripts, the second 1088. 461 letters in total. No. 163 and 164 are letters from Friedrich Schiller. There are nine letters from Fichte and a letter from Wieland. A special note mentions everyone who has worked on the documents — three people in total. The last person on the list is the acquaintance of Leo Leesment who inquired after Wieland's letter on January 31, 1957.

I was also given G. F. Meyer's book covered with Kant's notes. It sported a new leather binding. As the corresponding note stated, the book was restored in Dresden in 1974. Baumgarten's book was not found. What did happen to it?[4]

The Tartu Kant collection is published in Kant's academic complete works. However, it does not diminish the historical value of the original. Scholars will have to address these documents in the future when publishing Kant's materials.

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As I was writing this article, another relic immediately related to Immanuel Kant was found at Tartu University.

At the time, my daughter Inna studied at the Department of Psychology of Tartu University. She attended anatomy classes with her groupmates. Once she came back from a class and told me: "Dad, do you know there is a mask of your beloved Kant in the anatomicum?" I did not know that. At once, I went to the anatomicum and entered the office through a room where bodies were kept.

It turned out that, in the dissecting room of Tartu State University, on a shelf, next to different preparations, there was... the death mask of the great philosopher. The staff of the Department of Anatomy knew, of course, that the Anatomical museum had Kant's death mask. But for them, it was just an image of death. Maybe, for the old professors, Kant's name bore some significance, but younger medics did not pay much attention to some idealist philosopher. The fact that the great Kant's death mask was found in Tartu escaped even such specialists in the university's heritage who had worked there for many decades as Dr. Leo Leesment, Associate Professor Aleksander Elango, Villem Ernits, who seemed to know everything. The explanation is quite simple: what humanist will go voluntary to the dissection room literally making their way over corpses?

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[4] Later, I came across the information that Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* with Kant's notes was in Göttingen (see [18, H. 4, S. 483]).

Kant's death mask, Museum of Classical Antiquities, Tartu

How did Kant's death mask end up at the university? One can only guess. The registration book of the university's Museum of Classical Antiquities, where the mask should be registered has not been found yet (it might have been sent off in the course of evacuation during World War I). The most plausible version is that the mask was brought for Prof. Jäsche, who venerated everything related to his teacher. But, of course, it is only a version.

As to the mask itself, we can name the artist who cast the mask. It was Prof. Knorre from the Königsberg Art School (see [24, S. 334]).

K. H. Glasen [14] mentions that the mould made by Prof. Knorre was used to cast three bust-like masks. One of them ended up in the Berlin Anatomical Museum, another one in the Prussian Society of Antiquities (this copy was damaged and restored later), and the third one in the state archive in Königsberg (see [14, S. 27]). Maybe, the mask from Tartu University was the fourth copy? A wider audience does not know anything about it.

The face of the great philosopher was disfigured by death. The mask bears the traces of its "critique" of the declined reason. Thus, despite the then tradition to keep death masks of eminent people (for instance, there are several masks of Beethoven), Kant's mask was hardly cast repeatedly. To date, we know little about the three copies of Kant's mask that remained in Germany. Did they survive World War II? All that makes the copy from Tartu University even more valuable.

I wrote the lines above in 1998. Later, *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Heft 4/99, published an article by Heinrich Lange entitled *Totenmaske Kants in Berlin wiederentdeckt*. It says that a copy of Kant's death mask was found in the anatomic collection of the Institute of Anatomy of the Berlin *Charité* medical school. The photos provided in the article conform to the Tartu copy. The author provides well-known information about the creation of the mask. He demonstrates knowledge of the fact that Leonid Stolovich wrote about the discovery of Kant's death mask (Heinrich Lange read about it in the German edition of Kant's biography by A. Gulyga published in 1985).

However, the author of the article *Totenmaske Kants in Berlin wiederentdeckt* makes a fanciful suggestion that the Tartu copy might have been transferred from Königsberg to Tartu after World War II. The German archives and valuables, seized by the Soviet Army, were never transferred to Estonia, moreover, there is information that Kant's mask, although consigned to obscurity, was known to somebody.

In his article entitled *Kantiana in Dorpat (Tartu)*, the eminent expert on Kant, Rudolf Malter expresses his gratitude to Mrs. Anke from Albert-Akademie Königstein for her report that, during her study in Tartu in the 30s, she saw Kant's death mask in the Anatomical Museum [18, S. 486].

As to the so-called death mask of Kant (also mentioned by Heinrich Lange) that is exhibited in Kant museum of today's Kaliningrad, its story is as following. As the discovery of Kant's mask at Tartu University was reported, a young man, a student of an art college, came to Tartu from Kaliningrad. He asked for permission to copy Kant's death mask using the contact method, i. e. through applying wax and casting a plaster copy with the use of such mould. Permission was not granted. Then he made a visual copy of the mask, he drew and sculptured it looking at the original. The copy turned out to be quite crude, in my opinion. It is the copy exhibited in Kant museum in Kaliningrad. New museum staff did not know about the origins of the copy and turned to me for the explanation.

When I was writing this article, I did not know that Tartu University kept another relic related to Kant. In March 2001, the Tartu University museum organised an unusual exhibition of death masks, which also featured Kant's mask. However, a great surprise was another exhibit — the ***plaster copy of Kant's skull*** placed under the picture of the original in profile. It poses two questions: how was it possible to make a copy of the philosopher's skull and how did this copy get to Tartu?

The point is that, in 1880, a chapel was built in Königsberg Cathedral, where the philosopher was buried, thus it was necessary to reinter him. There is a picture depicting this process: Kant's skull is being taken out of the opened grave. Thus, it became available for scholars as early as the 1880s. In my library, there is a reprint of an article (it was found at a second hand bookseller's by Prof. Peeter Tulviste, who presented it to me) from the German *Das Morphologische Jahrbuch* yearbook of 1906 by the eminent anatomist and anthropologist, August Rauber (1841–1907), who became a professor of Derpt University in 1886. This article has a very unusual title *Der Schädel von Immanuel Kant und jener vom Neandertal* (*Kant's skull and that of the Neanderthal man*) — Leipzig, 1906. There are reasons to agree with the exhibition's organiser, Ken Kalling, that it was August Rauber who brought the copy of Kant's skull and another exhibit — Beethoven's skull — to Tartu.

* * *

The Tartu Kant collection had another valuable relic that was in obscurity for a long time. I mean Kreutzfeld's thesis (*Philological and poetical thesis on the general principles of fiction*) in the Latin language, on the blank pages of which Kant wrote his opponent speech. It was reported as early as the 19th century in the catalogue of books and manuscripts by the library's founder, Karl Morgenstern [11, p. IX, MCCLXXX]. It also mentions that the thesis had been purchased from Jäsche's inheritance in 1843. On the thesis itself, above Morgenstern's ex libris there is a note: "Olim Jäschii [once Jäsche's] Ex libr. Morgenstern. 1843".

The title page of Kreutzfeld's thesis with a fragment of Kant's *Tartu manuscript*

Why did Kant's manuscript on Kreutzfeld's thesis stay in Tartu, while the other part of the Kant collection was transferred to Germany? Initially, I thought that the *Tartu manuscript* had not been sent off at all, since Kant's opponent's speech was written in clear handwriting (apparently, so that it can be easily read) and it could be copied right there. Indeed, Kant's manuscript was copied in Tartu and first published in the *Altpreussische Monatsschrift* magazine by Artur Warda [13, Bd. XLVIII, H. 4, S. 662—670]. The research library of Tartu University keeps a reprint of this publication that was apparently sent by the author. In 1991¸ *Kant-Studien* published the German translation of the *Tartu manuscript* with a short translator's afterword. In 1913, this manuscript was reproduced in the 15th volume of Kant's complete works [17, S. 903—935].

First, I thought that the publication of the *Tartu manuscript* in the complete works had also been based on the copy. However, after the international scientific circles had learned the location of the manuscript through mass media, I was addressed by a representative of the Kant archive at Marburg University, Werner Stark. In his letter of March 1, 1985, he wrote that he could not imagine that Prof. Erich Adickes, who deciphered Kant's manuscripts for the complete works could have based the publication on a copy and not the original. Moreover, W. Stark informed me that, among the materials of the Kant commission of the Berlin Academy of Sciences from the Central Archive of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, he saw documents proving that Kreutzfeld's thesis with Kant's manuscript had been in Germany and had been returned to Tartu before 1914.

In the research library of Tartu State University, I found correspondence regarding the sending of Kreutzfeld's thesis to Prof. Erich Adickes for temporary use: on September 21, 1991, the library director V. E. Grabar (the brother of the famous painter and art critic Igor Grabar) approached the university administration with a proposal to meet the request of Prof. Adickes to send him Kreutzfeld's thesis. On October 4, the university administration sent a written notice to the library stating that they supported the request of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. On October 13, 1911, it was sent through the Ministry of

foreign affairs. In a letter of April 22, 1913, the university administration notified the library director that Kreutzfeld's thesis sent off to a professor of the University of Thübingen, Erich Adickes, had been returned on April 9, 1913 (see [1]). Therefore, after the preparation of the 15th volume of the complete works, where the *Tartu manuscript* was published according to the original, had been finished it was returned at the threshold of World War I, unlike the rest of the Tartu Kant collection.

However, this was unknown to scientific community. The manuscript was believed to have remained in Germany. It was sought for in vain, while it remained in the research library of Tartu University. It was never claimed. When working of the article entitled *Kantiana in Dorpat (Tartu)*, the eminent West German expert on Kant, Rudolf Malter, after futile search for Kant's manuscript in Germany, addressed me in a letter of November 11, 1983, asking to check whether it could remain miraculously in Tartu. And a miracle did happen.

The analysis of the original leaves no doubt that it is Kant's manuscript, though it is not signed and he is not mentioned as an opponent on the title page of either the first or the second parts of the thesis. As to the signature, it is missing, since Kant wrote the speech for himself. Was Kant an official opponent for Kreutzfeld's thesis?

Kreutzfeld taught at Königsberg Old Town School (altstädtiche Schule), but, since the position of a professor of poetics was vacant, two theses should be defended at the university (one for the admission as a member of the Faculty of Philosophy and the other for the position of a professor of poetics). The two theses were two parts of the work entitled *Dissertatio philologico-poetica de principiis fictionum generalioribus*. The discussion of the first one took place on February 25, 1777, of the second on February 28. The respondent, i.e. the participant of the dispute, who, unlike the opponent, supported the candidate, was *Christian Jacob Kraus,* Kant's student, who became his colleague. The opponents, as was tradition, were three students. It is worth noting that one of Kreutzfeld's opponents for the first thesis was *Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski*, Kant's student and, later, housekeeper, who witnessed the death of the great philosopher. By the way, there was a copy of Kreutzefeld's thesis at Königsberg University, which was bound the same way as that in Tartu, with the speech of one of student opponents.

However, alongside three student opponents, at least two professors from the faculty the candidate belonged to, had to participate in the discussion. Immanuel Kant also took part in the discussion of the second thesis on February 28, 1777. A positive prove that the opponent was none other than Kant was that the conclusion of the opponent's speech contains an address to the respondent Krauss: "Long ago, I started to count you as one of my best students". It could be said only by Kant. The handwriting corresponds to Kant's manuscripts in the Latin language kept in the research library of Tartu University[5]. Moreover, Jäsche and Morgenstern could hardly make a mistake about who authored the text.

Although the manuscript was already published, its cultural, historical and scientific value is not diminished. At the same time, the discovery of Kant's manuscript, its translation into the Russian language and the study relating to its publication showed that the *Tartu manuscript* is of great interest for the under-

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[5] The publication of this manuscript by A. V. Gulyga, L. N. Stolovich, and H. L. Tankler see in [4, p. 635, 674—675].

standing of development of philosophical and aesthetic ideas of the eminent philosopher. It was written in 1777, while Kant was working on his major work — the *Critique of pure reason* and is situated, thus, at the border between the precritique and critique periods of Kant's philosophy. The philosopher was an opponent for a thesis on poetics, thus, the *Tartu manuscript* is a work focused mainly on the problems of aesthetics.

Written in a relaxed style, figurative and ironic, this manuscript discusses a number of philosophical problems, such as cognitive capacities of senses, the relation between poetry and philosophy. The great enlightener attacked superstitions, astrology, and magic with great irony, and spoke of delusion-mongering and ambitions to deceive the gullible crowd for one's own benefit with contempt.

The complete Russian translation of the *Tartu manuscript*, edited and prefaced by the author of the article, was published by a teacher of classical philology and, today, a professor of Tartu University, Anne Lill in *Kantovsky sbornik* (Kalinignrad, 1985. Issue. 10. Pp. 120—129), in the book *Immanuel Kant's aesthetics and the present: proceedings of the fifth Kant Conference in Kaliningrad* (Эстетика Иммануила Канта и современность: Сборник статей по материалам V Кантовских чтений. Калининград — Светлогорск, 1990 год. М.: Знание, 1991. С. 53—62) and in my book entitled *Philosophy. Aesthetics. Laughter* («Философия. Эстетика. Смех. СПб., Тарту, 1999. С. 44—56) with a dedication to the German expert on Kant Rudolf Malter. The analytical analysis of this manuscript was conducted in the preface to this publication, as well as in a number of my other articles[6].

Kant's speech in Latin, although it was published in the complete works in the German language in the beginning of the 20th century, did not become a part of academic routine and was not even mentioned in works focused on Kant's aesthetics. The discovery of its original, in the research library of Tartu University, its publication in the Russian language and its analyses makes it possible to judge the work of the great philosopher on its merits.

* * *

Have all items of the Tartu Kant collection been found? Another discovery indicates that further search can give new results. In spring 1986, during the preparation of an ex libris exhibition in the research library of Tartu University, a book from Kant's personal library was found. It is a book by Leonhard Creuzer presented to Kant by the author with an inscription: «Dem großen Stifter der kritischen Philosophie Herrn Professor Kant in Koenigsberg als ein geringes Denkmal seiner aufrichtigsten Verehrung gewidmet von dem Verfasser» ("To the great founder of critique philosophy Herr Professor Kant in Koenigsberg as a modest sign of his sincere respect from the author"). The book is entitled *Skeptische Betrachtungen über die Freyheit des Willes mit Hinsicht auf die neuesten Theorien über dieselbe von Leonhard Creuzer*. Giessen, 1793. The inscription was made not on the title page but before it. The bottom of the title page bears the sign of K. Morgenstern and No 3453. At this number, the book can be found in K. Morgenstern's catalogue of books and manuscripts on page 200; however, there is no mentioning that the book had been presented to Kant. The analysis of the book itself shows that there is underlining on pages 42—44, 47, 49—54, 56, 60—64.

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[6] See.: [6; 5, p. 143—146]. The last article also appeared in [7, p. 34—43].

Text on pages 134—135 is set off by braces. On page 135, there are several additional lines, apparently, in the author's handwriting. One can hardly speculate who was responsible for underlining. Maybe, it was Kant, maybe, Jäsche. In his book about Kant, Karl Vorländer mentions Creutzer among the Königsberg followers of Kant in the 1970s [24, Bd. 2, S. 239].

Anyway, a book that belonged to the great Kant was found. We will hope that it was not the last discovery in our search for the Tartu Kant collection. And our expectations, as you will see below, were fulfilled in 2005.

Happy end

After I happened to find the Tartu Kant collection in Berlin, I told about it the then rector of Tartu University, Arnold Koop, and even made an official announcement. However, A. Koop, having learnt that the Tartu Kant collection was in the GDR, did not reply to the announcement. Due to the same reason, all attempts to publish the discovery of the Tartu Kant collection in the major USSR mass media — the *Pravda* newspaper set up an article but did not publish it, as it was explained, due to ensuing complications, i. e. problems in the USSR-GDR relations — yielded no result.

Nevertheless, despite the evident reluctance of the USSR leadership to complicate relations with the GDR, the author of the article managed to publish several works on the fate of the Tartu section of Kant's archive, as well as Kant's death mask (see *Столович Л.* О судьбе тартуской Кантианы // Тартуский государственный университет (ТГУ). 1980 — in Russian; «Sirp ja vasar» 1984 — in Estonian). These publications were noticed in the GDR and sparked off certain reaction, as well as corresponding studies of eminent German experts on Kant (see [18]).

The *Vestnik* of the Novosti press agency published my material entitled *The works of Estonian researchers on Kant's oeuvre*. This material and a similar news story by the TASS information agency found a broad response (I am familiar with more than 30 cases) in newspapers and magazines of the FRG, the GDR, Portugal, Kuwait, Cuba, Finland, Russia, and other countries. In connection with my discovery of the only returned part of the Tartu Kant collection in the research library of Tartu University in 1984 — the manuscript of opponent's speech for Kreutzfeld's thesis, the so called *Tartu manuscript* — information about the new development in the story of the Tartu Kant collection started to appear in central and local press (for instance, the *Literaturnaya gazeta newspaper*, the *Filosofskie nauki* magazine, *Kantovsky sbornik* published in Kaliningrad and others). Judging by the responses of specialists, including those from Germany, a wider audience was informed about the tragic fate of the Tartu Kant collection.

The history of movements of the Tartu section of Kant's archive and the documents from Estonian State Historical Archive in Tartu[7], leave no doubt that

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[7] See the *Tartu University 1802—1918* archive, which, in particular, contains a letter from the Ministry of public enlightenment of the Russian Empire addressed to the rector of Yuryev (Tartu) university notifying of the supreme order of the Emperor of August 18, 1895 to send off the manuscripts of philosopher Kant in possession of the library of Imperial Yuryev University for temporary use to the Berlin Academy of Sciences (Archive 402. Inventory 5. Case 595. P. 218—224). The author expresses his gratitude to the archive employee Tatyana Schor for her help in finding the materials relating to the sending of the Tartu Kant collection to Germany.

the Tartu Kant collection belongs to Tartu University. However, since it concerns one of the most valuable items among the documents of German culture, one can understand the desire to keep them in Germany. At the same time legal inconsistency of retaining the property of Tartu University is obvious. There was no surprise that the employees of the archive of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR tried to keep the location of the Tartu Kant collection in secret (for instance, the director of the Institute of Philosophy of the GDR, Manfred Buhr, gave a negative response to the request regarding the Kant collection, at the same time, the Institute of Philosophy was situated in the same building as the Central archive of the Academy of Science of the GDR, where the collection was found). Moreover, the archive employees did not show me everything: I never saw the volume with Kant's notes and drafts described by K. Morgenstern in the catalogue ("I collected, classified and bound those kept in an old box with a moth-eaten leather cover").

The ambiguous status of the Tartu Kant collection was an obstacle to the study of Kant's manuscript heritage. One of the solutions was suggested by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, i.e. to legalise the Tartu Kant collection through presenting it to the GDR on behalf of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR neglecting the rights of Tartu University. My archive contains a copy of the letter of the then director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, B.S. Ukraintsev, to the vice president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, P.N. Fedoseev, that suggests that the materials of the Tartu Kant collection be presented to the Academy of Sciences of the GDR on the basis that such an act of goodwill is appropriate from both research and political points of view. It is a great achievement to conduct acts of good will at somebody else's expense!

On the other hand, German specialists (in particular, the eminent expert of Kant's manuscripts, Werner Stark) emphasised that, regardless of the legal status of Kant's manuscripts, they should be available to scholars from any country. In 1993, W. Stark published a comprehensive monograph on the study of Kant's letters and manuscripts, dedicated to the history of the compilation of the Tartu Kant collection and the search for it [23, S. 19, 206, 208, 280, 343, 359].

In 1995, Tartu University made a request to Germany regarding the return of the Tartu Kant collection to Tartu. And on November 22, 1995, at 11.00 a. m., a truly historic event took place — the Berlin-Brandenburg Scientific Academy and the Scientific Academy in Göttingen returned a part of Immanuel Kant's archive, which left Tartu 100 years ago, to Tartu University. At the same time, the return of the archive took place without any red tape, despite the fact that it concerned genuine relics of German culture. I suppose that it is unambiguous evidence of the democratic nature and legal order of today's German state. Could we even think of it under the fascist or socialist rule in Germany?! However, this historic event was possible also due to the trust of German community in the Tartu University of today, which is capable of ensuring the safety of the invaluable documents of German and universal culture, as well as their availability to scholars from throughout the world.

I was, of course, extremely glad about such result of my 15 year search for and research on the Tartu Kant collection. The booklet published by the research library on the occasion of collection return mentioned my role in its discovery and listed my works (one of them was co-authored by A. Gulyga and H. Tankler), as well as the article by Rudolf Malter *Kantiana in Dopart (Tartu)* published

in *Kant Studien* [18], which focused on my search for the Tartu Kant collection, among the publications on the topic. An article by Serafim Shartashsky (pen name of journalist Ilya Nikiforov) entitled *Immanuel Kant's remigration* appeared in the *Estonia* newspaper of December 12, 1995. It gave credit for my efforts in search for the Tartu Kant collection, which ended in remarkable success. I was also "awarded" by the university with... my monthly salary.

P. S.

There are many stones dating back to the ice age on the fields of Estonia. Every time, they are thoroughly removed, but, after tillage, they come to surface again and again. This situation resembles archive search.

The Tartu Kant collection seems to have been studied backward and forward, however new, earlier unknown documents related to the great Kant appear every now and then. One of such occasions was the discovery of a leaflet that was a fragment of Kant's draft letter to his classmate from the Königsberg Friedrichskollegium, *David Ruhnken* (1723−1798), who became one of the greatest philologists of the 18th century, in the archive of the research library of Tartu University in 2005.

The discovery was reported in Estonian newspapers: *Tartu Ülikooli raamatukogust leiti filosoof Kanti kiri* [*Kant's manuscript found in the library of Tartu University*] in the *Postimees* of December 12, 2005 [20]; and *Tähtsast leiust Tartu Ülikooli raamatukogus* [*An important discovery in the library of Tartu University*] by the head of the Department of manuscripts and rare books of Tartu University, Mare Rand, in the *Eesti Päevaleht* of December 28, 2005. In 2006, Mare Rand published an article entitled *Rara rarissima im Bibliotheksbestand: Die Tartuer / Dorpater Kantiana* in the German language [19] = [9, S. 93−109], in 2007, her work *Karl Morgenstern and the Tartu Kant collection*[8] that describes in detail the discovery of Kant's manuscript, provides its photo, its text in the Latin language and a translation into Estonian was published in the *Yearbook 2004−2005*.

According to Mare Rand, the manuscript found in Morgenstern's papers is a draft of a reply to a Latin letter of David Ruhnken to Kant of March 10, 1771[9]. In this letter, David Ruhnken recalls his school friend, with whom he had associated 30 years ago and whose intellectual abilities, quite evident even at school, developed over his lifetime. Ruhnken writes about his life, his professorship and emphasises his continuing interest in Plato. He asks about the other school friends showing great promise, Georg David Kypke and Johann Lewin Porsche. Ruhnken's letter to Kant was first published in 1801 by Friedrich Theodor Rink[10], who was a student of Prof. Ruhnken in Leiden and, having returned to Königsberg in 1795, joined Kant's circle of friends (it was he whom — alongside Jäsche — Kant entrusted with the publication of his works and handed over a part of his archive).

Mare Rand's article offers the Latin text of the draft of Kant's reply to Ruhnken, as well as its translation into the Estonian language [21, lk. 173−175]. The hardly readable text was deciphered by Mari Murdvee.

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[8] See [21, lk. 194−195].

[9] Dacid Ruhnken's letter was also published in the Laint language in [16, S. 91−93].

[10] Ruhken's letter to Kant was published in an appendix to F.T. Rinks' book dedicated to Ruhnken: *Tiberius Hemsterhuys und David Ruhnken: Biografischer Abriss ihres Leben*. Königsberg, 1801.

The draft of reply to Ruhnken is not dated, but it was apparently written after the famous Ruhnken's letter to Kant of March 10, 1771.

Mare Rand's study based on the university library's archive materials traces the condition of the Tartu Kant collection and research on the subject, as well as its partial publication by the founder of the library of Derpt-Tartu University, Karl Morgenstern. Morgenstern also expressed great interest in Ruhnken's work, published two of his letters and, according to the copy of Ruhnken's letter to Kant of March 10, 1771, was going to republish it. Apparently, he put aside the draft of Kant's letter separating it from other Kant's manuscripts that he received from Jäsche. It was the draft that Mare Rand found in Morgenstern's archive only in 2005.

Even F.T. Rink made efforts to find the reply to his letter to Kant in Ruhnken's archive in Leiden. However, his request did not bring the expected results. This letter has never been found. Mare Rand suggests that Ruhnken might have not received a reply to his letter at all. However, it is not likely that Kant ignored a letter of his eminent group mate, whom, according to the draft reply, he still regarded as a friend, although, as researchers claim, Kant was not a diligent correspondent, despite the fact that the founder of critical philosophy went down in history for his punctuality. Kant's reply to Ruhnken, if it was written and still exists, should be further searched for.

What other gems of the Kant collection will be found during the next research 'tillage'?

1987—2007

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(философско-эстетические этюды).
М.: «Канон+» РООИ «Реабилитация», 2008

Kant in Russian poetry was also discussed by Prof. Kalinnikov with the example of Pushkin, Vladimir Solvyov, and Vyacheslav Ivanov in the monograph *Kant in Russian philosophical culture*. The focus of the work was the polemics between Russian religious philosophy and Kant's philosophy. In the new book, the author aspires to show that poetry, as the quintessence of art, could not stay aside; however, it is a unique phenomenon in the world artistic culture. The opposite phenomenon is also evident: deep interest in Kant was demonstrated by artistic circles, which could not but arouse the interest of professional philosophers in the receptions of his ideas. The mentioning of somebody's name in poetry is never arbitrary; it indicates that the person mentioned occupies a prominent position in the consciousness of the generation.

Prof. Kalinnikov aims to prove that one of the sources of grandeur and international recognition of Russian poetry is its constant dialogue with one of the geniuses who constitute the core of *world* culture. He also aspires to show the opportunities of poetry when addressing Kant's personality and discovering the unity of logic and poetics in his style of thinking, the unity of his ideas and biography. He attempts to prove that a poet's perspective on Kant is special, more flexible and multilateral than that of a philosopher.

Four hundred pages cover the whole post-Kantina era — from the early 19th to the early 21st century. The analysis of previously considered point is expanded, new names are introduced. However, the area of research is not exhausted by these names and works; the author calls his steps first, preparatory and is certain of the promising future of this research. The book could be called *The history of Russian poetry in its relation to Kant*. It consists of three parts corresponding to the three stages of its history: the beginning of the golden age (the first third of the 19th century), the silver age, and some episodes of the iron 20th century. The genre of the work is philosophical-aesthetical sketches, independent but permeated with the unity of the author's understanding of Kant and the features of Russian spiritual culture. Sometimes, they contain a new, original perspective on the ideas of the great philosopher, the author argues with previous interpretations of poets' philosophical ideas.

The four decades at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries were "the first Kantian age" in Europe. Kantianism was one of the cornerstones of the Decembrists' ideas. But the author's thesis that the call for vigorous actions was extracted from Kant's works should be handled with care. The analysis of the poems and letters of V. F. Rayevsky — the "first Decembrist", who was arrested in 1822 — shows that this impulse was very abstract (especially, if we keep in mind Kant's negative attitude to revolutions). Kant *could* contribute to the development of a reform programme, but the way to deep and correct understanding of his practical philosophy was still long.

Rayevsky's friend A.S. Pushkin had a better command of "Kantianisms" and used them more frequently. The author proves conclusively that the great poet, when constructing his plots, studied Kant's perspective and, relying on it, excelled in his spiritual development both the Enlightenment and romanticism. The central topic of the novel *Eugene Onegin* and the narrative poem *The gypsies* is the relation between love (happiness) and duty. The plot poses the problem differently, the solution, however is based on the same, Kantian, principles: duty is above love-liking but is compatible with love-respect. Tatyana Larina and Lensky, who live in respect of duty are spiritually complete characters, while their antipodes are defective. In this chapter's interlude, Prof. Kalinnikov answers unambiguously the disputable question regarding the role of love and matrimony in the life and opinions of the Königsberg philosopher himself. Kant's theory of genius corresponds to Pushkin's image of Mozart, at the same time, the poet does not insist on the historical truth of his version of Mozart's relationship with Salieri.

The second part of the book begins with an analysis of Vladimir Solovyov's works. The defence of his doctoral thesis sparked unprecedented interest in philosophy in Russian society. However, his was also the person who ridiculed the Kant fad that emerged in the second half of the 19th century in Russian university circles in the play *Alsim*. Another Solvyov's work parodies the superficial interpretation of transcendental philosophy. In this chapter's interlude, Prof. Kalinnikov employs Kantian devices in order to rationalise the category if *Sophia*. It denotes the common to the cognised and the cognising centre providing for the truth of cognition and representing in both of them the truly existing principle, i.e. God. Solovyov did not manage to find such link in Kant's philosophy and reproached him for the lack of a clear position on this issue, which is partially true. However, such link can be represented by the property of the world of things-in-themselves to be an aggregate of all possible experience (the property of the process of cognition to be potentially infinite), and the property of the natural world to be a systemic whole. It seems that a Kantian analogue of *Sophia* has been found, but, judging by the section's conclusion, the author is not completely satisfied with it and believes that he has only outlined the conditions for future research.

The next chapter focuses on the philosophical worldview of Valery Bryusov — pragmatism approaching positivism, prone to solve the final philosophical problems sceptically. Surprisingly, this world view originates partially from Kant's ideas: with their help, the poet was fighting against the dogmas of religious world view. Among symbolists, such attitude to Kant is unique. The analysis of the poem *Ballad* shows that is addressed to Andrey Bely, whose world view embraced the incompatible ideas of Kant and Solovyov. This conflict led Bely to the love tragedy, a part of which was Bryusov.

The third chapter is dedicated to Merezhkovsky, whose poem *Protopope Avvakum* features an argument with Kant about the problem of a lie for the greater good. It drew Vl. Solovyov's attention, who expressed his point of view on the subject. Kalinnikov shows that the argument developed as a result of insufficient understanding of Kant's position, which, if on sets aside all the nuances, is as follows: all means should be used for saving a human life. Merezhkovsky's dramatic tale *The return to nature* is considered as a philosophical piece about the relationship between a human being and nature and their influence on relations between people. Agnostically understood, Kant is opposed to Tolostoyan-

Russianist utopia and Nietzschean antiutopia. The argument is settled with the help of Vladimir Solovyov's ideas.

Further, the author discusses the works of Andrey Bely and his complex autobiographical poem *The tempter*. This poet resisted the influence of neo-Kantians — the Germans and the Russians — and, in his criticism, aspired to overcome Kant himself, which made him even more of a Kantian. The theoretical framework of Kant's symbolism is the *Critique of Judgement*. Kant's connection with symbolism is scrutinised in the third interlude.

The author moves from the Kantian Bely to the subtleties of the perception of Kant by Solovyov's followers, the adherents of religious philosophy, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Alexander Blok. Prof. Kalinnikov reveals the foundations of Ivanov's ideas — it is not only Platonism and neo-Platonism, but also Aristotelianism. Ivanov called Kantian symbolism "idealistic" and his, Aristotelian, symbolism "realistic". However, the gnoseology of such symbolism is a synthesis of Aristotleianism and Kantianism that supplement each other. Here, Ivanov follows his teacher, Vl. Solovyov. In Kant's philosophy, Vyacheslav Ivanov saw antichristian call for vain individualism. At the same time, their teachings are brought together by anthropologism. The poet made a contribution to the understanding of Kant's system: it is not dualistic, but rather triadic. Alongside the realms of things-in-themselves and nature, there is a third realm — that of the human being, a subjective consciousness.

The one but last chapter of the second part is dedicated to the connection between the image of the starry heavens with the moral law in Kant's world view and Russian poetry and the "poetisised" prose of the 19th-early 21st century. The review of silver age is concluded with the analysis of Ellis's (L. L. Kobylinsky's) translation of two Schopenhauer's poems, one of which was dedicated to Kant. As we know, Schopenhauer owes his philosophy to Kant to the same extent as neo-Kantianism does. Russian poetry had great interest in him.

The review of the 20th century begins with Marina Tsvetayeva. She is a representative of the Silver age, thus, it is only natural that she addresses Kant. She is not a "metaphysical" poet; Tsvetayeva did everything to belittle her understanding of Kant's philosophy. However, he meant a lot for her as a major figure in the spiritual culture of her second motherland, Germany, and as a source of general world view and, in particular, the theory of genius (poet). Socialist ideology is animus against Kant's philosophy; however, it was supported by the Soviet poet, Ye. M. Vinokurov, in terms of meditation on the history of the 20th century and the role of philosophy in it. Fazil Iskander's poem *Body and thought* came out at the beginning of new millennium, on the days of the 200th anniversary of the death of Kant. The poet addresses the problem of correlations between body and spirit. The problem solved by Kant is posed on the basis of the poet's life experience.

The book ends with reflections on two Kaliningrad poets, contemporary townsmen of the great philosopher. S. A. Snegov seems to be Kant's adherent in terms of theory of knowledge but, unconsciously, he was influenced by agnostic misinterpretations of the philosopher, thus, the writer argued with Kant. S. Kh. Simkin translated Kant's poems (only two of which survived). As a response to Simkin's poem *When translating Kant*, Prof. Kalinnikov expounds Kant's philosophy of the poetic art.

The new book by Leonard A. Kalinnikov is a work not only on history of philosophy and poetry (literature) proper, but culture in general. Looking for the

philosophical origins of Russian poetry, the author does not stop at Kant, showing the interweaving of this and other philosophical sources. The same relates to the search for poetical responses to philosophy. At the same time, the reader is offered detailed information and an integral conception of the lives and personalities of poets and philosophers. The author traces the dynamics of the poets' personal perception of Kant revealed not only in poems, but also letters, memoires, treatises (in case of the poets of the silver age). The dialogue of personalities is separated, when possible, from the dialogue of ideas. The presence of the German philosopher is detected even in the "unseen" — in the discussion of topics closely related to his name within history of science and philosophy. The philosophical interpretation of poetry is a complicated task. While solving this problem, the author displays ingenuity, deep knowledge of literature and exact sciences — it is their language the ciphered letters of poets are written in; Prof. Kalinnkov attempts to decipher the letters. It is the language, in which the author's literature images are expressed at times. The language of the book is lively and appropriate to the subject. The book should become a significant phenomenon in the literature on Kant's influence on Russian culture, as well as an impetus for further research.

Andrey S. Zilber

The 10th Kant readings:
classical reason and the challenges of modern civilization
Kaliningrad, April 22—24, 2009

From the 22nd to the 24th of April, the Immanuel Kant State University of Russia held the 10th Kant Readings timed to coincide with the 285th anniversary of the birth of the eminent philosopher. The conference brought together more than 100 scholars from the universities of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltics, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Southern Korea, as well as professors of Kaliningrad universities, and graduate and undergraduate students of IKSUR. Held over three days within the walls of the Kaliningrad Cathedral and IKSUR, the conference focused on the topical problems of epistemology, logic, ethics, social structure, religion, and theory of politics in the light of changing conceptions of rationality.

The conference included three plenary sessions featuring leading specialists in Kant's philosophy, whose achievements are acknowledged by the international scientific community: Prof. M. N. Gromov, head of the History of Russian Philosophy Unit of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Prof. B. Dörflinger, first chair of the Kant Society of Germany, Prof. L. A. Kalinnikov, president of the Russian Kant Society, professor of the IKSUR's Department of Philosophyc, Prof. J. Stolzenberg (Halle, Germany), Prof. L. Caranti (Catania, Italy), Prof. V. N. Bryushinkin, head of the IKSUR's Department of Philosophyc, Prof. S. A. Chernyshov, head of the Department of Philosophy of Bonch-Bruevich Saint-Petersburg State University of Telecommunications, Prof. V. V. Vasiliev, head of the Department of History of Foreign Philosophy of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, Prof. W. Stark (Marburg, Germany), director of Kant Archive, Prof. Yu. M. Shilkov (Saint Petersburg), and others.

The first two plenary sessions took place on the 22nd of April in Kaliningrad Cathedral. The conference opened with a performance of Gaudeamus, followed by the welcoming address of Prof. A. P. Klemeshev, rector of IKSUR. He emphasised that Kant conferences are of importance not only for philosophers and historians, but for the region's cultural life in general. Alongside the plenary sessions, the first day included festive events dedicated to the anniversary of Immanuel Kant: the traditional laying of a floral tribute at the philosopher's grave and an organ concert.

The first plenary session was opened by Prof. M. N. Gromov. His report considered Kant's influence on Russian intellectual culture. Prof. Gromov distinguished seven ways in which the ideas of the great Königsberger influenced Russian intellectuals. The first was direct acquaintance with the philosopher, attendance of his lectures, conversations and correspondence with him; the second was reading his works in the original or translation; the third was dissemination of Kant's ideas in Russia by German and Russian teachers; the fourth were visits of Russian students and interns to German universities, where Kant's ideas were expounded; the fifth was studying the works of European experts dedicated to the philosopher, the sixth was the development of Russian Kant studies and

consideration of different perspectives on I. Kant and his teaching; and the seventh was the assessment of contemporary interest in Kant and his works in Russia. Having overviewed all of the above, Prof. Gromov stressed that regardless of the philosophical preferences of Russian scholars, Kant as a personality have inspired respect in Russian people as an honest worker of thought, a selfless labourer, and a patient mentor. The plenary session was continued by a professor from Trier, the first chair of the German Kant Society, B. Dörflinger. The central idea of his report entitled *Jesus in Kant's interpretation* was that, from the perspective of ethics, the problem of actual existence of Christ is irrelevant; at the same time, the idea of the Redeemer is certainly of great significance. From the perspective of gnoseology, the question whether Jesus was an actual person does not seem to have a definite answer.

The next speaker was Prof. Dörflinger's peer, the president of the Russian Kant Society, Prof. L. A. Kalinnikov, whose speech was dedicated to the role of morality in the system of morals. The need to tackle this issue stems from the fact that theoretical works on practical philosophy are still dominated by the tendency to isolate Kant's ideas about morality from those about law. According to Prof. Kalinnikov, Kant's ethics should be considered as an integral structure, where the principal role of morality is that of the target and underlying tendency of the whole system of morals. In order to prove this thesis, Prof. Kalinnikov analysed the rules of morality and law and showed that the rules of morality have the property of absoluteness, while the rule of law that of relativity. It means that pure morality *per se* rarely serves as a behavioural motive; the general principle is its interaction with law and other legal motives facilitating morality. Summing up, Prof. Kalinnikov arrived at a conclusion that law rests on morality both in its nature and in effect.

The first plenary session was concluded by Prof. J. Stolzenberg. In his speech, entitled *Kant and the right to lie*, he considered possible ways to interpret this important problem through the analysis of certain casuistical examples. When criticising the right to lie, Kant builds his argumentation on the fundamental for any community notion of legal contract, which loses any sense upon the adoption of the rule stipulating that, in certain cases, it is permissible to lie in the course of formulating contractual obligations. In the light of these provisions, the right to lie, according to Kant, should not exist at all. However, according to Prof. Stolzenberg, Kant did not take into account the situation when a forced lie is not a justification of the universal right to lie. The cases of self-defence foreground the issue of value priorities. Thus, according to Prof. Stolzenberg, the duty to be truthful has no force when the principle of humanity is at stake and should be protected.

The second plenary session opened with the presentation by Prof. V. M. Sergeev, director of the Centre of globalistics at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, entitled *The structure of consciousness, power and world politicsm*, which was dedicated to the causes and consequences of the world financial crisis and its analysis as a manifestation of the features of the modern stage of development of consciousness. The next speaker was Prof. L. Caranti, who made a report on the theory of human rights based on the interpretation of Kant's philosophy.

Professor V. N. Bryushinkin put forward the thesis that Kant's theoretical philosophy is based on a particular case of communicative understanding of rationality that is the aspiration to secure sufficient mutual understanding between

the agents of communication. Prof. Bryushinkin believes that the specific feature of rationality in Kant's theoretical philosophy is that the philosopher abstracts from the structure of the agent's and addressee's reason and attempts to build an image of a sentient being in general. In this case, rationality reduces itself to the construction of a theory of reason, which turns out to be identical with the conditions of possibility of cognition of universal truth. The general conditions of the recognition of a certain judgement as the universal truth, according to Kant, are determined by logic. Logic itself acts as a canon and a negative criterion of the truth. As a result of the reconstruction of logical devices in Kant's system, as well as his ideas of rationality, V. N. Bryushinkin comes to a conclusion that Kant did not manage to build his theory of reason on the solid ground of general pure logic, since, when developing this theory, he followed unconsciously another concept of rationality, namely, a certain new transcendental rationality that does not commit itself to observing logical rules.

The first day of conference concluded with a presentation by Prof. S. A. Chernov, who focused on the problem of understanding the essence of science by contemporary researchers, placing emphasis on the question of the change of historical types of rationality, as well as the values, that scholars are guided by in their practice. He drew attention to the fact that young scientists develop distorted ideas of the essence and significance of research work. The understanding of the essence of science requires, for instance, the analysis of the tradition of transcendentalism and spiritual movement, which, undoubtedly, surpasses the dominating analytical-positivistic trend in philosophical solidity, as well as the determination of its relation to that what we call "classical", "non-classical" and "post-non-classical" rationality. Having considered the correlation between Kant's teaching and these types of rationality, Prof. Chernov arrived at a conclusion that the juxtaposition of the ideas of transcendentalism with "classical reason" and the features of "classical rationality" shows that the features of "non-classical rationality" correspond to Kant's position more closely than those of "classical rationality". Prof. Chernov believes that it should raise the question as to whether it is practical to distinguish between "classical" and "non-classical" rationality, considering that Kant's theory formulates the very ideas that made his apprentice Schopenhauer the founder of "non-classical philosophy", and that Kant's thought that the fundamental correspondence between any object of cognition and the activity of consciousness constituting the object underlies Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, whose model was used by M. K. Mamardashvili to build the most interesting theory of "non-classical rationality" in Russian literature.

The second and the third days of the conference took place in the administrative building of IKSUR and included workshop sessions focusing on the topics of the plenary presentations. Workshop sessions discussed five issues: "Rationality in Kant's philosophy", "Classical reason and changing rationality", "Kant's philosophy and its perception in different cultures", "Classical reason, changing governance, and the modern world order", and "Classical reason, contemporary ethical concepts, and modern religious consciousness".

The first sitting of the "Rationality in Kant's philosophy" workshop session opened with a report by Prof. G. V. Grinenko (Moscow) entitled "*The antinomy of pure reason" and the types of contradictions*. The author identified the role of Kant's antinomies among different types of contradictions. The presentation of G. Motta (Mainz) was dedicated to Kant's rejection of attempts at physical interpreta-

tion of metaphysical objects. D. N. Razeev (Saint Petersburg) explored Kant's *Critique of Judgement* from an epistmological perspective. He showed that Kant's *Critique of Judgement* represents one of the most important foundations of new scientific rationality, since, in this work, Kant managed to substantiate the epistmological significance of teleological judgements. Dr. S. L. Katrechko set out to identify the possible mechanisms of the genesis of a priori forms of sensitivity and reason, considered abstraction since Kant — regarded as such by empirics, which enables the transition from the empirical to more abstract content, but cannot fulfil its function in transition from experimental content to the (a priori) form, i. e. explain our possession of pure cognition that "must be entirely independent of experience... must have a far different certificate of origin to show from that of a descent from experience" — methodologically unjustified. Dr. A. O. Antonova (Saint Petersburg, SPbSU) analysed the influence of Kant's philosophical ideas on the formation of the two fundamental ideas of the 20th century mathematical thinking, namely, the notions of set and type. I. V. Chernikova (Tomsk), A. G. Kislov (Yekaterinburg, USU), V. V. Balanovsky (Kaliningrad, IKSUR), Ye. A. Krotkov and T. V. Bosova (Belgorod, BSU), K. V. Lemeshevsly (Kaliningrad, IKSUR), V. Ye. Semenov (Vladimir, VSU), V. Ottinen (Helsinki, Aleksanteri Institute), and A. I. Barkhatkov (Minsk, BSU) also participated in the workshop session.

The "Classical reason and changing rationality" workshop session opened with a presentation by Dr. A. Hahmann (Göttingen, Germany) entitled *The justification of rationality by greed — what remains of Kant's reason in constructivism?* Dr. Hahmann outlined the problem of correlation between morality and reason. While traditionally reason was considered as a foundation for morals, since the first half of the 20th century reason has served profit. An attempt to unite the reasonable principles of justice with the instrumental application of reason was undertaken by John Rawls in his work *A theory of justice.* Dr. Hahmann juxtaposed Rawls's attempt with a similar philosophical ideas of Kant. Prof. N. A. Dmitriyeva (Moscow, MSPU), in her report *Reason and life. The justification of philosophy in the late works of Natorp and the works of Russian neo-Kantians,* considered the views of P. Natorp and Russian neo-Kantians. T. G. Rumyantseva (Minsk, BSU) made a report entitled *The two projects of a "critique of reason": I. Kant and F. Nietzsche.* She compared the ideas of the two entirely different philosophers, who treated morality, religion, and freedom in quite dissimilar ways. However, they have one thing in common: both of them regard critique and the critical method as of paramount importance. Dr. G. Luise (Catania, Italy) gave a presentation entitled *Mind activity and teleology. Notes on Kant and Maréchal.* According to Dr. Luise, among the prominent 20th century itnerpretations of Kant's transcendental philosophy, one of the most remarkable is the teleological interpretation that emerged in the framework of catholic philosophical culture as a result of oppoistion between Thomism and criticism and was revised by Joseph Maréchal (1878—1944) — an eminent neo-scholastic from Leuven. Dr. Carola Häntsch (Greifswald, Germany) made a presentation on *Kant and the post-modern mind.* She considered the influence of the German classic on the further development of philosophical thought. In the presentation entitled *Rationality and practical logic,* Prof. I. N. Griftsova (Msocow, MPSU) focused on different perspectives on the correlation between logic and language. She analysed various concepts of practical logic, while informal logic, due to its certain features, was considered as an example of practical logic. The presentation also addressed certain prob-

lems of informal logic, as well as the study of non-argumentative speech acts. The presentation of Prof. G. V. Sorina and Prof. Yu. V. Yarmak dedicated to *Kant's texts in students' expert activity* focused on certain methodological aspects of the analysis of Kant's text and offered a methodology for practical classes with students of non-philosophical fields of study based on the "expert group" method developed by the authors. The result of such activity is analytical reports on the texts examined. The authors emphasised the high efficiency of the method and students' keen interest in the texts, which facilitates individual work and immersion in the analysis of a philosophical text. Prof. I. D. Koptsev (IKSUR) gave a report entitled *Inferences of understanding and reason as factors of textuality in I. Kant's philosophical discourse.* On the basis of Kant's texts, he proved that two and three-element logical-semantic structures, which Kant calls the judgements of understanding and reason, represented logical-communicative forms for the "packaging" of textual material and, thus, were forms of textuality in I. Kant's discourse. At the same time, they impart assertoric and apodictic modality to Kant's discourse. S. V. Borisov (Chelyabinsk State Pedagogical University), N. V. Zaitseva (Moscow, Russian Foreign Trade Academy), Yu. O. Orlova (Saint Petersburg, SPbSU), L. A. Dyomina, (Moscow, Mosciw State Regional Pedagogical University), O. M. Mukhtdinov (Yekaterinburg, USU) also participated in the discussion.

The "Classical reason, changing power and the modern world order" workshop session focused on the reception and contemporary significance of Kant's theory of law, politics, and state structure. Dieter Hüning (Mainz, Germany) addressed the topicality of Kant's theory of criminal law, which was deemed outdated or, at least, problematic even by Kant's contemporaries due to the permission of equal retribution and death penalty. At the same time, they neglected the fact that retribution is an appropriate response to the insoluble problems of the legal theory of intimidation that dominated in the Enlightenment period. Dr. Hüning proved the legality and provided the examples of the application of Kant's theory of criminal law as a critical measure for the assessment of (undesirable) contemporary tendencies in German justice. Dr. A. N. Salikov in his presentation titled *The influence of Kant's ideas on Hanna Arendt's political philosophy* emphasised that Arendt was mostly right to consider the teaching on judgements as the core of political philosophy, which Kant did not have time to write. However — all discussion participants agreed on that — Arendt's interpretation of Kant's aesthetics from a political perspective could be more viable if Arendt had managed to refrain from the idealisation and absolutisation of politics. Ye. S. Bezus (Yekaterinburg, Institute of Philosophy and Law) considered the power of judgement (in particular, *sensus communis*) as the foundation for coexistence in the modern world. Dr. N. V. Andreichuk in her presentation *Education as an imperative for the sustainable development of society* emphasised Kant's achievements in the development of philosophy of education and culture. Although actual reality and the 20th century philosophy proved reason to be neither the only, nor the central component, an alternative equal to the enlightenment project and capable of preserving society has not emerged yet, thus, we can do nothing but modify it. This conclusion was unanimously supported by the workshop participants. N. V. Bukovskaya (Tomsk, TSU), A. S. Zilber (IKSUR), I. O. Dementyev (IKSUR) also participated in the workshop session. A. V. Barsukova (IKSUR) focused on the influence of Kant's philosophy on the concept of European construction developed by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing — French ex-president and a practicing politician.

The "Kant's Philosophy and its perception in different cultures" workshop session was opened by Prof. V.N. Belov (Chernyshevsky Saratov State University) with a presentation *The system of V.E. Sesemann's philosophy*. Prof. Belov's principal idea is that the problem of the rational and irrational is essential to the works of the Russian philosopher. V.E. Sesemann (1884—1963) was close to the Marburg neo-Kantian school, but his adherence to neo-Kantianism and, later, phenomenology is marked by creativity and criticism. Dr. N.A. Kutsenko (Institute of Philosophy of the RAS) gave a presentation entitled *The influence of Kant's ethical teaching on the development of Russian theological thought in the first half of the 19th century*. The workshop participants were acquainted with a wide spectrum of factual material regarding the training of orthodox students — citizens of Rzeczpospolita — at Königsberg University and philosophical education at Kharkov University and Kyiv Spiritual Academy. At Kharkov University, Kant's philosophy was addressed to at the Departments of Morals and Politics and Physics and Mathematics. Kant's and, later, Fichte's philosophical ideas were well-known but differently interpreted. Dr. V.J. Povilaitis (IKSUR) made a presentation entitled *About one Russian admirer of Rickert abroad* based on N.A. Reimers's book *The aesthetic principle in history*. Nikolai A. Reimers (1894—1964) authored a number of works dedicated to topical and philosophical issues. *The aesthetic principle in history* (1931) is an attempt at an original philosophical-historical synthesis underlain by H. Rickert's philosophy of history. Prof. A.N. Kruglov (Moscow, RSUH) made a presentation entitled *Philosophical exile as a Russian tradition: the "case" of J.W.L. Mellmann* focusing on the tragic story of a teacher of philosophy, Mellmann, who was sacrificed in a conflict that involved censorship and the church. The dispute was provoked by Kant's interpretation of the idea of God. Ye Parkhomenko's (Estonia, Tartu University) presentation entitled *The heaven as a spiritual turning point in the reflection upon Tartu in February 1808 (on the perception of Kant in Estonia in the early 19th century)* was dedicated to the evolution of the philosophical ideas of Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche (1762—1842), a professor of theoretical and practical philosophy at Tartu University (1802—1838). Within history of philosophy, Jäsche is famous as a compiler and publisher of his teacher, Immanuel Kant, namely, his lectures on logic. V.I. Savintsev (IKSUR) and V.I. Cherednikov (IKSUR) also participated in the workshop session.

The "Classical reason, contemporary ethical concepts and modern religious consciousness" workshop session included thirteen presentations by scholars from Russia, Ukraine, Germany, Spain, and Southern Korea. The sitting opened with a presentation by Dr. U.F. Wodarzik (Worms, Germany) entitled *Trinary reason as Kant's testament.* The author tracked down the influence of Christianity, Platonism and neo-Platonism on Kant's philosophy and drew analogies between Kant's theoretical, practical, and religious reason and the world-human being-God triad, arriving at a conclusion that Kant's trinary structure of metaphysics was adopted by Fichte and, later, Hegel. M. Yu. Savelyeva (Centre for Humanities of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) focused on the problem of possibility to justify moral experience on the basis of Kant's ethics and postmodernist philosophical conceptions. The "ethical turn" in philosophy is a postmodernist paradigm of a foundation as the "foundation of foundations". There is no transcendental idea of foundation anymore, it is replaced by an aggregate of ideas that are proclaimed "founding" depending on the situation. M. Torrevejano (University of Valencia, Spain) gave a presentation entitled *Politics, moralising, and criticism.* She considered culture, civilization, and morals as products of rea-

son in the light of Kant's anthropological ideas. In her opinion morality can under no circumstances be reduced to civilization, i. e. solely social and political actions, it should determine human activity as a whole. I. A. Trotsak (IKSUR) analysed the critique of Kant's categorical imperative by A. Schopenhauer and proved that all three faults of Kant's ethical principles emphasised by Schopenhauer (insufficient theoretical framework, concealed theologism, and hypothetical character) were inconsistent, since they are based on an incorrect interpretation of Kant's works. M. Städtler (Univeristy of Münster, Germany) analysed to what extent Kant's ideas about religion can be applicable in the modern society. He emphasised the interconnection between the notions of reason, God and history in Kant's philosophy, arriving at a conclusion that today the transition from ideas to experience is not a philosopher's task and should be implemented in the course of historical action against the background of the unity of technical and moral-practical elements.

Prof. Choong-Jin Lee (Hansung University, Seoul, South Korea) dedicated his presentation to the perception of Kant's practical philosophy in the Confucian culture of Korea. According to his forecast, the focus of research attention of Korean scholars will be shifting from Kant's philosophy of law towards the ethics of the Königsberger. N. P. Pakhalina (IKSUR), A.M Sologubov (IKSUR), D. S. Ivanov (IKSUR), D. V. Polyansky (IKSUR), N. V. Danilkina (IKSUR), S. V. Lugovoy (IKSUR), A. A. Gorin (SPbSU) also participated in the workshop session. All in all, the session showed that Kant's philosophical ideas were still topical in the context of solving theoretical and practical problems arising in modern ethics and philosophy of religion.

The third plenary session became a natural continuation of the workshop session on the problems of Kant's theoretical heritage. The plenary session was opened by Prof. V. V. Vasiliev (MSU), who gave a presentation entitled *Kant's critique of idealism: illusions and reality* focusing on the identification of actual differences between transcendentalism and idealism on the one hand and Berkeley's "dogmatic idealism" and Descartes's "problematic idealism" on the other. V. V. Vasiliev stressed that one could answer this question through clarifying why Kant started to change and alter his views on idealism after the publication of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* In this connection, it is of importance to refrain from interpreting the later amendments as a reaction to external criticism. Having analysed different interpretations of Kant's attitude towards idealism, Prof. Vasiliev arrives at a conclusion that Kant's transcendental idealism occupies the traditional "critical" position in the middle between "dogamtic" and "sceptical" idealism. Within the particular issue of idealism, as well as in philosophy in general, criticism proves to be the middle way between dogmatism and scepticism, which, once again, emphasises the critical nature of Kant's ideas.

Strong interest of conference participants was sparked by the presentation of Prof. W. Stark from Marburg. He presented the first results of research on the origins of Kant's knowledge about Asia. Having collected the accounts of Kant's contemporaries and biographers and found textbooks and ancient maps, which the young philosopher could use, Prof. Stark attempted to reconstruct the image of world space built up in the consciousness of the future great thinker. The research of W. Stark, the director of the Kant-Archive in Marburg, is of major significance for philosophical Kant studies. For instance, it helps clarify some issues of Kant's anthropology, namely, elucidate the genesis of the philosopher's ideas

about the representatives of oriental culture, the knowledge of which was limited by Eurocentrism, which dominated geography at the time. An ample proof of this fact was provided by Prof. Stark.

The last plenary presentation, which concluded the main part of the conference, was made by Prof. Yu. M. Shilkov and entitled *Symbol and fiction*. The presentation shed light on the problem of fictional capacities of a symbol. Interest in this topic is stimulated by that the correct understanding of a symbol makes it possible to uncover the secret of human ability for creativity. Prof. Shilkov hypothesised a connection between the symbol and fiction paraphrasing Kant: symbols without fiction are void; fiction without a symbol, blind. In the development of his thought, Prof. Shilkov demonstrated that the creative mission of fiction is most vivid in its relation to reality and symbolic form. The "reality-fiction-symbol" triptych implements the function of both a carrier and a means, whose terms embody the discursive structure of fiction that mediates the relation between the symbolic form and reality.

While summing up the results of the conference, the participants came to a conclusion that the research on Kant's philosophical heritage was gaining in importance, since many problems addressed by the philosopher in the 18th century have become topical only recently. One of them, for example, is the issue of personal autonomy and freedom of thinking in the context of mass society. Thus, the fundamental development of Kant's promising ideas should continue, while the results of such research can be regularly published in the pages of *Kantovsky sbornik*. It was also proposed to schedule the next "Kant readings" to coincide with the 290th anniversary of Kant's birth (2014). In his closing address, Prof. Vladimir N. Bryushinkin expressed his gratitude to all conference participants for the high level of the 10th Kant Conference and emphasised the support in organizing the conference provided by Russian Foundation for the Basic Research, Centre for Advanced Studies and Education, Immanuel Kant State University of Russia, and the staff and graduate and undergraduate students of the Department of Philosophy.

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KANTOVSKY SBORNIK

Selected articles

2008 — 2009

Academic journal